

SEEING THE WORLD

看世界

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插图

2014.5.27

Fu Ying delivers a speech at the international forum: China and Its Neighboring Countries—Towards Common Prosperity and Development organized by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing.



2015.5.20

Fu Ying speaks at the first US-China Forum organized by the University of Chicago. Sitting next to her was Robin Niblett, Director of Chatham House (the Royal Institute of International Affairs) .



2015.7.29

Fu Ying attends the 22nd Fullerton Lecture. Walking with her is Tim Huxley, the director of International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) . The lecture was organized by IISS in Singapore.



2015.10.31

Fu Ying escorts Dr. Henry Kissinger onto the stage at the 2015 Beijing International Forum. She moderated keynote address and dialogue with Dr. Henry Kissinger at the event.



2015.11.1

Fu Ying delivers a speech at the luncheon for the Understanding China Conference in Beijing, hosted by the China Institute for Innovation & Development Strategy (CIIDS) .



2016.2.13

Fu Ying attends the panel discussion: Doubling Down? Fu Ying delivers a keynote speech at the 52nd Security Conference. Beside her was Bob Corker, Chairman of US Senate Foreign Affairs Committee.



2016.10.25

Fu Ying attends the panel discussion: World Order— quo vadis? at the 2016 Annual Meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club Sochi, Russia. Sitting to her left is Kevin Rudd, President of Asia Society Policy Institute and to her right is John Mearns, professor of political science in University of Chicago.



2017.2.1

Fu Ying attends a dialogue with young scholars at the 53rd Munich Security Conference.



2017.6.24

Fu Ying speaks at the 6th World Peace Forum in Beijing, organized by Tsinghua University.



Preface to English Version

The Chinese version of this book was released in June 2018 in Beijing, when tensions between the United States and China were already rising. A year later, as the English version of this book is completed now in June 2019, the relationship has grown more tense. It has become apparent that the US government is trying to change its policy on relations with China, which previous American administrations have followed over the past 40 years.

While the US, as a traditional superpower, has become less capable of managing the world affairs and less willing apparently, China, as an emerging power, is seen as rising with unstoppable momentum. These two developments are raising anxiety in the American strategic circle. Their concern is not only about the pace of China's rise but also the way it is rising. The US's worry is that China may turn into a rival, which will not merely surpass it but replace it as leader in the world and upend the century-old American dominance. So, to avoid that prospect, the US believes it needs to shift its strategy and pull together all its resources to meet the perceived competition from China. The US government's move to maximize pressure on China over trade and high-tech issues that we have seen in the past months is a reflection of this wave of "American Frost."

In my recent discussions with visiting American academics and former politicians, I sensed common pessimism. Most of them worried that the bilateral relations would deteriorate further. However, they also showed interest in finding a way out and explore a "New Paradigm." Meanwhile, Chinese scholars are also seeing the changes in the US's attitude and are

concerned that the relationship would undergo fundamental shift should the two sides fail to act quickly to stop the downside fall.

What will the future hold for China-US relations? As the US's policy adjustments become more entrenched, the sentiments for competition and confrontation are rising.

Reflecting on the current trend, we can imagine three possible scenarios: The first is the most optimistic, in which the two countries enter into a new stage of relationship characterized by competition and cooperation, dubbed as "coopetition." Here elements of competition and cooperation form a dynamic and yet controllable equilibrium.

The second scenario is an all-round confrontation, where the fundamental goals and strategies of the two countries oppose each other. As the "decoupling" spills over from science and technology to trade and economy, and beyond, it will eventually escalate into a collision between the two different systems and orders.

The third scenario is "drifting." This characterizes the current situation, where the US is trying to destroy the cornerstones of the relationship, and China is making efforts to maintain them. While the existing framework of the relationship is being dismantled, a new framework has not yet emerged, and neither side has demonstrated a clear and concrete path for the future of the relationship.

The pressing question for China is how to evaluate the US's strategic change, and how to accelerate changes in thinking and policy direction, before mobilizing resources to respond. The future depends not only on America's decision and behavior but also on how China respond and make its choice. Based on its fundamental foreign policy principles, China would

want the relationship to become one of effective cooperation. Even if sometimes competition is inevitable, it should be benign and kept under control. However, given the uncertainty, China must also prepare for the possibility of wider confrontation.

At this moment, as the international community is debating how to understand and engage with China, perhaps now is a good time to publish the English edition of *Seeing the World*.

China has made consistent efforts over the past 40 years and has tried hard to integrate itself into the global system, through reform and opening up, and has achieved remarkable progress. Nonetheless, the gap in understanding between China and the Western world has never disappeared. In this new environment, where building trust is even more important in order to form a new kind of relationship, this gap is posing a greater obstacle. Such a gap is, to a large extent, due to the hegemonic mentality of some people who have a deep-rooted prejudice against China's political and social system. It also illustrates the importance for the Chinese to gain the world's understanding and acceptance, which will be next to impossible to achieve without our unremitting perseverance in engagement.

The fact that China-US relations have become bumpy does not mean we should close the door again and abandon our efforts to deepen reform and continue opening up. As President Xi Jinping vividly described, "We have had our fair share of choking in the water and encountered whirlpools and choppy waves, but in the process we have learned how to swim."^① As China becomes more prominent on the world stage, it is also taking greater responsibilities; which inevitably results in encountering bigger waves and storms, so to speak. But we take these opportunities to learn and improve our understanding when engaging with the world.

The recent pressure from the US and many of its steps to “decouple” with China are alarming. However, our policy and determination to maintain peace and eventually build a community with a shared future for mankind should remain unchanged. For us, the “world power struggle” and “clashes of civilizations” are stories of the past and in contemporary international politics, the power of reason should prevail. As President Xi emphasized that, the goal of China's development is to benefit its more than 1.3 billion people; and that China has no intention to seek hegemony or challenge the existing international order and rules. 注 We trust that in the face of reasoning and facts, irrational argument, even the most forceful, would look weak. What is important is how we can consistently prove ourselves by providing timely and convincing information, although it may take time to make a difference.

The current “drifting” of the China-US relationship is dangerous and should not be allowed to go on for too long. Generally, “drifting” in game theory entails open prospects, which allows the postponement of difficult choices about the future direction. But the risk is that it may also allow a faster breakdown of the relationship due to misunderstanding and misjudgment. Visionaries from both countries should actively seek to communicate and explore the “New Paradigm”. At the moment, it is inevitable that we see a mixture of dialogue and debate, along with conflict and cooperation, but we also see the use of risk management, as essential. Hopefully, a relatively balanced China-US relationship can be cultivated through a period of dedicated interactions. Meanwhile, the other countries are expecting China and the US to find the right way to solve their differences as this will have a major impact on the future of the world.

Given the progress of the world over the decades, there is reason for us to be optimistic about the future. In the meantime, we Chinese need to

remain calm, be clear about why others have differing views. And we should try to understand the wide issues impacting the world. In the face of the great changes, we must withstand the pressures and seize the opportunities to improve China's relations with the rest of the world, while building our capabilities in world affairs. As far as the current difficulties are concerned, they may give us a hard time, yet they will also help us forge consensus at home, and the opportunities and challenges will work to turn China into a more mature and capable participant in world affairs.

With this book, I wish to share my hopes and beliefs with the readers. In the months and years to come, members of Chinese think tanks and academia need to continue keeping an open mind and persevere in communications with people both at home and abroad.

May mankind prosper in peace and in a community with a shared future.



21 June 2019

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1. This is from the keynote speech entitled "Sharing the Responsibility of the Times and Promoting Global Development" delivered by President Xi Jinping at the opening ceremony of the 2017 annual meeting of the World Economic Forum. http://www.xinhuanet.com//fortune/2017-01/18/c_1120331545.htm
 2. President Xi Jinping made the remarks during his meeting with US President's National Security Assistant Rice in the Great Hall of the People on July 25, 2016. <https://3g.china.com/act/military/11065468/20160726/23149056.html>

Preface to Chinese Version

This book *Seeing the World* is the second collection of my works, which includes speeches and articles published in foreign newspapers, magazines and online media in the period from 2015 to 2017. I am grateful to the CITIC Press for collecting these articles and recommending their publication in both Chinese and English. The book contains 40 articles, which have been divided into nine chapters including: World order, global changes and China's role, China-US relations, China-Russia relations and Asian issues.

These articles reveal the development of my thinking and ideas over time. I was a little uneasy about sharing them in this way as they were written on different occasions, often under the constraints of time and space. Some of the views could have been expressed in a more systematic and comprehensive way. The question of international order, for example, repeatedly appears in different articles. Some articles are transcribed in the original conversational style. However, I have finally decided to present them in their original form, with the hope to take the readers through the corridor of time and share what I experienced over the years of the debates going on about China.

This collection reflects how I and many of us in China look at the world and respond to some of the questions asked about China. Many views expressed in the book were also part of the academic discussions and debates. Over the years, I was fortunate to be able to improve my views by learning from advice as well as criticism. This has been a rewarding

journey, which has enabled me to probe under the surface and pull together the academic wisdom.

In December 2017, I attended three forums in Europe and the discussions focused on two concerns: Will the United States further shrink its international role and investment? In other words, what would the world look like without American “leadership”? Second, who would fill the “vacuum” and will it be China? People turn to China and want to know what China can do for the world. As it is growing into a world power, China needs to communicate better with the world and offer clear explanations on such questions as: Who are we? Where are we from? Where are we heading? What kind of world power do we want to be?

In his report at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 2017, Xi Jinping, general secretary of the CPC Central Committee, explained that China’s foreign policy objective is to foster a new type of international relations and build a community with a shared future for mankind. He said that the dream of the Chinese people is very similar to the dreams of the peoples of other countries; the Chinese Dream can be realized only in a peaceful international environment, and with a stable international order. China will stay firm on the path of peaceful development, and will continue its efforts to safeguard world peace, contribute to global development, and uphold international order.

China is changing the world as it develops itself. It is important for us to be able to convince the world of our purposes and objectives. There will be difficulties and obstacles and many of China’s ideas and propositions need to be repeatedly explained in order to gain understanding and trust. If we remain distant, we will only prolong the misunderstandings.

Publishing this collection is a tribute to my colleagues who have worked hard to explore the way forward. I also hope that this will help open up more substantive global dialogues.

I wish to express my heartfelt gratitude to the academics and my assistants who have helped me over the years. I must also thank the translators and editors for their meticulous work which made this publication possible.



15 January 2018

World Order

2014: A Turning Point in the World Order

Twenty fourteen marks the 100th anniversary of the outbreak of World War One and internationally the issue of war and peace is again a growingly hot topic. There is increasing worry that tensions and conflicts might occur in Asia. The main concern is about China, as some researchers compare it to Germany before World War One, as it shares the same kind of rapid economic growth, rising nationalism and fast expansion of defense capabilities. Whether China will embark on the road of regional expansionism became a focus of concern and was widely debated at the Shangri-La Security Forum in Singapore in May 2014.

However, what transpired in 2014 was quite different from what had been anticipated. In October, along with some Chinese academics, I visited seven US think tanks. At the time American academics were mainly concerned with four thorny issues. The first one was the Ebola epidemic, which was causing near social panic in American society, and people were worried that the country had insufficient means to deal with the imported infectious disease. The second was the so called Islamic State (ISIS), a well-organized extremist and terrorist force, with clear objectives and brutal means. It has even attracted volunteers from among the western educated young elite. This was particularly challenging at a time when the US had lost interest and the capacity to send massive troops abroad. The third was the Ukraine crisis. A fierce struggle erupted, with the US and Europe on one side and Russia on the other. With simmering political resentment on the issues, some even warned of the danger of a new Cold War. The fourth

is the slow recovery of the global economy and the prospect of American economic recovery was still not very clear.

Toward the end of 2014, as academics studying international relations in the US and other countries review the concerns they had about China and Asia at the beginning of the year, they might realize the urgency they had placed on those issues was overshadowed by the above-mentioned global concerns. In particular, the continuous decline of the oil price, which went beyond all expectations and proved yet again the unpredictability we see across the world currently. So, the international community's expectations of China's role and its willingness to work with China is getting stronger, although the US has not eased its concerns and suspicion over China.

From the perspective of the global order, 2014 looked like a turning point for the world. What happened in 2014 and how people look at it may indicate that the existing world governance is failing. In discussing the international problems faced this year, American scholars have often shown a sense of helplessness and have seen most of the problems as having no resolution. Indeed, the existing world order continues to fall short of dealing with newly emerging problems and phenomena. The current toolbox is no longer adequate. Both the need and the impetus for reforming the international order is growing. This may indicate that the post-Cold War era is coming to an end, enabling a new era to start.

During the 100 years since World War One, the world has undergone many changes. The Paris Peace Conference that followed the end of World War One failed to establish an international system that was strong enough to support a fair and lasting peace. The postWorld War One Yalta structure is essentially based on the division of spheres of influence by the major

powers and is essentially an extension of the Westphalian system. The subsequent rivalry between the Soviet Union and the US plunged the world into the Cold War that lasted more than 40 years. However, despite the fierce competition and confrontation, the relative balance between these two major powers kept the world generally in peace. A series of institutions for international governance, including the United Nations, established after World War One are maturing and continue to play their roles in the post-Cold War era and during the economic globalization.

Now the world has moved to a new stage. Many developing countries, including China, have achieved rapid economic growth, and their share in the global power structure is gradually increasing. At the same time, pushed by globalization, we are witnessing the wider spread of information and multi-polarization, and the flow of personnel and economic activities across borders has never been so extensive and active. This, in turn, is bringing more complex and multidimensional challenges. The traditional methods of understanding and behavior need to be adjusted. Although many events and issues are due to specific reasons and causes, emergencies or necessities, they all boil down to the fact that the current international mechanisms for management and governance are not meeting the requirements of the new situation. Sometimes, misjudgment, mishandling and overreaction to problems by the world's major countries have exacerbated these problems or made them more complex. For example, the spread of terrorism and the expansion of the Ebola epidemic could all have been controlled better, if they had been handled properly in their initial stages.

Why is this happening in the world? From the perspective of the world order, we may need to examine the following factors.

Firstly, the American factor. After the end of the Cold War, the US dominated world affairs. So, to a large extent, the US should be held responsible for some of the international disorder that has emerged. The moral standing of the US has been shaken, especially after the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Furthermore, American diplomatic policy-making became less effective, and political contention between the two parties added cost to the decision-making process. They became less sensitive and slower in judging the world's reaction. Most importantly, the US made a major mistake in judging the trend of the post-Cold War era. It appeared to be trapped for too long in Cold War thinking and continued to try to maintain hegemony through its military. The US has tried to promote its own political ideas and values around the world, with the aim of controlling it, to serve its own interests. If 2014 is a turning point in the world order, the most important sign would be that the American way was not working well.

Secondly, the factors relating to the emerging countries, which includes China. China became the second largest economy in the world in 2010. Measured by the market exchange rate, emerging economies are now accounting for 50% of the world's gross domestic product (GDP). However, the traditional powers including the US, although showing fatigue in international governance, are not ready to make room for the emerging economies. These economies are also not mature enough to take the lead. They are mostly developing countries and are finding it hard to agree with some of the western practices and concepts. They may therefore lack the willingness to fill the gaps in international governance. So, it seems, there is a long way to go before the world reaches consensus on how to transform and adjust the international order.

Thirdly, factors relating to other intermediate forces. Powers like the EU, Japan and Russia, are positioned between the traditional and the

emerging forces. They have a good foundation of industrialization and have both the interest and experience in dealing with international affairs. However, in this turbulent period, many of them are confronted with their own difficulties and are unable to spare any more effort on international affairs. The other forces also focus on specific matters and take a matter-of-fact attitude toward international affairs. This means that the world has yet to see the real rising of the third forces.

This could be a period of chaos and a time of high risk, as small issues handled improperly will turn into big ones. This is also a period when peace and stability is particularly important for China. In 2020, it wants to achieve its first centennial goal of development for the Chinese nation's great rejuvenation. Therefore, the positive trend of the international situation over the next five years and the overall relationship between China and the rest of the world are essential to China's successful development.

What will happen to the US in the future? There may be two possibilities. One is that it will maintain a strong momentum of economic recovery. Following a short period of patient management, the US will restore its national strength, re-tighten its partnership with Europe, Japan and its other strategic partners and rebuild its global prestige and credibility. If other countries fail to make adjustments or make mistakes, the US may be able to regain its control over world affairs. The US hegemony is spreading over both the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans. During the Cold War, its focus was on its Atlantic relationships. In the post-Cold War era, it shifted to the Middle East. Presently, given the rising importance of Asia, the US has paid more attention to the Pacific Ocean. The future status of the US international influence depends on the extent to which its comprehensive strength can recover; this may require more cooperation

with China and the rest of the world. It will also be impacted by the growth of China and other emerging powers.

The second possibility is the US weakens further and becomes one of the many major powers. The current economic recovery in the United States is not solid enough, and the fall in oil prices is a double-edged sword. The overall recovery of the global economy is also critical to the US. Another important point is the negative impact on its image caused by its double standards in international affairs and by putting its own interest above those of others. This does not accord with the general trend of world peace and development. If the US cannot make adjustments, it will be hard for it to win widespread international support.

Considering the current world positions of the United States and China, how they perceive each other will determine the world's direction. The traditional form of power equilibrium may no longer match the needs of the 21st century's complex international environment. President Xi Jinping and President Obama have discussed on a number of occasions the need to build a new model of major country relations between China and the US. This is a forward-looking approach with a strategic vision. However, to turn it into more solid steps, it requires the two countries to have further dialogues and greater cooperation.

How the other forces progress is also important. The structural reform in Europe is a long trek and the good old days may not come back even if the difficult times are over. Russia is in a worse situation and has suffered significant damage. As for Japan, its growth continues to stagnate. But these powers may constitute the third forces at some stage. Which direction they would go, and which moral force can attract them will also be key factors that will affect the international structure. These powers when working their

way out of difficulties will also form new types of inter-dependency or cooperative relationship with the other powers.

China's international performance in 2014 was extraordinary, and it represented a turning point for China as well as in the world's perception of it. As President Xi Jinping stated, China, as a major country, needs to conduct diplomacy with Chinese characteristics. In 2014, "proactive" is the best word to describe China's international performances. Relying on the advantages it possesses, China proposed a series of regional and international cooperation initiatives and diplomatic concepts, among which the most significant are the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, often referred to as the Belt and Road Initiative. At the same time, cooperation between China and Central and East European Countries (16+1) has also accelerated. When the Ebola epidemic hit many countries in the world, China was among the first to offer help, providing manpower and probably the largest amount of funding. By doing so, China has demonstrated its willingness and ability to bear the weight of international responsibilities. As its economy grows, it will also be expected to become more involved in both regional and global affairs.

The challenges faced by China are also unprecedented. China has no historical experience of being a global power operating on the world stage. So Chinese people need to gain more experience in world affairs, and are still in a learning stage and are trying to adapt to their new status. And yet, Chinese people are already having to face complex and difficult international situations. China participated in the creation of the international order and is a beneficiary and also one of its reformers. China joined other countries in reforming the world economic and financial order, by building consensus to make progress. But in the political and security fields, there are still profound differences between China and some other

major countries. Does China have a blueprint for the future world order? How is China going to take part in addressing the major international issues, and what feasible propositions has it for developing new orders that meet the common interests of the international community? These are questions we should consider seriously.

In this crucial period of turbulence and change, China needs to encourage think tanks to work on suggestions and ideas regarding the international community's concerns and questions, including, "how will China use its power in the future." Chinese think tanks should offer their own opinions. China needs to review its international role, and adopt a new, more open, and cool-headed diplomatic approach.

Being an emerging power, can we maintain modesty, self-examination and pressure awareness? As a matter of fact, China's dependence on the rest of the world is no less than the world's dependence on China.

In other words can we Chinese, develop the international vision and cultivate the spirit of internationalism? To become a major country in the world, it is necessary for China to gradually pool interests with a wider international community. Overall global growth will only benefit from China's growth. For a growing major country, it should always keep the common interests in mind, and sometimes can also build common interests in pursuing its own interests. In this way, there will be less resistance in working toward its own goals. Sometimes when there is a conflict between national expectations and common interests, providing for the common good may bring you more benefits than fighting for your own interests at the cost of common interests.

Moreover, a major country needs to be aware of the possible internal and external repercussions and reactions to its words and action. When a

major country or an emerging power talks or acts, its significance will not go unnoticed at the international level. Therefore, being a major country, China, while caring for its own needs, should also be sensitive to the international community's views. When China presents new proposals and initiatives to the world, it needs to have thoroughly factored in the probable thoughts and concerns of the other countries by ensuring that greater emphasis is placed on cooperation and common interests. It is important that China grows its soft power of persuasion, which is needed in order to win more understanding and support across the world.

As the need to develop “new think tanks with Chinese characteristics” is given greater importance at the national level, it now is a good time for Chinese think tanks to improve. A think tank's task is to first serve the needs of the policy making; second to communicate the policies nationally and internationally. In China, we need to pay particular attention to helping think tanks in the fields of international politics and diplomacy. This could include encouraging smoother communication between the decision-making agencies and the think tanks through improved platforms. It is also necessary for Chinese think tanks and academics to continually improve at both the ideological and political levels. In shouldering these greater responsibilities and using their deeper understanding, they will be more successful in helping the rest of the world understand China's policies and systems. Their deeper understanding will also provide invaluable support for China's future participation in regional and world affairs.

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1. Speech given at a workshop of Contemporary International Relations on January 8, 2015. The full text appeared in the first issue of Contemporary International Relations in 2015, published by the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR).

Debating 21st Century Order

Introduction

Driven by globalization, emerging countries have been rapidly rising. But will this lead to changes in the world order or international order in the 21st century?

China became the second largest economy in 2010. It is a socialist country with a huge population, unique history and culture, and it is going through a profound transformation.

I am often asked “What does China want from the world? What can China offer the world? And is China going to challenge the current world order that is dominated by the United States?”

For us in China, where food stamps were still printed up till 1993, these questions came too early. The young people born in China during the 1980s and 1990s are the first generation who have not suffered from hunger growing up. True, China’s economic standing is rising, but for the Chinese, what matters more is the per capita GDP as it determines their living standards.

That said, the Chinese people are not all indifferent to what happens in the world. The experience of the colonial era has left a deep impression on our outlook on international relations and order, and we prefer the kind of world order that is based on inclusiveness and fairness. As China’s

international standing rises, there are lively discussions across the country involving both the public and the scholars on these issues.

In China, we say “chip in with a piece of brick in order for the jade to follow” to encourage more comments. With this purpose in mind, I now share some views starting with an observation on the current US-led world order, and I will also talk about China’s experience in the international order and then make a comparative analysis. Finally, I will comment on the challenges.

First, let’s look at the world order led by the United States

Dr. Henry Kissinger’s book *World Order* gave a thorough overview. My take is that he strongly believes in the Westphalian system, but accepts that it needs to be modernized.

The Westphalian system eased the anarchy among European nation states, providing a framework for rules and mechanisms that underpin modern international relations. But from the very beginning, it was designed as a Western order instead of a universally applicable principle. For many of the colonized countries, one of its inherent flaws is that it is seen as an exclusive political and military club, and across other parts of the world, differing ideas of order existed.

It took the US about a century to rise and establish its leadership position in the Western world order. After the end of the Cold War, the US tried to spread this order quickly to the rest of the world. In November 1990, US President George H.W. Bush used the term “new world order” to declare the new framework for America’s global strategy, while emphasizing the “irreplaceable” leadership of the United States. This “new

world order” has three components. First, it takes “the Western value” system as its high moral position. Second, the American military alliance system is its security backbone. Third, the American-formulated economic and financial structure is used as the foundation of the world economy. According to the American idea of world order, the UN system is meant to reflect and follow through on the principles and terms of the US-led order.

Admittedly, this order has facilitated world progress. Especially since the Cold War, economic globalization has enabled capital, markets, technology and production to disseminate widely and reach all corners of the world. This has allowed many developing countries that had long been sidelined to capture development opportunities. China, with a huge population and widespread poverty, has grasped this opportunity and achieved significant development. Two months ago, I visited India and heard much talk about how to attract investment and be creative. It is expected that another big country is also trying to take off economically.

However, this order system is also facing challenges on all three fronts. In the political sphere, the promotion of Western values into other parts of the world has failed to achieve its original aim. In security, it is essentially still about bloc politics, and in Asia-Pacific, for example, the US seems to take greater care to the security interests of its allies, and does not hesitate even when there would be cost for other countries like China. The financial crisis of 2008 also exposed flaws in global economic governance.

What is more worrying is that as many new issues have arisen, it has been unable to provide satisfactory solutions. As more and more non-traditional and cross-border security threats are dominating the world agenda, the US’s leadership has also fallen short, due to its domestic or international constraints.

During my recent visit to the United States, I observed that many think tanks are engaged in a debate about who is the new strategic target and how to cope with the impact of China's rise.

Dr. Kissinger told me that what he was concerned the most was, how much longer the US could maintain the current order, and how much time the US has to design a new order. He believed that China and the US need to work together, but he also said that this would not be without challenges.

Obviously, a major test for the United States as the strongest of today's powers will be whether it is able to adjust and work with, instead of against, the new-comers on the world stage to maintain the current world order.

China's experience with the international order

I am using the term "international order" instead of "world order," because they are not entirely the same.

The international order China supports and identifies with is the UN framework and its associated international institutions, which were built in the wake of World War Two. It was built to maintain world peace and security and has widely recognized legitimacy as it provides principles and norms for fair and equal relations among countries.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated at the fourth World Peace Forum held in Beijing in June 2015, "China was directly involved in designing and building the international order and system with the United Nations as their centerpiece." And China will always remain a participant, facilitator and contributor to this international order.

In China's long history of the feudal kingdoms, it maintained a stable but limited relationship with the outside world. It developed its own understanding and concept of "the world under heaven", albeit constrained by its geographical knowledge. In the 19th century, Western gunboat diplomacy forced open China's door, totally upsetting China's view of the world. But it also started China's integration into the Western dominated "modern world". This process has not been without pain, hardship and setbacks.

In 1971, the People's Republic of China returned to the United Nations and started to embrace the international rules and norms based on the UN Charter. The then Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping, when speaking at the UN General Assembly in April 1974, explained China's view of the modern international order and the importance of developing countries gaining political independence. He also highlighted the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; non-aggression; noninterference in internal affairs; peaceful coexistence; and equality and mutual benefit)

These have been China's consistent policies over the past 40 years. In the report presented to the 18th National Congress of the CPC, China made a call to turn the international order and international system more just and equitable. In April 2015, at the Asian-African Summit held in Indonesia, which marked the 60th anniversary of the Bandung Conference, Chinese President Xi Jinping, stressed the importance of promoting a more just and equitable international order and system. He also reiterated that China is committed to developing friendship and cooperation with all countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.

China has now grown into an active member of the UN agencies and other international institutions, and the biggest contributor of UN peacekeepers among the permanent members of the Security Council. So, China has chosen to integrate itself into the international order and indeed has greatly benefited from being part of the international society. While emphasizing the principles of fairness, justice, openness and equality, China also supports incremental reforms needed for the order to adapt to the new realities.

China, together with other emerging countries and members of the international community, has actively promoted such efforts as the G20, RCEP, BRICS, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Belt and Road Initiative. We stand for enhancing and deepening the current international system centered on the UN, by improving its efficiency, extending its reach and widening its representation in order to bring about a healthier and more equitable global market and an environment that is conducive to development. The fact that the AIIB got support from more than 50 countries speaks volumes.

On international security cooperation, China stands for common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security. We hope that the world will avoid returning to power politics and power fights. Instead of the exclusive security model, we hope that the region and the world will move toward the more comprehensive and cooperative security that is being promoted at the ASEAN Regional Forum, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia.

A comparative analysis

Apparently, what is concerning the US is that sooner or later, China will challenge it as the world power, and its dominance over international affairs. As we see it, what the US wants is paradoxical. It, on the one hand, wants to continue leading the world order and govern the world's affairs, while on the other hand is reluctant to change even part of the exclusive nature of its system.

To China, “power fighting” belongs to the 2th century. China, as I explained earlier, developed through its own history and traditions which are different from those of the West. So it does not believe in the logic of power politics. China has, however, grown a strong belief in the international order and remains an enthusiastic supporter of its principles and purposes.

This is why the Chinese often feel perplexed when the US talks about China challenging the existing order and US leadership, as the US and China seem to be having a dialogue of the deaf.

That said, I do not think China and the US are at loggerheads about how the order should evolve. Rather, they share many similar views for the future: Pursuing world peace, prosperity, and the hope of strengthening and improving the UN system. The two countries also have a similar stance on nuclear non-proliferation, as well as on the need to manage crises and avoid conflicts among major countries. Even on some important political issues, both countries have made it clear that they do not have a grand strategy to undermine each other. This can be seen by the US's insistence that it has no intention to contain or blockade China.

So, both sides agree that there is the need to reform the international order to match the new realities. The question is: Are we going to work in

the same direction?

An inclusive global order for the 21st century

The 20th century saw two world wars, which brought huge suffering for mankind. Then, in less than two years, following the end of World War Two, the US and the former Soviet Union—wartime allies—slid into a 40-year Cold War that threw the world into block politics.

Professor Nicholas Boyle theorized that the character of a century becomes very apparent in its second decade. Over the past five centuries, the major event that changed the course of the century tended to happen in the second decade; like the Thirty Years War in the 17th century (1618–1648), the Napoleonic wars in the 19th century (1803–1815) and World War One in the 20th century (1914–1918). Each re-balancing of world power was achieved through conflict or war.

Now that we are in the second decade of the 21st century, are we able to break this historical pattern and blaze a new model of major country relations?

Dr. Kissinger ends his book on the world order with a question. “Where do we go from here?” he said, “A reconstruction of the international system is the ultimate challenge to statesmanship in our time.” He also writes that in the modern world there is a need for “a global world order”, and the leaders of leading countries need to rise above the urgency of day-to-day events and think about the bigger issues, and their impact on the future world order.

Indeed, driven by globalization, the world has become flat, and countries are more interconnected. But when it comes to the question of order, different perspectives exist, and not just between China and the US. Opposing beliefs also exist in other parts of the world, like the Russian–US disagreement on Ukraine, and ISIS’s claims to be restoring an Islamic Caliphate.

Perhaps, at some stage, the international community can think about a bigger and more inclusive framework of global order. We could compare such a framework to an umbrella, where each and every member of the international community has a place and a say. Chinese President Xi Jinping himself has talked on many occasions about a community of shared interests and a community of shared future.

Naturally, for such discussions to reach an agreement will take a long process. But what is important as we move forward through the 21st century, is that we should think beyond the old concept of power politics. And instead of getting entangled in power distribution, countries need to be focusing on development and finding solutions to our common challenges, not just traditional ones, but also the more complex and challenging new frontiers we are facing. We need creative new approaches to meet these new challenges, which involve in sovereign boundaries and require creative and united responses.

China and the US are at the center of these changes. But we cannot successfully move forward if the two countries continue to take mutually exclusive measures politically, economically or securitywise. They need to be aware of the risks and avoid inflaming situations and finger pointing. They should give stronger support to the UN and ASEAN as they help to shape consensus.

Be it order or system, at the end of the day, it is about communication and understanding among peoples. Therefore, countries need to engage in multi-level exchanges. China, as an emerging country, needs to learn how to improve the way it conveys its policies and strategic intentions, both regionally and globally to ensure greater understanding and support.

So, here in the 21st century, let us hope that the mistakes that led to conflicts in the 20th century will not be repeated, and let us work together to ensure that this will truly be a century of peace, prosperity and without major wars.

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1. Speech at the 22nd International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Fullerton Lecture on 29 July 2015. The full text of this speech can be found on the websites of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC and of the China-United States Exchange Foundation.

Under a Common Roof: China's View of the Global Order^注

Debates are going on, on both sides of the Pacific, about the future world order.

For the US, the core issue is how to maintain its world dominance. Due to its natural fear of a power transition as a traditional power, the US is deeply concerned about whether it can remain strong and if the newly rising powers will compete against it for world dominance. Some scholars suggest that the US may need a new grand strategy.

In China, this debate is more about how to improve the international order and global governance. After more than three decades of fast growth, the country is experiencing unprecedented changes in its international surroundings. The world is again at the threshold of changes which are involved in physical and spiritual aspect. The impact is felt at global, regional and country levels and at times is unpredictable. Many in China have realized that the country is one of the driving forces for global change and is having a growing influence on international affairs.

The Chinese public is keen to learn and develop an international vision. When American President Barack Obama said “If we don’t make rules, the Chinese will”, amazingly, this remark prompted the Chinese to find out what the rules are, how they affect us and what we should do. Many Chinese scholars are also studying and working on the theoretical basis for the future order.

The US, on the one hand, is full of doubt about China's intentions as a newly rising large economy. It is deeply worried that China may challenge its leadership and create a new set of rules and a different world order. While China, on the other, has repeatedly stated that as a member of the international order, it has adhered to the rules and benefited from them. It has neither the intention nor ability to overturn the existing order system. China and the US appear to be talking at cross purposes on this issue. So, are they talking about the same thing? Are the world order the US claims to lead and the international order China identifies itself with the same order system?

The answer is both "Yes" and "No". The general understanding is that the US-led world order is a global hegemonic power system, which not only includes existing international trade and monetary institutions but are also underpinned by American values and its global military alignments. The Western countries are its main allies and beneficiaries. We have to give credit to this order system for its role in keeping peace and bringing prosperity to many parts of the world after World War Two, as well as in empowering globalization.

But this order system is not all inclusive and is increasingly showing signs of limitations in a world full of new challenges. This exclusiveness is also undermining the legitimacy of the US leadership. Take China, for example, the US regards China as a newly rising power and wants China to accept its leadership and act as a subordinate partner. But at the same time, it treats China politically as an alien and militarily as a potential target, as some of its allies in the Asia Pacific are inclined to regard China as a source of security threats.

It needs to be noted that, when discussing this issue, the term China uses is international order or international system. What China is referring to is the international institutions within the UN structure, to which China has a sense of belonging as an equal member, who was one of its important initiators and remains a contributor. Chinese President Xi Jinping, when visiting the US in September 2015, expressed his views at the United Nations General Assembly. He said China would remain a staunch defender of the international order and will continue to uphold the international order and the system underpinned by the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. Indeed, what China offers to the international community, be it in the economic or security fields, mostly revolves around the UN system and are under the auspices of the UN.

Obviously, both orders are valid, and there is a big overlap between the so-called world order and international order. The US is the original designer and main supporter of the UN system and considers it as an indispensable body for international coordination. However, when the US finds itself unable to control it, it has been known to just bypass it. As for China, it has achieved leap-frog growth within the existing international order, and its future opportunities for development come from within it. It also offers China the platform for playing a greater international role. So China has every reason to continue supporting and participating in the international order and system.

However, we have to admit that the current world order and the international order are no longer able to cope with the complicated challenges facing mankind. If we look at Syria, we see a country suffering from a variety of turbulent influences, ranging from religious extremism, terrorism and humanitarian crisis, to external interference, civil war and

potential regime changes. It is clear that there can be no single solution to this type of difficult crisis.

The United Nations, which has just passed its 70th anniversary, has played an irreplaceable role in maintaining peace and promoting development. However, it is unable to overcome the structural flaws which came with its birth. Nowadays, the UN finds itself increasingly unable to meet the global challenges the world faces. When the international financial crisis broke out in 2008, the UN and its institutions provided little in terms of early warning, nor did it play a significant role in countering the crisis. On the issue of climate change, the UN has not been very effective in bringing the Kyoto protocol to fruition.

The international system and governance are in need of reform, and the Chinese people want to be with others, at the forefront of the reform efforts. But, reforming does not mean discarding everything or a complete replacement. What is needed are improvements, updates and reshaping as necessary.

Earlier in the month, the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee invited Professor Qin Yaqing, Principal of the Foreign Affairs University, to give a lecture on global governance. After the lecture, President Xi Jinping said, “The global governance reform is at a turning point, and reform and changes are inevitable.” “Global affairs increasingly need to be addressed by the countries concerned and through working together,” He also reminded the Chinese people that, “We should be aware of not only our own needs for the world but also the international community’s expectations of China.” China is already consciously making moves to participate in the reshaping and enriching of the current international institutions. For example, China is facilitating structural

reformation in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). China has also offered, together with other countries, such initiatives as the Belt and Road, the AIIB, and the BRICS Development Bank. The 2014 Ebola pandemic which first broke out in West Africa overstretched the international health organizations. China was the first to send medical teams along with financial support, which played an essential role in the international efforts to fight the crisis.

President Xi Jinping announced a series of assistance programs from the Chinese government. These included committing \$ 1 billion to a ten-year joint China-UN Peace and Development Fund, and pledging 8,000 troops to a United Nations peacekeeping standby force. China will also provide \$ 100 million in military assistance for African Union peacekeeping missions over the next five years.

In 2016, China will host the G20 Summit. This is the first time China will host this important global macro-economic policy forum, which will be a good opportunity for creative and constructive improvements in global governance.

It can be expected that China will, as it maintains its own growth, undertake further international responsibilities.

So, what kind of order do we want the world to have in the future? Instead of debating which order concept is better and should succeed, we should go beyond this debate and create a new overarching concept, a global order. Its global governance should be wide ranging and include world power coordination, regional cooperation and North-South dialogue. Everything that is needed in this multifaceted times can be included, with every country and region's concerns and interests accommodated, by providing a common roof for all.

This common roof of global order should comprise of three major institutional capabilities: to guarantee world peace; to ensure sustainable global development, and to ensure that all problems are resolved through cooperation. In this framework, countries should nurture the habit of cooperation and act by the rules while allowing the major country coordination and the multilateral frameworks also playing an active role. President Xi Jinping has mentioned many times the two concepts of the community of common interests, and the community of shared future when he emphasizes the objectives of win-win cooperation and common development. So under this common roof, the world should become a global community of common interest heading towards a shared future.

The future shape of the global order will undoubtedly be significantly influenced by the US as the leader of the existing world order. The challenge for the US will be huge, as it will have to rethink its strategy. The big question is whether it can break its fixed thinking and behavior set and grow out of its narrow group interests, and avoid being hijacked by the perceived moral worth, or the interest of its allies.

For China, as the largest developing country and a relative newcomer to the world stage, the challenge may be bigger. China lacks experience at the international stage. It needs to expand its international vision, but more especially the general public needs to widen their horizons. We should not only look after our own interests but also look beyond and think about wider issues and interests considerately. Although this will take time, the Chinese people need to grow out of the sense of being victims of history and become true world citizens.

The success of the future global order depends very much on whether China and the US can have a sincere dialogue on cooperation. Currently, the

two countries have extensive cooperation but also suffer from conflicting interests and competition. The world benefits from China-US cooperation, but any conflict, if not properly managed, may bring risk to the wider community.

Now, as “danger” looms in the South China Sea, the US regards China’s behavior of safeguarding its territorial and maritime interests as strategically expansionism aimed at controlling the whole region, and is therefore trying to counter it. China regards the sending of US military vessels close to the Chinese islands as provocative gestures. This tit-for-tat rhetoric and behavior is caused through misunderstandings and is only pouring oil on the flames in a region that is already troubled by conflicting territorial and maritime claims. But maybe, in another way, this is also a way of sending stronger signals that we need greater coordination and there is a need to improve understanding and trust. The fact that our two militaries are meeting and talking gives us hope that the two countries may find a better way to resolve our differences.

It is not possible to predict the world’s future, or whether a global order can be shaped. But by countries talking to each other, I am hopeful that the international community can find consensus on a structure that will ensure that the 21st century can truly be one of peace and prosperity. More than 30 years ago, when China started its unprecedented reform, Deng Xiaoping used the metaphor, “crossing the river by feeling for the stones”. Now we may need a similar approach when shaping a new global order.

China needs to learn, and learn fast, as it gains experience from participating in international governance. China also needs to help the world to better read and understand China, as this will be crucial for our effective participation in international cooperation.

1. Speech at the luncheon of an international conference under the theme of “Understanding China”, hosted by the China Institute for Innovation and Development Strategy on 1 November 2015. The revised version of this speech was published in the Huffington Post on 11 November 2015 and the Chinese version were appeared on Guancha.cn.

Disorder or Reconstruction of Order? 注

Chinese President Xi Jinping's super state visit to Britain in October 2015 surely marked a major step forward in our relationship. It is a time when we can expect to see China and the United Kingdom build a golden age of cooperation.

Boring is certainly not a word that could be used to describe Britain. Many people were quite surprised when the country decided on Brexit in the recent referendum. Then reading the news the following day, they were surprised again to learn that many voters were already regretting the result and wanted another referendum.

Now it is hard to predict how things will play out, but we all agree that the world is changing and many new questions have been raised: Is this the end of European integration? Or could this even be the start of the break-up of the European Union? Will this accelerate the decentralization of the Western-centric world power structure? The most profound analysis I have read is by Dr. Henry Kissinger, who reminded us how Europe's first steps towards integration evolved out of bitter fighting and rivalry. I also think his call for unity is quite thought-provoking. He called for unity even during Brexit, hoping the differences would stop short of a full break-up of the European Union.

Many are asking what China will gain or lose in this. China tends to look at the world from a long-term perspective and that our best interests lie with stable global growth. What China can clarify is that at this moment we

remain committed to having close ties with the UK, while also continuing the policy of supporting European integration.

The concern often raised is, will China challenge the US-led order and set up its own system? Conversely, others are concerned by the possible future of a disordered world in the 21st century. The two worries are contradictory and yet connected.

Let me borrow from Raymond Carver: What are we talking about when we talk about order?

It is commonly accepted in Britain and the West that the existing world order has been built and led by the US, and is also known as Pax Americana. This order, as I see it, contains three pillars: American or Western values, the US-led military alignment, and lastly the economic institutions centered around the UN. This world order is rooted in the history of international politics with some modern contributions. The United States, as the leader, has also reaped great benefit from its leadership role.

But where does China stand with respect to this world order? It is not hard to see that China has never been fully embraced into this order system. Despite its tremendous progress, China has long been alienated politically by the Western world. The US-led military alliance puts their interests above those of others and pays little attention to China's security concerns. It is now even asserting increasing security pressure on China in the Asia-Pacific region. So it is fair to say that the existing world order has flaws in its inclusiveness.

In the meantime, viewed from a wider perspective, the world order is facing multiple challenges, not necessarily from China. These are more

often due to its inability to offer solutions to the problems in today's world, and sometimes it is even creating new ones.

As an example, over the years, the global promotion of Western values has not always been successful, especially in countries where new governing structures have failed to grow fast enough to replace the regimes brought down through Western intervention. Chaos can occur, which then only reinforces the disorder and even results in negative spillover effects including domestic conflicts. When the war on terror was first launched, who would have thought terrorism would one day take a "semi-state" form? Who would have thought when the first spark of revolution erupted in the Arab world, that one day Europe would be faced with millions of refugees?

In the area of security, the US-led military alliance gives priority to its own safety over that of others, which gives rise to new difficulties on global security issues. As to some regional disputes, this has complicated the situation and may have aggravated disorderliness.

Globalization is changing the world and bringing new challenges to its power structure. Over the past decades, we have seen the diffusion and shifting of capital, technology and markets away from the center of the developed world. In the mean time, some of the less developed world are picking up speed of economic growth and achieving unparalleled development. And now we are starting to see the decentralization of world power along the same lines, where the newly rising developing countries are expected to participate and take more responsibility in world affairs.

The diffusion of power is a reality in today's world. But, should it be allowed to lead to disorder? Why can't the international community move fast enough to reshape its structure?

China, as a rising country, is aware of the increasing international expectation, as well as the concerns about its role. So, is China going to challenge the US and is a conflict inevitable?

What you hear from the Chinese leadership is that China is part of the international order. You need to note that the term used here is “international order” and what it refers to is the UN and its institutions, including the principles of international law. This may overlap to certain extent with Pax Americana, but it is not exactly the same. China has a strong sense of belonging to the UNled order system, as not only is China one of its founders, but also a beneficiary and a contributor, as well as one of its reformers. As Chinese President Xi Jinping said, “There is no intention to unravel the system or start all over again.”

Indeed, China is learning and offering its own ideas and initiatives to improve the international order system. For example, the opening of the AIIB, to which Britain is also a signatory, and the Silk Road Economic Belt Initiative, which will increase the connectivity between Asia and Europe. In the field of security, Chinese President Xi has also proposed to build common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security.

Currently, an important security challenge is the dispute in the South China Sea, on which China and the US have serious differences.

I think the US is taking a geopolitical perspective and this probably comes from its long established ways of thinking. Theories about geopolitics are not unfamiliar to you. It was the British scholar and MP, Sir Halford John Mackinder, at the beginning of the 20th century, who advanced the Heartland Theory, which stated, “Whoever rules the Heartland commands the ‘World-Island’ and therefore commands the world.” Which

as I understand it, guided decades of Europecentered geostrategic rivalry and the resulting struggles and wars.

When the US rose as a world leader, it switched geostrategic emphasis from land to sea, following Nicholas John Spykman's Rimland Theory: Whoever controls the Rimland rules Eurasia and therefore controls the destinies of the world.

The reason I am recalling this is to try to explain that since the US sees controlling strategic sea passages as vital to ensuring its world supremacy, it gets agitated over other countries' maritime activities including the Chinese construction around the Nansha Islands.

To put things into perspective, the South China Sea covers 3.5 million square kilometers, the islands and shoals which are far away from international waterways and only cover less than 20 square kilometers when put together. The media and the US military magnified the issue and presented China's construction work as a sign of geostrategic ambition. During my visits to the United States, I often heard real concern that confrontation between China and the US would be unavoidable if China continues to grow economically.

But for China, especially in the eyes of its general public, the focus of concern is its sovereignty over the Nansha Islands, the shoals and their surrounding waters. Nansha is the most southernly group of the four archipelagos in the South China Sea, which Chinese people firmly believe they have owned since ancient times.

Authority over Nansha was returned to China from Japan after World War One. This return was widely respected in the following years, with countries including the US applying to China for permission when carrying

out maritime research activities. It was only during the depths of the Cold War that some neighboring countries started occupying some of the islands, claiming they were discovering new territory. But really, who would be discovering new territories after World War One? And the oil and gas reserves that were discovered later in the South China Sea only made the disputes more complicated.

China improved relations with its neighbors in the 1990s. Following years of efforts, China and other claimant countries finally reached the consensus that the disputes are to be resolved through bilateral peaceful negotiations, and that before they can be resolved, the countries concerned would pursue joint development while shelving the disputes. The differences on Nansha did not become a hindrance to East Asia's successful multilateral cooperation. The signing of the Declaration on Conduct in the South China Sea (DOC) provided a rule-based structure for managing the disputes.

But in recent years, increasing provocation by some claimant countries in an attempt to make their occupation of the Chinese territory permanent and legal, have disregarded the spirit of the DOC. This has led China, after years of tolerance, and frustrated by its unsuccessful effort at persuasion, to decide to reinforce its presence on the territories by improving the infrastructure, increasing security and undertaking sea reclamation projects.

All this has happened against the back-drop of the US AsiaPacific rebalancing, which included growing its military presence and putting greater emphasis on the interests of the alliance. This development has added a new dimension to the situation. When US naval ships and aircraft were sent to operate very close to the areas where Chinese are present, such behavior caused tensions to rise and posed serious threat. More and more

people in China believe that US is behind the countries which are undermining China's interests.

An act invites reaction and a misjudgment leads to a response. To overcome the tension, China and the US need to have a better understanding of each other's intentions and avoid misjudgments.

So let me state that China first and foremost wants to protect its sovereignty and rights. When observing China, one should not lose sight of its history. Given the memory of a century of humiliation by foreign invasion and aggression, Chinese people and their government are very sensitive about territorial integrity. It would never allow an occurrence of losing territory to happen again. That is also why there is an emphasis on the need to build sufficient defensive capabilities.

China also has a great interest in maintaining the freedom and safety of navigation through the international transportation routes in the South China Sea and is willing to work for it. China has improved its capacities to offer public service in the South China Sea by building three large lighthouses which are now put into service. We also have plans for providing maritime monitoring and environmental protection services in the future.

China and its neighboring countries share the common interests to maintain peace and stability in the region. There is no such an agenda in China as to gain supremacy in the region. The current emphasis is to ensure the full implementation of DOC, while we have stepped up the negotiations on a Code of Conduct with the ASEAN countries. The common aim is to build rule-based regional order.

The US is not a claimant in the South China Sea disputes. But China and the US both have fundamentally common interests in maintaining peace and the freedom of navigation, and for the greater good, the two countries should be able to find a way to cooperate.

I don't see why China and the US should enter into a zero-sum geostrategic rivalry which will only lead to a prolonged power fight. The world has seen so much of this, and who knows, at the end of that path is not the well-known Thucydides Trap?

July 1st marked the 95th anniversary of the founding of the CPC. Xi Jinping, general secretary of the CPC Central Committee, made an important speech reminding the CPC to keep to its original aspirations, and remain committed to serving the people. In his speech, he also touched upon world affairs and reiterated that China's foreign policy objective to promote world peace and prosperity, and China is willing to work with the world to promote international order which is based on fairness for all countries.

So, giving the changes and in view of the issues confronting the world, when we think about the future order, we may need to go beyond the current constraints and foresee a more overarching concept: A global order. It may need to include such wide topics as global governance, concerted mechanism of powers, North-South dialogues and all the other essential principles and themes of this new era, to ensure that every country and region's concerns are accommodated. Essentially, it should provide a common roof of rules and order for all.

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1. Speech at Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, a world-leading policy institute based in London on July 6th 2016. The full text of the speech was first published in the National People's Congress Magazine, No. 14, 2016.

Global Changes and China's Role

For Peace and Development in the 21st Century 注

There has been a continuous debate on how we can maintain world peace since mankind entered the era of peace and development after the end of the Cold War.

In the 21st century, have we learned to value the hard-won peace? Can major countries maintain peace when the established world structure is undergoing transition?

According to Nicholas Boyle, a professor at the University of Cambridge of the UK, there has been a cataclysmic Great Event of international significance at the start of each century over the last 500 years. Occurring in the middle of the second decade of each century, they could be events that sparked wars, religious conflicts or brought peace. With Professor Boyle's research in mind, we should find it no surprise that where the relationship between China and the United States is heading has become a focus of attention of international academia.

China is a big country in terms of the size of its population and territory. But there is still a sizable gap between China and the developed world in terms of the economic development and comprehensive national strengths. Moreover, it is hard for people outside China to imagine how serious the difficulties and challenges China is confronted with. China must focus its efforts in the foreseeable future on ensuring the realization of its goals of national rejuvenation and greater prosperity for the people. It is therefore important that China has a peaceful external environment to facilitate the fulfillment of these goals.

Both China and the US have expressed the political will to maintain lasting peace and are trying to build a new model of major country relations between them. They have also expressed the willingness to engage in multi-channel dialogue, in order to find the right balance between their respective interests and address their disagreements. This will undoubtedly be a long and arduous trust-building process. The US concentrated its strategic focus on Europe during the Cold War and shifted it to the Middle East after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001. Now Washington has turned its attention toward Asia. The US's Asia-bound strategic shift came at a time when the region was witnessing booming economic growth and active cooperation among countries. What the US is doing is to increase military deployment in the region and strengthen military collaboration with its Asian allies. Now as we see increased friction and conflicts in the region around China, a question has arisen: Does the increased US military and strategic presence in Asia accord with the trend of cooperation and development in the region?

In his book, *For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War*, Melvyn P. Leffler, a US historian, made a detailed analysis of four major opportunities for the US and the former Soviet Union to ease tension and why they missed them. The book left two impressions. Firstly, though the two superpowers never concealed their policy targets of seeking the demise of the other, what consumed most of their efforts proved to be how to prevent a head-on conflict. Secondly, the two superpowers were never on the same channel in dialogues and were unable to establish trust. While the former Soviet Union focused on drawing lessons from the war and building up arms, the US kept high vigilance against the Soviet threat and detente was no more than a means to achieve the goal. As the saying goes, tomorrow's history is written today and history cannot escape the trend.

Since entering the 21st century, the world has undergone many changes. The time has gone when the world's big powers vied for hegemony. Some previously impoverished developing countries are already fast-tracking their industrialization, while some developed nations have been struggling to extricate themselves from financial and economic woes. This is narrowing the gap between some of the developed and developing countries. In the West, where people believe capital means power, some scholars claim that the center of world power is shifting from the West to the East. This view has kindled debates about whether emerging powers will pose a threat; how they should undertake their international responsibilities and whether the world's leadership will be peacefully transferred.

In real world, the center of world power has not been seen shifting in one direction. It is more likely that the power that influences international governance and world affairs will diffuse from the traditional Western center to a wider sphere. It is no longer possible for a few countries to dominate all world affairs and a single nation will find it difficult to resolve global issues without the support of others. While the diversification of world power is moving forward and taking shape, the transformation of the established world structure and international governance will be more gradual. During this transitional period, the old structure, if suitably reformed and adjusted, should continue to operate for some time.

In this context, it is indeed worthwhile for us to reflect on Professor Boyle's statement about the 'Great Event' that occurs in the second decade of each century. Will the 21st century be a new age of peace and cooperation, or will it fall back to the old age of power competition or even conflict? Both developed countries such as the US and developing countries

such as China have their due historical responsibilities in answering these big questions.

Facing a series of common global challenges, ranging from degradation of the environment and climate change to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, terrorism and even food safety, countries, big and small, are in the same boat. If all countries can swerve forward from the old ways and work with others more openly, the common challenges facing us can be tackled more easily. Otherwise, the difficulties will only become more complicated and harder to address.

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1. This article was published in the Expert Opinion Column” of the People’s Daily on May 28th, 2013.

A Century Later

—A Retrospective on the Two World Wars 注

This year marks the 100th anniversary of the outbreak of World War One and the 75th anniversary of the outbreak of World War Two. One hundred years may be long enough for the world to change but not enough to erase people's memories of the wars. Many war retrospective events and seminars are being held and some new books have been published. However history can not be well understood without comparisons to the present, and the current focus of discussions on the world wars is reflecting many contemporary concerns: will another war occur in the 21st century? What could be the causes of wars in the world today?

Imperialist powers dug their own graves by fighting to control the world

The most profound lessons learned by mankind in the 20th century came from wars fought by imperialist powers comparing to control the world, while the value most cherished is peace, won by people of countries against imperialism, colonialism and hegemony.

As we look back on World War One, we should not forget the fact that the war broke out because of the conflict for interest caused by imperialism countries scrambling for new frontiers and more colonies. After the reunification of Germany in the 1870s, the inherent nature of capitalism—

the contradiction between the socialization of production and the private ownership—became increasingly prominent and needed to be resolved through geographical expansion. To sustain profit growth, monopoly groups were desperate for new sources of raw materials, new markets and fresh places for capital investment.

After his accession to the throne in 1888, Wilhelm II, the 29-yearold Kaiser of the German Empire revealed his militarist ambition. His “world policy,” which was characterized by the urge for colonial expansion, had stirred up pro-war emotions in German society. Facing a world that had already been divided among several longstanding European empires, Germany accelerated its arms expansion in an attempt to change the world structure through war. The monopoly capitalism in the country was eager to seize overseas interests by any means. As Bernhard von Bulow, Germany’s Secretary of State for foreign affairs, once proclaimed, “The days when Germans granted one neighbor the earth, the other the sea, and reserved for themselves the sky, where pure doctrine reigns... those days are over...we do not want to put anyone in our shadow, but we also demand our place in the sun.”

As a matter of fact, the newly emerged capitalist countries, including Germany, Japan and the United States, had already participated in the fight for overseas colonies as early as the end of the 19th century. For example, in 1900, Germany played a leading role in the invasion of Beijing by the Eight-Nation Alliance. Regarding the consequences of the invasion, Diether Raff pointed out in his book *A History of Germany from the Medieval Empire to the Present* that after the Boxer Rebellion was suppressed by the Eight-Nation Alliance, China paid enormous war reparations and never recovered from this huge blow. By the eve of World War One, Germany had already grabbed 2.9 million square kilometers of colonies and become the

biggest winner among the new empires. However, the British Empire already possessed colonies with an area of 33.5 million square kilometers, 110 times the area of its own land, while France occupied 10.6 million square kilometers of colonies. In contrast, although Germany was already stronger than Britain and France economically and militarily, its colonial possessions were much smaller than those of Britain and France. Thus, the greedy nature of imperialism and monopoly capital started to beat the drums of war.

On 28 June 1914, Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary was assassinated by a young Serbian nationalist in Sarajevo, Bosnia: This became the immediate cause of the outbreak of World War One. After the assassination, it took only five weeks for the whole of Europe to be pulled into the war. The triggering of the war may have been an accidental event, but issues had been building up for a long time — a war between the old and the new imperialism could not be avoided. On this issue, western historians usually pay more attention to the causes of the various events leading to the war, but they may have not given enough attention to the economic expansion needs that were driving the imperialist war.

World War One was the first to be referred to as a global war. By the time it ended, on 11 November 1918, more than 9 million soldiers had died and more than double this had been injured. In addition, there were a large number of civilian casualties, including those who died of hunger and through epidemics. Even now, you can find many memorials commemorating the victims of World War One in many European towns, reminding people of the sons, husbands and fathers lost to many families. This was mankind's first self-inflicted global disaster.

The war-makers had not anticipated the outcome of the war: the fall of the German, Austro-Hungarian and Russian imperial dynasties, and the establishment of the Soviet regime following the October Revolution. Although the victorious countries, including Britain and France did their utmost to impose sanctions on the defeated countries, neither side thoroughly apportioned blame for war crimes and related extremist ideas. The political boundaries drawn up after the war actually sowed the seeds for conflicts which occasionally arise. After the war, Germany was reluctant to admit defeat and was unwilling to accept the harsh punishment outlined in the Treaty of Versailles. Less than a quarter of a century later, while the West was hit by the Great Depression, the fragile peace that followed World War One was threatened. Just as French Marshal Ferdinand Foch had predicted after hearing about the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, “This is not peace, but an armistice for twenty years.”

In 1939, Nazi Germany launched a European war, which would become World War Two, claiming to seek more “living space.” Earlier, Japanese militarists had already ignited the war of expansion and aggression in Asia. In such a war where “the aggressors crawling out of the ashes”, heroic resistance was undertaken by the countries being invaded. The end of World War Two dismantled the global colonial system built by the imperialist countries. In Asia, it completely wrecked the militarist ambitions of Japan to gain world power by seizing and occupying Asian countries. The surge in national liberation movements after World War Two laid an important foundation for a new era of peaceful world development.

The Chinese as victims of the two World Wars woke up and joined together to resist and fight against the unjust war launched by the imperialists. It was the collapse of the colonial system, and the global turmoil resulting from the two World Wars which gave China the chance to

rid itself of the foreign aggression and internal strife. In 1919, the Paris Peace Conference had allowed Japan to take over the territories in Shandong which had been occupied by Germany after the Siege of Tsingtao. This had left China, the victorious nation, to suffer humiliation as if it were a defeated nation. This event aroused strong indignation and growing discontent among the Chinese people against imperialism and the weakness of the national government, resulting in people who were diligently seeking ways to save their country completely losing illusion in the Western powers.

The patriotic and anti-imperialist May Fourth Movement opened the door for the spread of Marxism in China and enabled the Chinese proletariat to emerge onto the historical stage. The establishment of the CPC in 1921 signified the beginning of the Chinese newdemocratic revolution. To resist Japanese imperialist aggression, the Kuomintang and the CPC achieved cooperation, forming the most extensive nationally united front. The entire country, including soldiers and civilians alike, fought hard to defeat the brutal invaders. The CPC had been strengthened by the anti-Japanese war and was able to grow its root deeper among the people. It firmly opposed the civil war launched by Chiang Kai-shek, but had to fight back and ultimately won that war to establish the People's Republic of China, where the Chinese people became the masters of the country.

The past century has witnessed arduous efforts and great achievements of the Chinese people in striving for national independence and prosperity under the leadership of the CPC. By the 90th anniversary of the founding of the CPC in 2011, China had become the second largest economy in the world. It has not only realized its aspiration of standing on its own feet among the world's peoples and has never been so close to achieving its goal of rejuvenating the Chinese nation. Under these new conditions, President

Xi Jinping proposed the concept of the Chinese Dream and presented the great prospect of common prosperity and development for all ethnic groups across the country.

Transcending the old eras of war and revolution, and building a new century of peaceful development

In the 21st century, mankind has moved beyond the old era of imperialism, colonialism and hegemony. According to Marxist theory, the old era was characterized by the desire of capitalist countries to launch wars to serve economic expansion. Today, economic globalization has provided broader space for the peaceful development of mankind. At the same time, the development of weapons of mass destruction, advanced technological development, the spread of international moral concepts and other factors are constraining the conditions and desires of the major powers to resort to force, and the possibility of a World War has been significantly reduced.

As early as the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping made his assessment on the issue of war and peace by arguing that the world had entered a new era of peaceful development. The economic globalization that followed convincingly validated his perceptive judgment. Constant progress in globalization, informatization and the liberalization of trade have enabled factors of production to flow freely and be allocated in an optimal way. This clearly demonstrates that war and geographical expansion are no longer the primary and appropriate way to grow profits. After the Cold War, the division of the world based on the confrontation of political blocs was broken. In the past, the Western developed countries had possessed most of the world's capital, technologies, talents and even experience. However,

through the process of globalization; these began to be dispersed more widely.

China not only perceived the changing times from the beginning, but made good use of the opportunities brought by economic globalization. Through its policies of reform and opening up, it was ahead of other developing country in terms of absorbing international capital and technologies, and participating in global markets. At the same time, the policy of opening up also allowed international investors to benefit from China's development and deepened the interdependence between China and other countries. China's success has provided a new impetus to sustainable global growth and made an important contribution to the steady world development. Many other developing countries are also sharing in the wave of globalized development and in doing so are significantly increasing the strength of the developing world.

World economic growth is no longer driven by the developed countries alone. Developing countries with billions of people are also brimming with vibrancy. In the second half of 2012, the proportion contributed by developing countries to world economic growth has ever reached 90%, and currently remains at over 50%. According to the Atlantic Council of the United States, the global economic center was in the East between the years 1000 and 1820, and it then took 90 years to complete its shift to the West. Throughout the entire 20th century, the global economic center was in the western developed world dominated by the United States. However, in the first decades of the 21st century, the world economic center is quickly moving back to the East. This shows that the developing countries including China have followed the trend of the times with peaceful development and have become an important force in boosting peace and development worldwide.

However, this transformation is not as simple as turning a page in a book. Behaviors which go against this trend can still be seen. The data shows that although the number of global armed conflicts and wars has declined after the Cold War, regional conflicts and medium scale wars that create many casualties are still occurring. The path to peace in the 21st century is full of twists and turns and the light of peace is sometimes obscured by the haze of power politics. Most notably, Western countries including the United States were not able to rid themselves of their “winner-takes-all” hegemonic thinking after the Cold War. Many post-Cold War civil conflicts that have required international intervention are the result of the West imposing its political model on other countries. The Western powers’ expectation of globalization is not confined within the economic sphere, it also wants to achieve a Westernization of global politics.

For more than two decades, the Western powers forcefully promoted their own concepts and expanded their interests globally. To achieve this, they were not hesitated to use force, and sometimes even started wars, using fabricated pretexts. Consequently, countries like Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya were one after another thrown into turmoil and even now, some of them still see no signs of stability. Various so-called “Revolutions” have extended from Central Asia to the Middle East, leading some countries into protracted political crises and social unrest. At the same time, a new round of geopolitical competition is continuing to be disguised in many forms of political rhetoric. All these bare the imprint of the post-Cold War political shock wave. The Cold War lasted more than 40 years and in theory ended 20 years ago. However, the winding down was never completed and the effects of the Cold War remain to this day. The current grim situation in Iraq which is facing fragmentation has clearly demonstrated the dire

consequences of acts of imposing one's own political system onto other countries.

Obviously, in these respects, the United States has not been following the trend of peaceful development, causing high cost to both its hard and soft power. Even so, the United States still enjoys considerable advantages in its overall national strength, especially in its military, which makes it the most powerful country on earth. When it comes to the issue of global peace and stability and the possibility of a major war in the 21st century, the first thing that comes into people's minds is the policy choices of the United States. Currently, there is much reflection and discussion in the United States about its international policies. But moving forward, the world situation will be affected by a number of factors including how the United States adjusts its policies, and how it interacts with other major powers and with the international community to establish trust and cooperation.

China, a contributor to the prosperity of the new era and a guardian of peace

When China grows into a major power, the international community rightly has some concerns: What will it bring to the world? What does it want from the world? What can it do for the world? Is China willing to work with other countries to contain war and safeguard peace in the 21st century? These concerns are also of crucial importance to China and it must respond to these questions through its behavior.

Among the history books commemorating World War One, *The Sleepwalker: How Europe Went to War in 1914* by Professor Christopher Clark of the University of Cambridge, attracted lots of attention by

providing a unique perspective of the war. Rather than repeating the well-known events and processes of the war itself, he elaborates on a series of random remarks and actions made by the decision-making circles in Vienna, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Paris, London and Belgrade. In his timeline that is limited to the ten years before the war, he also highlights the incidental factors which triggered the events. The author believes that the major countries through a combination of mishandled issues, misunderstandings and inadvertently released signals produced a situation where they effectively sleepwalked into a war that no one desired.

The publication of Professor Clark's book drew various interpretations. Western academic circles started to focus on Asia, a region not only enjoying vigorous economic growth but also faced with many conflicts. As they are trying to locate the sleepwalker of Asia—the trigger for new contention and clashes—China, unfortunately, became the innocent victim. There is a view that China has something in common with the emerging major powers from history, which were keen on taking control of the world, and the examples of similarities include high-speed economic development, continued increases in military expenditure and diplomatic assertiveness, along with the disputes with its neighbors which have been compared to the historical conflicts between old and new major powers. If you follow this view, the concerns center around: Will China compete with the United States for world domination? Will there be a war if China cannot handle its conflicts with other countries properly? Actually, from China's perspective, such thoughts and concerns are reversing cause and effect. As President Xi Jinping pointed out in his speech at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations on 23 March 2013, "...to be in step with changing times, you cannot have your body in the 21st century and your head still in

the past” and “the old mentalities from the Cold War era and zero-sum games should be discarded.”

Indeed misinterpretations about China in international academic circles are not new, as the underlying reason is that, they continue to believe in the traditional western concept that “A strong nation is bound to seek hegemony.” The key idea embodied in this concept is that once a country becomes stronger, it will inevitably seek a global redistribution of power, with the aim of replacing the dominant power and maximizing its interests. In the 21st century, there is a common perception in these circles that Asia is where conflicts are concentrated and a special focus should be put on the fastgrowing China. This idea is very popular in the United States. The second decade of the 21st century has seen growing anxiety in the United States on its possible decline and the threat from China and astonishment over China’s great achievements. In 2000, the United States’ GDP was approximately \$9.8 trillion, surpassing secondranked Japan more than \$5.1 trillion, while the GDP of sixthranked China was only \$1.2 trillion. In 2010, the United States still held its number one position, but China had leapt ahead to become the world’s number two. As of 2013, China’s GDP maintained its upward trend and reached \$9.4 trillion, more than half of that of the United States.

The strong growth in Asia is also tremendously attractive to the United States. The so-called rebalancing of its Asia-Pacific strategy reflects its desire to strengthen its control over Asia. However, the highlighting of its military return and the emphasis on military alliances are not in line with the main tone of Asia’s focus on economic growth. In fact, since the return of the United States to the Asia-Pacific region, the Pacific has not been very peaceful. In April 2012, Philippine warships harassed Chinese fishermen at Huangyan Island, China; the following September, the Noda Government of

Japan announced the “nationalization” of the Diaoyu Islands in a dispute between China and Japan; and in May 2014, Vietnamese naval ships conducted activities which disrupted operations at a Chinese oil drilling platform in the South China Sea. Backed by the tacit support of the United States, these provocations became more aggressive. While the countermeasures used by China against these provocations while defending its own interests have been sensationalized as the “China threat” and “diplomatic aggressiveness”.

What is particularly notable is how the Japanese leadership failed to show their desire to handle the Diaoyu Islands dispute properly. Instead, they use the case to make up the “China threat to Japan” at the national level and tried to alarm their people and win the support of the United States. Their aim was to achieve a breakthrough in the exercise of the right of collective self-defense and to amend their pacifist constitution. This erroneous attitude and dangerous tendency reminded us of Germany’s refusal to accept its defeat after World War One, and its attempt to revive a militaristic political atmosphere. After World War Two, there was an incomplete settlement of Japan’s war crimes due to the impact of the Cold War. This led to a serious misunderstanding of history within Japan, which unavoidably creates doubts among its neighbors about its future intentions.

On historical issues, China firmly upholds the victory in World War Two and the post-war international order, and resolutely opposes any attempt to negate history and create conflicts. China cannot tolerate irresponsible practices by individuals or countries to reverse the general trend of peaceful development in the region. Along with the peoples of the Asia-Pacific countries, China must establish and maintain a common understanding and stance, by taking a stand against this misguided group within Japan to ensure there is no chance the invaders can make a

comeback. At the same time, the domestic pro-peace forces in Japan will not be infinitely tolerant of this kind of behavior which tries to turn back the clock of history.

Though there might be some different interpretations of what has happened around China and some may even try to take advantage of the individual incidents, China has stood firm regarding its strategic principles. It will respond strongly to provocations and effectively control tensions in the conflicts, while firmly abiding by the inciple of maintaining regional peace and stability. The theme of today's Asia is still the common aspiration for peace, development and cooperation. The Asian situation is still characterized by political stability and sustained economic development. Like China, most countries are focusing on maintaining healthy growth and improving their people's wellbeing. The stable situation in Asia did not come easily and is to be cherished.

China is both an important contributor to and a beneficiary of Asia's stability and development. It has an important responsibility to maintain peace and build prosperity in Asia, and will not allow anything to interfere with the direction of its development. China is not joining the world as an armed warrior; it will never use gunboats to open international markets for Chinese products. China was the first major power to successfully enter the world stage through peaceful development, and there is no reason for it to change. As President Xi Jinping said in his speech at the Korber Foundation in March 2014, "China's pursuit of peaceful development is not an act of expediency, nor diplomatic rhetoric. Rather, it is a conclusion we have reached based on an objective assessment of China's history, its present and future. It represents the consistency of our confidence in our thinking and our readiness to act. "

With the improvement of its international status, China is also simultaneously increasing its participation and involvement in international affairs. It advocates a concept of Asian security that includes the four elements of being: common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable. China has initiated the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Projects of Silk Road, which are aimed at meeting the fundamental needs and interests of Asian countries. These are important public goods designed by China based on its relative merits. China has also proposed to build a new model of major-country relations with the United States that are centered on the principles of no conflicts or confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation. China fully adheres to the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence; it supports the ASEAN-led framework of regional security dialogues and cooperation, and supports its value of inclusiveness and negotiation. At the same time, China is constantly improving its military capability to defend peace. In the current international environment the establishment and maintenance of peace and security can only be ensured by strength.

As the Chinese proverb goes, “One gains new knowledge by reviewing the old.” A look back at history helps us to better understand the present and face the future. One of the most important developments in the 21st century will be China’s becoming a world power, as it will be an important factor that will make a positive impact on the world situation. For the first time China will stand on the world’s center stage and will not only be able to control its own fate, but also bear responsibility for renewing the international order and norms. Its national interests will therefore become more regionally and internationally focused. This will require it to gradually transform its economic strength into positive and effective regional/international influence that will enhance its ability to safeguard

common interests and to provide public goods. China will also need timely communication with other countries, including major powers and neighboring countries, in order to help them understand China and its policies, to avoid misunderstandings and misinterpretations, and create a favorable atmosphere for cooperation.

Looking back at the history of international relations over the past five centuries, we rarely see a whole century which did not experience war. In the 21st century, in order for mankind to truly get out of the vicious circles of war and conflict, China will play its role and assume its responsibilities. This will also be of great significance to China itself. It must and will surely become a builder of prosperity and a guardian of peace in the 21st century. As President Xi Jinping reiterated in his speech to the Brazilian parliament in July 2014, “China resolutely opposes all forms of hegemony and power politics, and stands ready to work with other nations to safeguard humanity’s conscience and international justice.”

As we review the profound lessons from the two world wars, we need to ponder how we can establish a clearer global consensus to oppose war and safeguard peace; how we can establish fairer and more equitable principles for interactions among nations; and how we can make public instruments such as international laws, international norms, and international mechanisms effectively serve the common interests of mankind. All these are major issues that must be addressed in the new era, and they are where China’s commitment to world peace should be focused. It is urgent that China improves its own abilities and international awareness. In the future, the world structure which China will help to build is likely to be multi-polarized and transcend old ideas. In such a structure, the interests of all parties are respected and taken into consideration. It should be able to effectively contain the contradictions and differences among major powers,

restrict the unilateral threat and use of force, and unite the people of all countries. With such a structure, mankind will be able to overcome challenges together, through broad understanding and cooperation among the major powers and the whole international community. This will ensure that the 21st century becomes a century in which peace and prosperity are made and shared by all people.

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Are China and the US Missing Opportunities? 注

China has entered an era of consumerism. Getting rich and pursuing happiness seemed to be at the center of family conversations. Some describe today's China as being consumed by "trivial matters", where people have deeper pockets and more leisure time. The hot topics in cyber networks reflect that young people are mainly worried about themselves: "Should I help an elderly person who has fallen on the road?" Or, "Should I visit my mother or mother-in-law during the Chinese lunar New Year (Spring Festival)?" Surely, we have bigger issues to deal with. At the Central Poverty Alleviation and Development Work Conference held in late November 2015, the discussions centered on how to raise over 70 million Chinese people out of poverty in the next five years [poverty level currently 2,300 yuan (\$ 355) per annum]. The CPC Central Committee has now developed a comprehensive support package, which includes more help for producers and improved medical and educational resources.

As this is happening, we see on television that there is chaos in many parts of the world. There are countries torn apart by conflicts and wars, resulting in millions of refugees leaving their homes. Major terrorist attacks are spreading harm and fear, which only reinforces the value of peace and stability. The rapid growth China has enjoyed over the last three decades, and the wellbeing of Chinese people are essentially the benefits of the sound political and security environments that we have managed to maintain. One cannot help admiring the foresight of Deng Xiaoping who shifted China's policy, based on a global analysis and determined that the world was moving into a time of peace and development.

The 70th anniversary of the end of World War Two was marked in 2015. In the century since the beginning of World War One, mankind has witnessed two global hot wars and one cold war. These along with endless conflicts and local wars have taught us many harsh lessons. Standing on the threshold of another historic chapter, we need to re-evaluate our options. Should we choose to reaffirm our commitment to worldwide peace and development or allow conflicts and turmoil to reign, and spell disaster for mankind?

Much tension was seen during 2015, presenting the world with many signs of change. Perhaps, the word “divergence” can best describe current international politics, as many confrontational factors are either emerging or reappearing.

Firstly, the threat of terrorism against the civilized world has commanded global to become the primary concern for people worldwide. I remember when the 9/11 attacks occurred in 2001, we described terrorism with a Taoist quote, “a semblance great, the shadow of a shade”(Daxiang Wuxing). Now, terrorism has moved out of the shadows, challenging the civilized world in deeper and more visible ways. However, in terms of response, the international community has yet to forge effective solutions. The Syrian crisis, for one, is the grave outcome resulting from too many complicated and entangled factors, which include big power rivalries, religious conflicts and sectarian feuds. When all are mixed together, it makes it almost impossible to solve. The most asked question recently has been whether or not the international community is countering terrorism in the right way. Within China, a debate has also taken place on what and how we should get involved. As a matter of fact, China has put in significant diplomatic efforts to help resolve the Syrian issues through a political solution. These include proposing what became the UNbacked Geneva

Conference on Syria. The more important question is, can the international community recognize and acknowledge that real political changes are underway and agree on the collective efforts needed to safeguard common security across the world?

Secondly, traditional geopolitical rivalries are manifesting themselves again, and the world's major powers are seeing more divergence, rather than convergence of their common interests. For instance, the tension caused by the geopolitical rivalry between Russia and the United States (as well as its European allies) was demonstrated in the Ukrainian crisis, giving rise to the concern that a new Cold War may start. In the Asia-Pacific, the United States appears to be fueling another geopolitical contest by involving itself in the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, and in doing so strengthening its military alliances in the region. The United States biggest concern in the Asia-Pacific is the so-called power shift, or the possibility of it being pushed out of the region by China. This geopolitical mindset has motivated the US to meddle in the problems China has with its neighbors, and which raises the risk of elevating territorial disputes into strategic rivalries. We are already seeing US warships and aircraft testing the resolve and tolerance of China by sailing close to or flying over Chinese islands and shoals in the South China Sea. This not only significantly increases the risk of accidents, but is also against both countries' interests, which are to maintain peace and stability in the area. If this does not constitute a security hazard, what does?

The so-called major power rivalries we see today are more like the prolonged ending of the Cold War. Though the world has moved on, there will always be those who cling to old ways and pretend that all new problems are just variations of those of the past. When the two countries are

entangled in this way, how can they cooperate and deal with the real and bigger challenges that face the world?

Thirdly, on the economic front, we see a divergence in both growth and cooperation. In 2015, the US economy picked up significantly, registering a quarterly growth rate of 2%—3%, unemployment went down, and it maintained its lead in innovation. This performance stood out in the Western world against other economies that did not fare as well. However, it has generally been agreed that the momentum gained by the world's largest economy did little to boost a global recovery. People have also been worried about the possible negative spillover effect from the US Federal Reserve's interest rate hike, and are waiting for the inevitable to happen. Some have described the US's recovery, which is happening as the cost of capital outflow and a decline in Europe and the emerging economies, as "sucking vitality from the rest of the world." This could actually weaken the prospects of a global recovery. (The US Federal Reserve decided on 16 December 2015 to raise the benchmark interest rate by 25 base points, the first rise in the nine years since 2006.

At the same time, the Doha round of the World Trade Organization's multilateral trade negotiations appears to have existed in name only. The United States pushed hard on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) agreements in order to maintain dominance in international economic affairs. This set of new rules agreed without including the major economies led to suspicions that the United States was building new "walls". Does that mean that in the future the global economic order will again move toward exclusive blocs?

Lastly, on the cultural front, while globalization has enabled the free, open and convenient flow of people, this openness is also encountering new

challenges. It seems that the trend of cultural divergence paradoxically coexists with the trend of cultural convergence. According to the World Tourism Organization, international tourists make over 1.1 billion journeys annually, which included in 2014 over 100 million overseas visits made by Chinese tourists alone. With so many globetrotters, one concern for all governments nowadays is their safety. Developed countries have long upheld the banner of human rights, which are also the core principle of their refugee and immigration policies. But such values are being challenged and tested when confronted by terrorists and extremism. European countries are reflecting upon whether they are able to practice what they have preached. However, if we close the door on communication between different regions and groups, and allow deglobalization to become the mainstream, will the world be divided again? And how is that a safer world?

This list is only the start of one that shows the signs of divergence in today's world.

Globalization gained momentum following the end of the Cold War. Capital, technology, talent, labor and information have been diffusing from the developed Western countries to the wider world. China is a beneficiary of this trend, as it has achieved its opening up and reforms objectives on the back of globalization. At the same time, we are also witnessing the impact of globalization on traditional structures. Fragmentation has been seen in hotspot issues, communication and people's perceptions. How to respond to this crisis of fragmentation needs to be carefully considered by the international community.

Reasons behind the fragmentation run deep. For although the Western-centered world order greatly contributed to the world's progress and growth, it failed to make timely adjustments as emerging economies rose

and the old and new challenges became entrenched. It has not only failed to reflect the new economic realities but also lacks effective ways to manage or solve ongoing problems. It is like an adult still wearing clothes in smaller size is happy with their familiarity but uncomfortable.

The United States, as the leading power in the existing world order, has made one major strategic mistake after another. Its invasion of Iraq in 2003 left the country in disorder. In 2010, the West embraced the so-called Arab Spring after the political upheaval in Tunisia, thus witnessing chaos, like having opened a Pandora's Box. As the old orders were breaking down, the new orders were not yet in place to provide peace and security. Social and economic unrest is still rampant in many countries across the Middle East. What is more, the financial crisis of 2008 wreaked havoc on Western countries and created a global recession, with some in America referring to the crisis as a "strategic disaster".

Now, the United States is trying to get out of the mess. But by proposing a "Pivot to Asia," suddenly making China their target of strategic focus, the United States has fueled distrust in its relationship with China. Will this turn out to be another strategic mistake on the part of the United States? Will it cost the two countries the chances to work together in addressing global problems? A lack of responsibility might be the principal challenge of our time. We live in an era of shared risks when major problems demand global solutions.

But there is no need to get overly pessimistic, as the international community has already started to explore solutions. The G20, for one, has played a crucial role in combating financial crises. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank both approved a major realignment of voting shares towards the developing countries. And

recently the IMF decided to bring the Chinese currency, the yuan, into its Special Drawing Rights basket.

At the same time, the AIIB initiated by China is aimed at compensating for the inadequacies found in the existing international financing mechanisms. Moreover, negotiations led by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership free trade agreement, involving China and other 15 countries, is also well under way. The bilateral agreement between China and the United States on climate change has also laid a solid foundation for the success of the UN Climate Change Conference in Paris. All these efforts bring home the importance and vision of a community with shared future as proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping, which promises a brighter future for global governance and a stronger presence from the developing world.

Now, China, as one of the most important players in the world today after a long phase of focusing development will get around to assuming greater international responsibilities, and can no longer focus purely on its own growth. We must take initiatives to develop a sound international environment, with particular emphasis on how to safeguard peace and stability across the world.

When Dr. Henry Kissinger was in Beijing recently, I arranged a meeting for him with some young people. During the discussions, there was much criticism of the United States and its role in the changing world order. Dr. Kissinger listened with great patience, and then asked, "If you were given a chance to run the world now, what kind of international structure would you have in mind?" There was no answer. Obviously, we are still at the stage of feeling dissatisfied and more content to criticize than to propose a new design.

International responsibilities have fallen on our shoulders earlier than expected. And as more countries realize that China might be the next biggest opportunity and start adjusting their strategies, we need to think about what we can offer to address global issues and ensure balanced world development. By showing other countries the benefits China's development can bring, we can persuade them to work with us willingly and with mutual trust.

As we interact with the rest of the world, it is incumbent on us to explain our country's purpose and our dreams. The world is interested in listening to China's stories, and the window of opportunity is now open for us. We need to raise awareness, and in doing so, we must improve our international communications, which in turn will help build stronger and closer global ties.

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1. Speech at Sanya Forum on 12 December 2015. The full text of the speech was first published at Caijing.com.cn and ThePaper.cn, titled: China's Responsibility in a Changing World. On 7 January 2016, the FT Chinese version published an excerpt from this speech titled: Are China and the US Missing Opportunities? The English version also appeared on Beijing Review on 7 January 2016.

International Order and China's Place in It

As Chinese, we are frequently asked: Is China challenging the US as leader of the world order? Or, is China making a parallel order? The answer is, of course: No! We would say, China is part of the international order. But are we talking about the same order?

The US-led world order, which rests on the American value system, the US military alliance as well as the dollar centered world economic structure and the UN institutions, was formed through historical events and has played its role, and the US has reaped huge benefits through its leadership. However, with globalization evolving and international politics fragmenting, this world order is being overstretched and is having growing difficulties in providing new and effective solutions to all the current issues and challenges.

At the political level, the global promotion of Western values has often not acclimatized, especially in the Middle East where regime changes have been carried out. The breaking down of the old governing structures has resulted in a vacuum of power and trust, this has created chaos and further widespread unrest. In the area of defense, the US-led military alliance puts the security interests of its members above those of others and has often created difficult situations, especially in complex regional disputes. Moreover, in the area of economics, when confronted with the 2008 global financial crisis which exposed flaws in the international governance the newly born G20 undertook the responsibility to facilitate of reforming the global governance system.

Against this background, China has grown economically and consequently has gained greater weight on the world stage. So it is quite natural that people want to know where China stands. When you listen carefully to Chinese leaders, they insisted that China supports the current international order. However, you may notice that Chinese do not use the term “world order.” Rather, we talk about the international order, which refers to the UN and its related institutions which are based on the UN Charter and its related principles. China has a strong sense of belonging to this international order, as it was a founder, and is a beneficiary, contributor and also a reformer of the order.

During his speech in Seattle last September, Chinese President Xi Jinping argued that “many developing countries want to see a more just and equitable international system. But it doesn’t mean that they want to unravel the entire system or start all over again.” What they want is “to reform and improve the system to keep up with the times.”

China has proposed some remedial changes where the existing international order falls short. The Belt and Road Initiative and the AIIB are new public goods China is offering. They are nonexclusive and are aimed at achieving common benefits. They operate in line with the internationally acknowledged norms and draw from the experience and lessons of other international institutions.

China and the US have many common interests in world affairs, from their support for the UN to the need for joint cooperation in addressing global challenges. The 2015 China-US bilateral agreement also played a key role in the success of the UN Climate Conference in Paris. Having said that, China cannot support the US-led world order in its entirety. As you are aware, China is deeply concerned over the long-held rejection and pressure

against its political system, by the US and other Western countries. And on the security front, China stands for common security. We do not want to see the world divided again by the forming of separate exclusive military blocs.

The global power of the future will be more dispersed, and the challenges of the future will be more complicated. And that calls for changes. As we don't want to remold everyone into our own image, we can at least work together to build a more inclusive order framework, a common roof, accommodating where possible the diverse interests, needs and ideas of all. Naturally, this will take time.

China's commitment to peaceful development remains on course. We don't want to be distracted or see external environmental factors cause China's peaceful rise to be reversed. But, if threatened or when confronted by tough situations, China has more leverage and means at its disposal.

Chinese are a calm and patient people. China's priority is to conduct our own affairs well, by promoting economic growth and increasing prosperity for its people. As our capabilities improve, we will be able to do more for the region and the world. In the meantime, China needs to learn more from and communicate better with the world.

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1. Speech on the panel named "Doubling Down? China and International Order" at the 52th Munich Security Conference on 13 February 2016. An excerpt from the speech was published in the "Expert Opinion Column" of the People's Daily, on 15 February 2016.

Major Countries Need to Build Trust Among Them

The topic for this Valdai Forum is “World Order Quo Vadis?” which is also a topic attracting diverse opinions. There is obviously no consensus yet on how we should adjust the existing orders. More importantly, there is lack of trust among major countries.

Throughout the history of international relations, trust has been a rare commodity. Though mankind has progressed a lot, the lack of trust remains an obstacle to genuine partnership in today’s world. Take Russia and the US for example, even 25 years after the end of the Cold War, it is still hard to tell how much more they trust each other.

The relationship between China and the US is also often troubled by the lack of trust. In its more than 30 years of reform and opening up, China has built strong economic ties with the US. However, the recent unpleasant encounter in the South China Sea put our conflicting security interests under the spotlight, reminding many in China that in spite of the two countries close interdependence, they are far from partners when it comes to security.

We need to re-examine the US’s world order which it wants to lead for the next hundred years and try to understand what it means for China.

The world order the US seeks to keep is US-led, as it is based on American values, rejecting other ideologies and supported by a military

alignment that does not take into consideration the security interests of non-member countries.

In the economic field, the boundaries are not that distinct. While it advocates the US dollar centered global economic framework, it has also encouraged globalization, which led to the opening-up of the world economic structure. The UN institutions, G20 and many other organizations are also encouraged to play a growing role in global governance.

China does not have a strategy to challenge the US-led “world order”, but when it shuns Chinese political system and security interests, it’s hard for China to support it.

So, will the US adjust? I have discussed this with many American scholars, and the answer is No. I remember when seeking advice from Professor Mearsheimer, he told me that “China should either submit or challenge” and that it’s only natural that China would seek to replace the US and that the US should counter it.

Obviously, Chinese nation is not going to submit, nor would the other emerging countries, such as Russia and India. So is this really an “either-or” choice? Does it really mean that in the developing countries as people move out of poverty and start pursuing their dream of prosperity, their countries would have to engage in power struggles and fall into the “Thucydides Trap”?

Chinese have their own view of an international order, which is centered on the UN. Chinese President Xi Jinping said that China firmly upholds the international order and system underpinned by the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and together with other countries would want to make the international order more just and equitable.

You may notice the term we use is “international order.” China as one of the founders of the UN, is a beneficiary as well as an active supporter and reformer. This order structure overlaps to some extent, the US-led “world order”, but not entirely.

Today’s world agenda has shifted from bloc politics to development and cooperation. Globalization has allowed freer flow of goods, capital, technology and resources. China has achieved unprecedented growth thanks to good leadership and the tremendous endeavors of its population.

According to the World Bank, from 1992 to 2014, the world economy more than tripled, growing from 24.7 trillion to 78 trillion US dollars, while global trade volume more than quadrupled, growing from 5.1 trillion to 23.8 trillion US dollars. Both the developed and developing world benefited greatly from this growth, with the contribution of emerging markets and developing countries to world growth rising from 26.97% to 61.4%.

China is comfortable to stay within this international order, as it has allowed China to achieve its purposes. But we also believe there is a need for reform.

We have to admit that the world’s landscape has been transformed, but today’s order and rules are falling short of providing all the solutions, and are sometimes creating more problems.

The challenges we face today are diverse and complicated, with interventions from major countries causing more disorder than order, which sometimes spilled over into greater turmoil. The world has witnessed upheaval in countries, resulting from power vacuums where terrorism thrives, and people are left in destitution. The lesson is profound.

Globalization has also revealed its downside, with uneven development and distribution of wealth, and the lack of sufficient oversight in the flow of capital. Regional integration is also losing momentum. The existing international order needs to improve to be better suited to the time and to strengthen its global governance, but changes should be incremental.

Chinese President Xi Jinping has talked about the concept of building a community with a shared future for the mankind and the need for “a new model of global partnership.” China has proposed the Belt and Road Initiative, which is aimed at nurturing new growth and promoting mutual prosperity and security through wider cooperation. The Eurasian Economic Union that Russia proposed is in the same vein and the two can reinforce each other. The US, in spite of its apprehension, could also find opportunities in these initiative should it join them.

To conclude, the key to a common order, if there can be one, is to have an inclusive framework that provides a common roof covering every country and their concerns. This may sound idealistic and can’t be possible without trust. But as we are already meeting new challenges together, there is every reason for us to nurture this cooperation and build trust along the way.

Many ask what kind of role China wants to play in the world as it moves towards the center of the world stage. I see there are a number of elements that China holds high in its foreign policy thinking.

Firstly, mutual respect, especially in the political arena. China takes it as the foundation of trust. No country should try to impose its own values on others and countries should be respected for exploring their own paths.

Secondly, we believe in common security, meaning one country's security should not be at the expense of another's. The 21st century should not witness another round of geopolitical rivalry and new bloc politics.

Lastly, China supports economic inclusive development as highlighted at the G20 Summit in Hangzhou, to “allow economic growth to serve the needs of everyone.”

While the world expects China to take more responsibilities, it also wants to understand China's intentions. It is important that the Chinese explain ourselves more effectively in order to win more trust. We also need to learn from other countries and to be open to new ideas while developing our own.

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1. Speech at the 13th Annual Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club on October 25, 2016. Excerpts of the speech were published in Global Times, No. 4031, October 26, 2016. The full text was first published by Pangoal Institution

Economic Globalization in a World Full of Uncertainties

Uncertainties in the international situation caused by black swan events

I wonder how the year 2016 will go down in history. So many unexpected events have occurred this year. It is even described as a year of black swans. The first black swan was the British referendum on 23 June to decide whether UK should exit from or remain in the EU, and the Leave Side won, shocking the whole world. Brexit was obviously not a policy choice made by the British government but rather by the people due to their concerns. Since the 2008 financial crisis, the British people have become increasingly dissatisfied with the government, feeling that their concerns had not been heeded. Brexit was in part an expression of this feeling.

Donald Trump winning the American Presidential election on 8 November 2016 surprised the American media. It was considered an even bigger black swan event. American scholars called it a political earthquake and a revolution of the masses whose sufferings had not been heeded or addressed. Although the media and the elite had repeatedly stressed the unreliability of Trump, the people preferred to give him a try because they believed they had nothing to lose.

America is the most powerful and internationalized country in the world. The choices made and priorities given by the next American administration will have an impact on the whole world, which is why the

world is waiting and observing so carefully. In Washington DC, American think tanks and academics, known for their capability to produce ideas and policy recommendations, are now all in the guessing game. Much of their analyses and pre-judgments are based on uncertainties, and no one is clear what the administration will do in the future.

Challenges and opportunities for China

What does this mean for China? The usual talk is that “China may emerge as the winner,” but there is no certainty that this will happen. There are no grounds for optimism, rather, we may be faced with challenges requiring wisdom and audacity. Some scholars in the US have predicted that American policy toward China may well turn cool in the future. In his campaign, Trump stressed that economic relations and trade with China had inflicted huge losses on the US. He believed that his opinions reflected the mood of voters, and that he must do something after taking office.

This may mean rather grim prospects for China-US economic ties and trade. At present, discontent with China, regarding trade and the exchange rate, is influencing American’s view of China. Any new policy based on this discontent will challenge bilateral relations. People of vision in the two countries believe that a trade war is unlikely to happen as both sides will be losers. Meanwhile, the potential friction does not allow us to be optimistic, as it gave rise so many questions. Will the US take more radical measures to punish China for trade imbalances? Will it adopt a more stringent position on IPR-related issues? Will it tighten cyber security restrictions? Will it increase military operations in the South China Sea? Will it place more demands on China on the DPRK nuclear issue?

Negative rhetoric in the US about its relations with China is of course not good news as China is on a tough road of deepening reform. But there is no need for us to overreact. Every previous new US President when taking office tended to make some harsh judgments about China, but the two sides ultimately found paths to cooperation. China-US relations have grown into a giant towering tree that is hard to shake, with the two economies profoundly interdependent. Many Americans conceded that any sanctions against China will unavoidably lead to huge losses for the US itself.

Although neither side found the eight years of the Obama administration completely satisfactory, there were some remarkable achievements during that time. In the past four years, President Xi Jinping and President Obama met nine times. The two sides reached a common understanding and accomplished a lot together, including their cooperation at the global level, such as dealing with climate change. In 2015, bilateral trade reached over \$558 billion, and the two were each other's second largest trading partners. By the end of 2015, direct investments by Chinese enterprises in the US amounted to \$46.6 billion, creating many jobs and making America the fourth largest overseas direct investment destination for China.

Scholars are suggesting that Chinese business community should prepare the toolbox to respond with both international and domestic legal, procedural and economic measures to deal with possible moves that harm Chinese interests and to produce positive solutions. For example, what the US needs most is to attract investment and create jobs, which is actually aligned with Chinese enterprises' need to go global. The US is also in urgent need of infrastructure construction, and no other country can do this better than China. However, the absence of sufficient information about China in the US is a problem. In particular, Americans have little knowledge about

how Chinese enterprises operate and conduct international cooperation. The business and other communities in China need to communicate their views in a more proactive way. We must not allow fallacies to spread and interfere with or even undermine our cooperation.

From a broader perspective, the prospects for China-US cooperation are good, however, there may be some immediate challenges. According to Goldman Sachs, the American economy is hopeful of robust recovery. In particular, the policies to reduce tax and raise interest rates and increase expenditure on infrastructure construction will stimulate economy, which will lead to a recovery in the manufacturing industry and increase employment. But it is by no means easy to overcome the structural contradictions in American and other developed societies. The US often highlights the trade deficit and blames China for so-called unfair trade practices, but the American businesses investing in China have taken the bulk of the profits. Where has all the money gone? Why has America not been able to develop its labor force through a restructuring process? America's problems will not be resolved by blaming China. Obviously, the US is still not prepared to address the more profound problem of unequal distribution of wealth, which is the inherent contradiction of the capitalist system. It can only make some cosmetic changes.

It may be suggested that American domestic and foreign policies are becoming more economy-oriented. More specifically, excessive expansion and strategic overreach will give way to more inward-looking behaviors focusing on job creation. This does not mean the US will cut off its contacts with the rest of the world. Rather, it would want to make better use of the world's wealth and markets to serve American interests and address its poverty and unemployment problems. If so, the direction of change in the US is fairly clear. Economic interactions will be the focus in the future. But

as to what will happen in 2017 and what influences will those events have, we will have to keep watching.

America and globalization

With these changes, the greatest impact internationally is probably the global uncertainty caused by America's opposition to and abandoning of globalization. Since the end of the Cold War, from Clinton to Obama, the US has always been the primary advocate of globalization. For the West, globalization also means the advancement of universal values, Western democracy and liberal economic system of capitalism. They want to achieve a standardized world following the Western model in the political, economic and all other spheres.

In the early 1990s, I went to the US on a program organized by the United States Information Agency (USIA) for diplomats from developing countries. The theme was the formation of American security policy, and our itinerary covered the American Congress, think tanks, universities and some defense academies. Throughout the trip, I was trying to get the answer to one question: What was America's strategic objective in the present world? Now that its arch enemy the former Soviet Union was out of the way, what was the US trying to achieve with its military deployments all over the world? Everywhere we visited, the answer I was given was more or less the same: democracy, human rights and universal values. These are all soft targets, whereas the military is hard power. What I wanted to understand was whether the very strong global military presence of the US would serve these soft goals. My impression was that many in the US firmly believed in these US objectives for the world, although they could not clearly say how to achieve them.

Later developments showed that the US had indeed been fighting wars for these objectives. It tried to reform regimes even during the war against terrorism. Did it misread or misjudge the world trend? Obviously, it failed to keep up with the world trend of peace and development. Before the US invaded Iraq, China's GDP was only one ninth of the US's; ten years later, when the US withdrew from Iraq, it has increased to about one half. Now that the US is more sober-minded, Obama complained that China had been freeriding. And according to Trump, America should not have wasted so much money fighting everywhere in the world.

In the meantime, the US was busy promoting free market economies across the world. Profit-seeking behaviors led to a rapid relocation of manufacturing enterprises. Within one generation following the end of the Cold War, America's industrial foundation was hollowed out, leaving infrastructure in disrepair and its social contracts falling apart. Wealth flows more rapidly to the wealthy. These people are the proponents and biggest beneficiaries of globalization. The rich get richer, the poor become poorer. The majority of ordinary Americans including the middle class have felt being deprived and hurt. Europe has had a similar experience, and in some European countries, youth unemployment rates remained high.

Now we have a picture where the Western ruling class have manipulated globalization, while "revolutionaries" of the masses are targeting globalization and countries like China which have succeeded in it.

China and globalization

China has transformed itself from a poor agricultural economy into a country being fast industrialized, and over 600 million people have found

their way out of poverty. This results from the fact that in China we have the right leadership from the CPC. With a proper understanding of the world trends, China set firm objectives of reform, opening-up and economic development. It has actively participated in the economic globalization while refusing the westernization of its political system. With growing success, its self-confidence is on the rise and people are united.

Many in the US are asking whether China wants to fill the leadership gap when the US retreats from globalization. It is very hard to give a yes or no answer to this question, as it is more like a rhetorical trap.

The 30-year economic globalization has resulted in profound interdependence among countries. History cannot be undone. Globalization is unlikely to be reversed. The US may stop supporting it, but globalization will not come to a halt. Besides, there is no alternative. If globalization is abandoned, fragmentation may well be more harmful as beggar-thy-neighbor policies and protectionism could prevail. The problem of globalization lies not with its direction, but with its lack of management, which has led to imbalances within and between countries. The rational approach is to improve it. The initial stage of economic globalization may be considered as version 1.0, and now it is time for us to consider globalization version 2.0. Such changes are already unfolding.

First, in a new round of the technological revolution, the development and evolution of web platforms, mobile communications and artificial intelligence technologies have been the catalyst for new production and distribution models. For example, the November 11th Singles' Day online shopping festival in 2016 generated \$18 billion in total sales in just one day, which also extended to 235 countries and regions.

Second, the industrial division of labor has further expanded into the developing world. While China works to transform, upgrade its manufacturing sector, emerging countries like India and Vietnam and those in Africa also have started to take over more jobs for labour division in manufacturing. They are the force which will add to the sustainability of economic globalization.

At the same time, China through its own experience recognizes the shortcomings of globalization and has embarked on a tough journey of transformation and modernization. Indeed, we can and must play a greater role in the future globalization process. China does not want to see a turning back on globalization. At the APEC meeting in Peru, President Xi Jinping sent a clear signal when he voiced support for the development of an Asia-Pacific free trade area. The Belt and Road Initiative and the AIIB, both proposed by China, have been fully launched. Through both projects, China will gain more experience and means to participate in and influence the future globalization.

China used to be a closed and backward country. We missed several opportunities in the past to join the global tide of development. Today's great achievement in China has to a large extent benefited resulted from the reform and opening-up policy promoted by Deng Xiaoping. Indeed, the Chinese people have experienced many twists and turns, but it has been these hardships that have strengthened their belief and commitment to the country's goals. Today's world is more complicated than ever. We must observe it with a cool head and stand firm, meet our challenges and proactively seek opportunities to ensure our successful path continues along with the progress of the world.

1. This speech was given at the Sanya Forum on 11 December 2016. The speech was later revised and published in the Global Times, 19 December 2016.

Global Changes and China's Role^注

These days, people are watching closely with both expectations and concerns the rapid changes that are affecting the world. This is more evident to me when I was attending the 53rd Munich Security Conference (MSC) in Germany in February 2017. The conference was focused on such important topics as international order, changes to economic globalization and global governance. China's role in the changes is one of the focus of attention.

China's role in promoting economic globalization is appreciated

The 2017 MSC report was entitled “Post-Truth, Post-West, PostOrder?” Wolfgang Ischinger, Chairman of the MSC, remarked at the opening of the conference that he had never seen in his career the world facing so many uncertainties, with different interests and values eroding the society from the outside deep into the inside, accelerating the decline of the West.^注 One could see that the participants of the conference including those from Europe and the US were aware that the old international order is not sustainable and a new order is needed, but they are less clear about where the world should be heading. A sense of confusion and anxiety was felt at the conference as well as an eagerness to look into the future.

Many people also want to know China's views on these issues. When having a roundtable with the MSC young leaders, I found that they were interested in President Xi Jinping's speeches delivered in January 2017 at the World Economic Forum's Annual Meeting in Davos and at the United Nations Office in Geneva. They welcomed President Xi's remarks which

brought confidence to a world troubled by trends of anti-globalization, counter-globalization and protectionism, and which demonstrated China's firm support for the international order and economic globalization. They suggested that China should come up with detailed and specific proposals to translate its appeal in supporting economic globalization and free trade into action so that globalization may overcome current difficulties and achieve improvement.

I shared my views on China's proposals on global governance and economic globalization. In 2013, President Xi Jinping formally proposed the Belt and Road Initiative. Three years on, this initiative has gathered support from more than 100 countries and international organizations. China has jointly issued cooperation documents with 56 countries and regional organizations on cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative framework, and signed free trade zone agreements with 11 countries and bilateral investment agreements with 56 countries. As of June 2016, Chinese companies had built 38 large-scale transportation infrastructure projects in 26 countries within this framework; China's investment in the countries along the Belt and Road has reached \$51.1 billion, and 52 economic and trade cooperation zones have been established in 18 countries with the total investment amounting to \$15.6 billion. Since its launch in January 2016, 57 countries have become members of the China-proposed Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which has made a total of \$1.73 billion of loans, already supporting nine infrastructure projects in seven countries. In May 2017, the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation will be held in Beijing. The participating countries will discuss how to complement each other and promote new growth in the region through the Belt and Road Initiative.

Many participants expressed their admiration for the “China resolve” and “China pace,” complimented China’s contribution to globalization. Some also noticed that China’s efforts had not been duly reflected in international media coverage and suggested that China communicate more with the world so that more people would understand its vision, goals, good will and capabilities.

Has globalization driven by the West gone astray?

The debate about ‘world order’ and ‘China’s new leadership role’ is attracting attention, but the concepts behind these terms are not as clear as they may appear.

China has long regarded itself as a creator, contributor, beneficiary and reformer of the existing international order. This international order is shaped by the framework centered on the United Nations and complemented by other international institutions, such as the World Trade Organization and the World Bank. Designed by the victors of World War Two, this order is based on the principle of sovereignty of nation-state and has played a vital role in safeguarding world peace. The end of the Cold War and the rise of multilateralism allowed this rule-based international framework to play greater role, including advancing economic globalization. As capital, technology, talents and industries continue to spread away from the developed nations out to the wider world, economic globalization continued to gather momentum.

As the only superpower to have survived the Cold War, the US has prided itself on being the winner and turned its head with the ambition of creating a ‘world order’ under the US rule, also proposed by some as Pax Americana. This US-led world order is founded upon its unipolar leadership and is not always bound by the rules of the UN. This is particularly evident

in the field of security, where the US has often gone its own way, bypassing the UN and its norms and principles. The US-led military alliance with their own security interests forms the core of this exclusive US-led world order and their interests are often held above those of others. The liberal democratic system adopted by the US and its allies is promoted as superior to other forms of government. China does not agree with this way of thinking and has not been accepted by this exclusive club, either.

The economic globalization which has been the most important development in the post-Cold War landscape was enthusiastically advocated and promoted by the US and its allies. As economic globalization is providing strong impetus for global economic growth, great advances have been made in science and technology and social progress. In particular, the growth of the emerging economies has helped expand the size of the world economy and market, from which all countries benefit. However, destabilizing factors have also increased in recent years. On the one hand, there has been a resurgence of geopolitical conflicts among major countries and the aftermath of conflict in the Middle East is still hurting the region. As a result, the world order has been found wanting in the face of conventional and non-conventional security challenges. On the other hand, impacted by the global financial crisis, the world economy has structurally moved to a lower growth level. Uneven growth across countries has resulted in uneven distribution of wealth, widening the income gap and growing social problems. Some developed countries in particular, are suffering from the weakening of the middle class. As anti-globalization and deglobalization sentiments rise, many people in the West have become doubtful about globalization and its benefits, and the US has begun to waver in its commitments to it.

There has been a complex web of factors at play. While the world's wealth has been substantially expanded through economic globalization, with the absence of a sound global governance system, there has been a failure to rein in the capital and distribute the benefits fairly. Lying beneath the hotly debated imbalance between global savings and consumption is a deep structural problem—the unequal distribution of the world's wealth and a North-South growth gap. There is an important point that should not be missed: the globalization agenda that the US and its Western allies tried to pursue was not limited to the economic sphere. It also included a political dimension: 'global Westernization,' meaning the exporting of Western values and systems under the flag of liberalism. But such interventions in some parts of the world have not been working well and in some cases even backfired, causing protracted turmoil in some countries. The consequent refugee crisis has taken a heavy toll on both the reformed and the reformers.

The many problems bubbling to the surface are signaling that the global governance has come to a historic crossroad and requires significant changes. But before getting down to new reforms, we must first get to the crux of the problems. The issue is not so much that the current international order is incapable, but that the sole superpower in the system has been aiming at the wrong target. Secondly, it is not that economic globalization is flawed as a whole, but the way Western countries promote economic globalization is. We cannot say that the UN Charter and the basic norms governing international relations have become outdated. Quite the contrary, the problems lie in the fact that they have not been implemented seriously. Also, we cannot say globalization is a total failure. Instead, what we can see is that it did not serve the political purposes Western countries intended. As new global issues continue to emerge, a new way of thinking and acting is required.

Bringing new changes to the world order does not mean starting all over again

Chinese President Xi Jinping has on many occasions talked about ways to improve the current international order and global governance. China proposes to solve the mounting international challenges through boosting economic growth.

While speaking at the UN Sustainable Development Summit in September 2015 and the UN office in Geneva in January 2017, he stated that mankind was in a time of significant growth, reform and adjustment, and an era of numerous challenges and increasing risks. The only way to properly address the global challenges is through the pursuit of peace and development. As President Xi remarked, “We must hold on to development as our master key.”

China’s views on economic globalization are realistic and constructive. Indeed, economic globalization is a double-edged sword, but it is by nature open and inclusive. We should look squarely at the current problems, while remembering we cannot change the past, to ensure that we properly adjust and regulate globalization. And in doing so, we should make it more vibrant, inclusive and sustainable, so that it can deliver benefits to all.

President Xi has expressed his view on a number of occasions over the changes in the international order and global governance from a wider angle of perspective and called for the building of a community with a shared future’ with a network built on cooperative and win-win relationships. He advocated that the international community should promote partnership, security, growth, intercivilization exchanges and the building of a sound ecosystem. In this way we will be able to strive to achieve the goals of

lasting peace, common security, common prosperity, openness and inclusiveness, and making our world clean and beautiful. He reiterated that sovereign equality is the most important norm governing state-to-state relations over the past centuries and the cardinal principle observed by the United Nations and all other international organization. Dialogue and consultation are effective ways to bridge differences, and political negotiation is the fundamental solution to end conflicts.

He also advocated for the principle that development should be fair, open, comprehensive and innovative, as well as the principles of dialogue and consultation, achieving shared growth through discussion and collaboration, win-win cooperation, exchanges and mutual learning, and sustainable development.

These proposals advocated a new framework for the international relations. China supports the reforming of the existing international order, to make it more balanced and better reflect new developments and the interests of the majority of countries. We do not want to discard the existing order and start all over again. Rather, we want to maintain the international order and a global system that adheres to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, and we also hope to see that such reform is carried out from within and through consensus building.

China remains guarded about Global Westernization

Once we have made clear the principles, directions and approaches, the next step should be to carry them out. Reforming the international order and global governance will inevitably be a complicated and time-consuming process. China should prioritize and continue to boost its domestic

economy, to bring benefits to its people. By ensuring success at home, China will become stronger and wield greater influence, which in turn will enable it to do more for the world. To play a world role, China prefers multilateralism giving play to the existing international institutions.

To play an effective role, China must carefully choose areas where it has the skills, experience and capabilities, to address the concerns of developing countries and provide new public goods tailored to their needs. We should also promote North-South dialogue and cooperation. Recently, with a focus on its neighborhood, China has been promoting the Belt and Road Initiative, designed to improve connectivity and further growth. We are also committed to leading the negotiations or feasibility studies of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (RCEP), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Free Trade Area, and the Asia-Pacific Free Trade Area, so as to build an Asia-Pacific Partnership network. This will contribute to building a global partnership network and promoting economic globalization. As its global influence grows, China needs to foster more and closer links with other major countries, to establish more balanced and stable relationships, rather than letting the relationships slide into the trap of a zero-sum game. By promoting greater dialogue and embracing the spirit of inclusiveness and openness, China also hopes to communicate better with the international community and reduce misunderstandings and mistrust.

China must keep an open mind and learn from other countries in the world. It saw peace and development as the dominant themes in the world and decided to focus on growing its own economy. By maintaining an open mind, it was able to appreciate and follow the trend of economic globalization by boldly testing and quickly adapting to it. China successfully introduced capital, advanced technologies and management

skills from other countries and regions, making tremendous progress in riding the wave of economic globalization. It was not all plain sailing or without difficulties, controversies or doubts, but China eventually overcame the enormous obstacles and survived many painful setbacks. Now China is able to navigate through the ocean of deeper reform, knowing it is on the right course. It has also made a significant contribution to world growth with its own achievements. China has also taken stock of globalization in a sober and critical way, staying vigilant against the attempts of some of the Western countries to impose their own values on China and their advocating of global westernization. Following a development path that best suits its own national conditions China has achieved domestic social stability and policy consistency. These successful experience will be valued in China as it is joining efforts with other countries to improve the international order and global governance in this ever-changing world.

China needs to be sober-minded about being called “a world leader”

Today, there is a view in the world that the US is going to retreat from its leadership position, and that China will fill the power vacuum and become a new “world leader.” Politicians and scholars from other countries tend to use the word “leadership” to describe China’s role, believing it is only a matter of time before Chinese leadership replaces the US’ in an increasing number of global issues.

In the Western understanding of international relations, “world leader” has been a special term to describe America’s role in the world. The modern concept of US leadership originated from the hegemonic stability theory of the 1970s, which was based on the believe that the international system

needed to be managed by a single dominant superpower who could regulate the interactions of the actors in this system. The US was already the most powerful state in the world during the World War Two, and then during the Cold War, it became the leader of the Western world. After the Cold War ended, the US remained as the only superpower standing and wanted to extend its leadership globally. There is a phrase on the first page of the 1997 White House Report— “A National Security Strategy for a New Century”, “leadership today for a safer, more prosperous tomorrow,”^注 which reflects the US’ view on its role in the world. The Obama administration, which regarded itself as defender of the liberal values, also give importance to maintaining the US’ role as a world leader and took it as a major policy objective. Even President Trump, who has tried to make a radical break from Obama’s foreign policies, did not deny the US’ role as a world leader. Rather, he has advocated putting ‘America First’ in order to regain strength before it can once again shoulder the responsibility of “leading the world”.

It should be noted that the “world leadership” the US is keen to keep tries to take a “creationist perspective” of the world. It was founded on the principle of realist’s believe of maximizing the security for the hegemonic power. To maintain the position of ‘world leader,’ the US has relied on its supreme military power and its military alliances for global intervention. The US is also a strong economic power with the ability to influence the world economy through the US-dollar centered international monetary system. Politically, the US promoted ‘universal values.’ After the fall of the Soviet Union, as its egoism has grown, the US has tried to lead the West in transforming the world. But its miscalculation and behavior has not only thrown some part of the world into chaos, but also took a heavy toll on itself. The Obama administration made some introspection and exercised prudence in the use of force. Now the Trump administration has taken one step further by reflecting on whether the US should continue to uphold

responsibilities for its allies and making enemies around the world. The international community should welcome such self-reflection and the adjustment to American goals. But such change may not be easy for the US, as it is so accustomed to its global strategic reach and is so comfortable with its leadership role. This is not the first time the US had been confronted and dealt with a difficult situation, we need to wait and see how things would play out.

Going after the maximization of international power inevitably involves the suppression of real and potential opponents, which does not conform to China's diplomatic philosophy, practice or our goal in international affairs. China upholds the UN-led international order and follows closely the basic norms outlined in the UN Charter. As a socialist country, China embraces the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states and the equality of nations, large or small. China, with its very different culture and history, is not the US, nor will it ever seek to become a hegemony like the US.

Despite its tremendous achievements over the past decades, China is still a developing country confronted with difficult challenges as its drive to reform and opening up entering a new stage. China's focus will continue to be on its domestic front and long-term national policy objective. Only with constant success at home can China offer more to the world.

So how do we define China's international role? President Xi Jinping has highlighted on a number of occasions that the Chinese diplomatic goal is to maintain world peace and promote common development. China wants to be a contributor to world peace, a facilitator in global development and an advocate of the international order. President Xi also called for staying cool, reminding us that China should keep a sober mind or be clearheaded

in the face of the title ‘global leader.’ No matter how strong China may become, it would never be able to control the world, as ultimately it is only through consultations and negotiations among nations that complex international issues can be resolved. There is no doubt that China, in pursuit of its vision of international order, is already playing a growing role in global governance. This was seen in September 2016 when China hosted the G20 Hangzhou Summit, and when President Xi personally presented to the UN Secretary General China’s ratified documents to join the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, showing its commitment to addressing climate change.

Promoting development of more inclusive international order

China is giving lots of thought to the complexity of present-day security threats which pose a huge challenge. As a major country in a complicated geopolitical environment, China is fully aware of its responsibility in maintaining world peace and international security. Since the rise of nation-states in 17th century Europe, lasting peace has been hard to achieve. The world has witnessed centuries of power struggles and wars as states competed for dominance on the international stage. It is time to end this cycle. China is striving to achieve national rejuvenation and is setting a historic precedent with its peaceful rise, while also developing the capabilities to promote peace and prosperity across the world. China therefore is duty-bound to acquire the capabilities to ensure that the world will stay on the path of peace and development. As Chinese Premier Li Keqiang emphasized when delivering the 2017 Government Work Report, we must “offer constructive proposals for addressing global and regional hotspot issues.”

When talking about future reform of the international order and the reshaping of global governance, we need to find the right balance of power and interests between China and the US. Due to the significant differences in their political systems and foreign policies, China may not agree with the US on every issue. However, the two countries do have common interests and shared vision in many areas, which makes their collaboration necessary and possible. Moving forward, China, as it feels appropriate, will gradually increase its involvement to ensure the successful transformation of the international order.

Global governance extends from sound domestic governance and to participate in global governance, a country needs to first manage its domestic affairs well. Under the leadership of the CPC Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core, China is successfully strengthening domestic development, achieving social fairness and the rule of law. Taking advantage of the opportunities brought about by economic globalization, China has achieved peaceful rise with the hard efforts of its people and in turn it has contributed to economic globalization and reforms of the international order. Such a phenomenon is rarely seen in human history. With domestic success, China is also able to do more in promoting international peace, cooperation and justice. China will not and does not need to go onto the old path of geostrategic conflict and hegemonic struggle. Looking forward, China should have the interest, capabilities and courage to promote a more inclusive international order, which will accommodate the different interests and views of all parties, and to create a common roof for all.

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1. This article was written for a Special Coverage for the 2017 Two Sessions (i.e. the annual National People's Congress and the Political Consultative Conference held early March) under the title of "China Approaching the World's Centre Stage". It was also carried on China's

Reference News on March 9, 2017. The English version appeared in the China-US Focus on May 2, 2017.

2. Munich Security Report 2017.
3. <https://clintonwhitehouse2.archives.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/Strategy/>.

China's Vision for the World: A Community with a Shared Future for Mankind

Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013, with the aim of expanding China's cooperation, originally with neighboring countries and regions and then it has spread. The initiative represents a major contribution by China, adding momentum to a new phase of economic globalization. To promote the visibility and understanding of the initiative, China hosted the Belt and Road Summit in May 2017. This initiative joins an array of newly developed diplomatic policies and guidelines put forward by China. While acknowledging its growing global status, China recognizes the need to consider wider global interests, and is willing to do more to help protect world peace, advance sustained development and promote international cooperation. The objective is to promote a community with a shared future. President Xi, in his keynote speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2017, noted that, "as long as we keep to the goal of building a community with a shared future for mankind and work together to fulfill our responsibilities and overcome difficulties, we will be able to create a better world and enable people to lead better lives."

A Community with a shared future is all inclusive

The vision for a community with a shared future is the culmination of President Xi's ideas on reforming and improving the existing international order. Special consideration was given to developments in the 21st century

and their impact on international relations. It also represents an effort to search for an answer to such big questions as where mankind is heading, when viewed against the backdrop of a changing global landscape and the need to improve global governance. The post-World War Two world has in general been one of peace and prosperity, primarily due to the formation of the international order and the spread of economic globalization. However, the existing international order has been found wanting in the face of ever increasing global challenges and the growing diversity of the international players. Confronted with heightened risks and worldwide insecurity, there is the danger that global development is disrupted and thrown off track, which highlights the urgent need for innovation and reform of the current international order. The international order, which China supports, is the framework centered on the United Nations (UN) and its institutions. This order was created after World War Two as a safeguard for an ideal world of nation states, and a world government built on multilateralism. It represented historic progress for humanity, by incorporating international relations into a framework of rules and putting world finance, trade and development under universally recognized rules of governance. The US and the western developed countries have played a major role in designing and building this order.

However, although the Western world is committed to this UNcentric international order, it has not confined itself to this framework. After emerging victorious at the end of the Cold War, the United States crowned itself as the world leader and has tried to extend the Western order to make it the new world order. The American version of the world order does overlap the UN-led international order, but goes beyond it. For example, it pursues security through US-led military coalitions and puts its members' security interests above those of non-allies. Politically, it seeks with evangelical zeal to transform non-Western countries into ones

accepting Western political systems and values. When addressing global or regional issues, they focused on pursuing their own interests, using the UN framework if it meets their needs, and otherwise taking unilateral actions, some of which have led to a succession of blunders, leaving ensuing turbulence for the rest of the world to deal with.

The People's Republic of China has been an active supporter and participant in the UN-led international order. China agrees with, and is fully committed to economic globalization and has complied with the rules that govern international trade, investment and financial transactions. It has been tough for China to adapt to the trend of economic globalization, but its effort has been rewarded with the benefits of faster integration into the world economy. However, on security, China has been ostracized by the US-led western coalition, with China's values dismissed as being alien to their world order. To safeguard its own security and stability, China has been wary of the political and security agenda promoted by the West. Over recent years, China's growing strength has given it more credibility and influence in the world, enabling it to join the efforts promoting a more balanced global development through long overdue reforms and improvements. However, this has also caused unfounded suspicion that China's departure from its longtime passive posture is a sign of it challenging the US-led world order.

World history shows that order does not evolve in a linear way. Over time, old orders gave way to new ones, due to clashes among major powers or through the decline of the dominant power. A successful order should be able to accommodate the growing interests of all its members. The current international order, although imperfect in its efficiency and execution, is the closest to fairness that mankind has achieved. It does need to be improved, however, with the wisdom and efforts of all its members in dealing with the

changes. China has reaffirmed that it has no intention to create a parallel order, but rather, it would like to see a world of nations under the same roof, big enough to house all countries. The proposition of building a community with a shared future best expresses this ideal, as it celebrates diversity and inclusiveness, and respects the legitimate interests and values of all nations, regardless of their social systems or levels of development. In this new round of changes, it is important not only to carry on the traditional framework but also to modernize the existing order and systems. This can be done by developing concepts reflecting the latest trends, while ensuring that the changes are not only attractive to all but also practical, viable, and resilient. While serving as a guideline for China's diplomatic endeavor, the proposition of building a community with a shared future also serves the efforts of the international community to meet challenges, handle crises and solve problems. According to President Xi, there can be three pillars underpinning this community: cooperative security, common development and political inclusiveness.

Pursuing cooperative security through consultation and collaboration

Cooperative security originates from China's traditional concepts of security, with its long-held belief in the need to maintain stability, discourage expansionism as well as in political concepts based on moral principle and justice. This concept has deep roots in China's traditional strategic thinking, i.e. "caring about the well-being of all under heaven," "respecting peace and stability," and "exhausting peaceful means before resorting to force." Today, China's diplomacy champions preserving the country's fundamental interests and seeks to handle security issues

through consultation and cooperation. When the use of force becomes unavoidable, it needs to be justifiable and legitimate.

The concept of cooperative security has also grown out of an increasingly complex global security environment. We are in an era of unprecedentedly diverse security challenges. As civilization advances, our shared interests grow, and our multilateral security mechanisms become more mature. Therefore, the risk of conventional conflicts or even war between major powers or blocs are generally being kept under control. However, “invisible but formidable” forces like terrorism and cybercrime are lurking across borders, disrupting countries’ traditional security and overwhelming the existing international mechanisms. As security challenges begin to transcend national boundaries and spread across the world in new and unanticipated ways, no country, however powerful, can tackle them alone. Therefore, we need to go beyond the traditional notions of security and grow out of the zero-sum mentality of the Cold War and pursue cooperative security through collaboration for the sake of long term world cooperation, stability and peace.

The concept of cooperative security is China’s answer to the need for addressing modern security concerns vis-a-vis the US-led collective security mechanism, a term coined during World War One, and widely and effectively applied to strengthen the security and defense of the allies during World War Two. However, collective security viewed nowadays is essentially locked into a zero-sum mentality. Since it pursues an unlimited expansion of its own absolute security, at the price of that of non-allies, collective security cannot provide security to all members of the world community. There is another disadvantage of this mechanism. Through alliance arrangements, one country’s security interest and foreign policy is bound up with those of the other members, leaving each member less room

to make independent decisions. Cooperative security is a more realistic vision than collective security as it avoids the old-fashioned friend-or-foe identifications of the world and is oriented towards the greater goal of protecting the security and interests of all. Such an approach marks an important step forward in world security thinking.

Northeast Asia is a testing ground for cooperative security in Asia Pacific. The Korean nuclear issue had remained unresolved for decades, as deeply rooted mistrust between the United States and the DPRK hampered comprehensive implementation of the agreements reached in previous rounds of multilateral negotiations. The DPRK has continued carrying out nuclear and missile tests, while the United States and South Korea, for years, have staged large-scale joint military exercises on the peninsula. Such mutual provocation has spiraled into a vicious circle, pushing the region to the brink of conflicts. To cope with this tough situation, China has proposed the “dual-track” and “suspension for suspension” approach, which call for North Korea to suspend missile and nuclear tests and the US and South Korea to suspend their large-scale military exercises, thus allowing the parties to return to the negotiating table.

Simultaneous efforts should be made to achieve denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and establish a peace-making mechanism. This would address the concerns of all relevant parties in a fair and nondiscriminatory manner and eventually tackle the security issue at its roots. In other words, the purpose of these approaches is to break the current security deadlock first, and then try to find a way to achieve common security. To terminate the on-and-off Korean Peninsula crisis, we should encourage all relevant parties to work together under the same cooperation and security framework, while ensuring stability through diplomatic efforts. By mobilizing economic resources and applying bilateral and multilateral means, we should urge


North Korea to halt its nuclear program and turn its attention to improving its citizens' livelihoods and joining regional cooperation. Under today's new circumstances, a new version of Northeast Asian cooperation scheme is needed, and sharing development opportunities should be the new approach toward finding solutions to security issue.

The Belt and Road initiative: promoting common development

Development helps in reinforcing security. It is unimaginable that long-term stability can be achieved in a country or region if it is stuck in poverty. Peace can also be shaky in a socio-economically unbalanced country or region, where wealth is concentrated in the hands of few. Lessons from history show that unbalanced development provides a breeding ground for extremist ideologies. The vision of creating a community with a shared future encourages global and regional cooperation to help developing countries, and narrow the North-South gap and regional imbalances. It is hoped that greater development can generate new impetus to increase inclusive and sustainable global economic growth.

The central and southern subcontinents of the vast Eurasian region, once home to splendid ancient civilizations, have now become underdeveloped areas. For years, these areas have received considerable attention and benefited a lot from assistance from such international institutions like the World Bank, the IMF and the Asian Development Bank. The economic assistance is not without political thresholds and there was also low approval rates due to limited resources. They were not able to address all the immediate needs in the area. Following the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013 and the subsequent establishment of the AIIB, China has tried to complement the effort by creating favourable

environment for free trade and investment. It started from the neighboring areas and then spread further, providing new public goods to the international community, and specifically to the developing countries in the Eurasian region and beyond. At the conference on the Belt and Road Initiative in August 2016, President Xi further explained that under this initiative, efforts will be made to build transnational connectivity, enhance collaboration in trade and investment and facilitate cooperation to improve productive capabilities and create new demands. All of the efforts should contribute to the rebalancing of the global economy.

According to a rough estimate by Chinese government agencies, the Belt and Road Initiative covers more than 60 countries and around 4.4 billion people, or 63% of the world's population, but only 29% of the global GDP, or \$23 trillion, and a quarter of the world's trade volume . Against the backdrop of a prolonged global economic downturn, China's Belt and Road Initiative can help meet the needs for infrastructure improvement and promote industrialization and modernization in the region and beyond. It may also allow the huge potential of these countries to come into play and stimulate new growth for the world economy. As predicted by the US consulting firm McKinsey & Company, the countries along the Belt and Road are expected to contribute over 80% of global economic growth by 2050. China intends to turn into practice the vision for common development and a community with a shared future through the Belt and Road Initiative. It would work with all countries concerned to address the issues of uneven development and stimulate new prosperity.

Political inclusiveness requires tolerance and acceptance of differing views

To realize the goal for a community, we need political inclusiveness. The world comprises many diverse countries, which follow different paths and have different experiences. They all deserve to achieve success in their own way. As yet, there is no single model that has proved to be successful and universally applicable. The objective of building a community with a shared future relies on an open approach and acceptance of diversity, which would enable nations to follow their own paths that they believe would lead them to success—highly evolved civilization, democracy and prosperity.

Mutual respect is essential for state-to-state relations. Only through respect and a willingness to communicate, can countries learn from one another and efficiently play their part in the development of human civilization. Over recent decades, China has been learning from many other countries while exploring its own path, growing out of poverty and weakness through trial and error. From experiences drawn from setbacks and successes, we realize the importance of having the courage to learn from others while upholding our own principles and adhering to our own path. China should continue to improve its governance and build its strength. As China grows stronger, it will be able to do more for the world by joining the efforts along with other countries to build a community with a shared future.

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1. This piece was adapted from a Chinese article published on page 8 of the People's Daily on May 16, 2017, and appeared in the Diplomat in the US on June 22, 2017.
 2. These data come from National Development and Reform Commission, 程国强“共建‘一带一路’，共创美好未来”.

China-US Relations

China and the US, Learning to Work Together^注

For Chinese scholars of international relations, this is a good time as China is increasingly active in communicating with the rest of the world. President Xi Jinping has just concluded his state visits to five Latin American countries, reaching many agreements and consensus which will have a long-lasting impact. To reflect China's vision and aspirations, Chinese leaders over the last couple of years have made a number of major initiatives and proposals, and have offered new concepts and proposition at regional and international forums.

Today we are here to launch the *Blue Book of the United States 2014*. It has carried articles with rich content and offered fair and objective conclusions, as many of their analysis are based on substantial data and hard facts. In a sense, it is the culmination of Chinese academia's take on the US and China-US relations. I find it insightful, and I would like to offer my congratulations on its publication.

In today's information age, the internet is facilitating faster and wide transmission of information, enabling more people to know the world better. However, the easy access to information has sometimes resulted in unreliable and inconsistent research. We take our hats off to the scholars who bent on producing rigorous and scientifically sound research that provides significant and convincing findings t help develop China's international thinking.

Today, scholars of international studies across the globe are focusing on two big topics. One is how the US will adapt and adjust when making

policies in this new and more diversified international environment. The other is how China as an emerging power will influence the world order. This leads to another subject that has become increasingly interesting to researchers: how should China, the world's largest developing country, co-exist with the US, the world's most powerful industrialized country? I had the privilege of consulting Dr. Kissinger about these topics when I was attending a conference in New York recently. He suggested that the US was entering an unusual era of foreign policy, following a long period of absolute world dominance.

Is it reasonable to conclude that due to its anxieties the US is ill suited to today's world? Since 2010, the US has been gripped by the fear of its own decline, and its perceived competition from China for world dominance. China's rapid economic growth has taken many in the US by surprise. In 2000, the US represented 30.8% of the total world economy, with a GDP of \$9.9 trillion and greater than the next four largest economies (Japan, Germany, the UK and France) combined. In contrast, China, ranking sixth with its GDP at \$1.2 trillion, a ninth that of the US. Over the last decade, China has maintained a fast-paced growth, without experiencing any serious domestic instability or participating in any large-scale international conflict. By 2013, its GDP had reached \$9.4 trillion and was over half of that of the US's.

From a broader perspective, China's growth reflects a significant change in the world—the major engines for world economic growth are no longer confined to the developed countries. Driven by globalization, resources including capital, technology and talent, which were once concentrated in the developed countries with a population of approximately 1 billion people, are now flowing into other regions. Many developing countries have seized this unparalleled opportunity to get ahead and gaining

economic vitality. In the second half of 2012, the contribution of developing countries to world economic growth at one point reached 90% and even now stands at over 50%. China and the other developing countries, having kept up with the trend of the times, are continuing on the path of peaceful development and are becoming a significant force in the promotion of world peace and prosperity in the new century.

When I attend international meetings, I repeatedly hear the same questions: What will China bring to the world when it becomes a world power? What does it want from the world? What can it offer to the world? Can it join with other countries to stop wars and safeguard peace?

Some Western scholars worry Asia, as the world's fastest-growing region with many disputes, will be the next flashpoint. Some are drawing a parallel between China and previous emerging powers fighting for world dominance. Others are comparing the disputes which China has with its neighbors, to those between established and rising powers in history. From China's perspective, these views and concerns are ill-advised. In his speech at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations in March 2013, President Xi Jinping said that "to keep up with the times, we cannot have ourselves physically living in the 21st century, but with a mindset belonging to the past, stalled in the old days of colonialism, and constrained by zero-sum Cold War mentality."^注

Why is China the subject of such persistent misinterpretation? One reason might be rooted in the traditional Western conviction that a rising power will always seek to restructure world politics and replace the existing superpowers, which is a popular theory in the US. Every time I hear these questions, I would explain that China is just trying hard to meet its people's basic needs, as there is still a large percentage of its population living in

poverty. Some American scholars reply that; the American people know very little about what the Chinese are thinking or what Chinese daily life is like; all they see is that the Chinese are getting richer, so they assume that China is becoming wealthier, stronger, and more like the US.

Indeed, its new position in the new global context presents challenges for China. As it is quickly moving from the fringes to the center stage of international affairs, its impact is no longer limited to internal affairs but also extending to neighboring regions and beyond. China is striving to adapt to this new position by increasing its awareness of international affairs, fulfilling international responsibilities and helping the international community know more about China. The *Blue Book of the United States 2014* published by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences is a case in point, as it offers a comprehensive account of Chinese views.

Undoubtedly, China differs significantly from the US in politics, culture and its level of economic development, as well as in the way of thinking about international politics. For instance, China can hardly agree with the American advocacy of a homogeneous global political system, which, in our view, shows their limited understanding of and inadequate respect for the differences. China hopes that the US will pay more attention to and support the closing of development gaps. In dealing with current conflicts and disagreements internationally, the US has grown accustomed to requiring other countries to follow and assist in their actions. This is confusing and unacceptable to many developing countries, including China.

At the same time, the China-US partnership is considered to be the most important in the world, and the cooperation between the two nations has become unprecedentedly extensive. More than 90 intergovernmental dialogue mechanisms have been established. There are also wide and

diverse academic exchanges between the two sides, with over four million visits made between the two countries each year.

In international affairs, China and the US share both the hope for global peace, and the need for steady growth in the world economy that can only be achieved through the development of global free trade and investment. As permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, both countries respect and support the United Nations framework of multilateral cooperation. The US has benefited significantly from its involvement in developing the existing international rules, and China, as a member, has also benefited from the current international system. Without the proactive efforts made by China and the US, it would be harder to make progress in the reform of international rules and governance.

It looks like the China-US relationship has a dual nature, resulting in it being complicated and difficult to manage. The relationship is sometimes dominated by conflicting interests, while at other times the two countries work together in great harmony. A strained bilateral relationship will definitely inflict harm on global peace and prosperity, and a lack of mutual understanding and trust will only amplify conflicts and further disrupt bilateral ties. For example, though the US has on many occasions clearly stated that its Asia-Pacific Rebalance policy is not designed to suppress China, there are many in China who believe that the Asia-Pacific region has become less peaceful since that strategy was announced. This was echoed in my recent talks with several US senators, where I felt there were some serious misunderstandings between us.

At the joint opening ceremony of the 6th Round of the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue held in July 2014, President Xi Jinping said: “How China and the US interpret each other’s strategic intent will

impose a direct impact on the policies they adopt and their bilateral relations. We must not make any mistake on this fundamental issue, otherwise it will lead to total failure.” He also said, “If China and the US cooperate well, they can become the bedrock of global stability and promoters of world peace. Should they enter into conflict, it would lead to disaster for both countries and the world at large.”

President Xi’s proposal for a new model of major-country relations is aimed at forging a path toward peace and cooperation: “Most importantly, we should join hands to solve problems, rather than wait for the problems to pull us along.” Indeed, to build a new model of major-country relations, the two countries must handle every problem, big or small, with patience and proper means, and constantly promote mutual understanding. At this point, our priority must be to carefully consider what we can achieve together.

Building a new model of major-country relations is a big challenge for both China and the US. While the US has extensive experience in international cooperation, China is quite different from any of America’s traditional partners. In the 21st century, Trans-Pacific cooperation between the two countries should be equal and mutually beneficial. Not only should they actively move things forward, but they should also be ready to make compromises and cater to each other’s needs. It is crucial that this relationship is not a one-way street, where only one side is meeting the needs of the other side; instead, both sides should make their fair share of compromises and pursue cooperation on an equal footing. In particular, both countries need to improve their mutual communications to resolve misunderstandings, not only at the strategic or micro levels but also among two peoples. The two countries should also cultivate their ability for cooperation in international affairs.

1. Speech at an international academic conference with the theme “Trends in Contemporary US Domestic & Foreign Policy and the Prospects for China-US Relations”. The meeting was jointly organized by the Institute of American Studies (IAS-CASS), the Chinese Association of American Studies (CAAS) and the Social Sciences Academic Press (SSAP). It was also hosted for the launch of the Blue Book of the United States: Annual Report on the Development of US.(2014). The full Chinese text of the speech was published in Issue 5, 2014 of the Chinese Journal of American Studies.
2. Xinhua News Agency, “Xi calls for new-type international relations, ”China Daily, March 24,2013. www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-03/24/content_16340253.htm.

The Way Forward for China-US Relations^①

Exploring the relationship between China and the US has always been the focus of the academic circles in both countries. We need to be attentive to the development and changes in the US, understand the reasons behind them and find the ways and means to promote cooperation and resolve our differences. Meanwhile, it is also necessary to keep pace with the developments and changes worldwide, study the new issues that are emerging in the international relations, and propose innovative ways to deal with them and even to influence the changes. I think this is where the purpose of the *Annual Report on Research of USA (2015)* lay. I would like to congratulate them on the release of this blue book, and my warm thanks go to all those who have contributed.

I have just returned from a trip to the United States during which I met with several US lawmakers and professors. I also touched base with seven think tanks and talked to some media people. What struck me was how diverse their views toward China were. Generally speaking, their views about China can be divided into the following three categories.

The first kind is what I call the pessimists. A good example of this type of view is Professor John Mearsheimer, a professor of political science at the University of Chicago. He is probably the most prominent doomsayer regarding China-US relations. He tried to substantiate his beliefs through the inevitability of a power conflict between China and the United States, by citing China's exponential growth. He thinks that China is seeking to reshape the current world order to suit its own interests. Prof. Mearsheimer

believes that the US and its allies have to stop China before it gets too big to control and that the US has no time to waste. One of his remarks, in particular, left me a deep impression: “China can wait, we can’t!” Many scholars told me not to pay too much attention to views of this type, as they are not in touch with the realities of the two countries’ relations.

The second kind could be called optimists, who are mainly people in the economic and scientific field. They believe a rising China will bring more opportunities for win-win cooperation. In particular, they cite the fact that China has contributed more than 30% to the world’s economic growth since the 2008 global financial crisis. Whether China maintains this pace of growth or its cooperation with the US, are crucial for both the US and the rest of the world. If China can succeed in its current efforts to transform its economic growth pattern, more opportunities would be provided to the major trading nations and multinational corporations, while the US, China’s major partner would derive great benefits from such a trend.

The third kind appear rather “prudent” or “concerned,” a mindset particularly prevalent among American think tanks. Many experts have candidly expressed concerns about whether our relationship can remain stable and move forward, yet they stop short of expressing conclusive opinions either way. At present, both US think tanks and the media are engaged in a heated debate concerning the motives underlying China’s land reclamation in the South China Sea. They are not concerned about the territorial disputes per se, but that China might completely undermine US dominance in the region. Hence, they hold that the United States must contain the Chinese expansion by all means. Examining such a scenario, some experts focusing the China-US relations have begun to worry that the two might fall into the “Thucydides Trap”.

For the think tanks and media in the US, China's growing influence inevitably arouses attention and suspicion. That is why media coverage of disputes and problems relating to the South China Sea, differences concerning cyber security, high technology and military affairs have so often been blown out of proportion.

I met with Dr. Henry Kissinger during this trip. He believed that China-US cooperation is moving in the right direction, but that more candid communication and sincere cooperation are needed. Dr. Kissinger maintains that the prospects for a common world order acknowledged by all countries are possible, although establishing it will be a painstaking process.

I also listened to some Chinese scholars who are observing this debate about the US-China relations and the US concerns. They suggested that the underlying reasons could be the US's grave disappointment with China in three areas. First, the US took it as a given, that a seismic change in the Chinese political system would occur once China's modernization were realized. But that did not happen, and their much-anticipated "Chinese Gorbachev" has never appeared. In reality, China's success and renewed confidence have only made the Chinese model more secure. Second, since integrating itself into the international system, China has actively participated in and even helped shape international and regional affairs, rather than passively bending to the will of the United States. Third, as China's economic reform has entered uncharted waters, large American companies in China are no longer able to reap the kind of high profits they used to. They are not adapted to the changes, and have started to have complaints.

Consequently, the United States has swung between support and suspicion, recognition and obstruction with regards to the important role

China has started to play in global issues, such as climate change and international governance. It has mixed feelings toward China's rising international status. It remains ambivalent about China proposed initiatives, including the Land and Maritime Silk Road Initiatives and the AIIB. What struck me was that after the US rejected China's proposition, there is now a wide belief among the American think tanks that no convincing reasons exist for the United States not to support or participate in these initiatives.

Indeed, it is hard to find a precedent in history where major powers have established an equal and mutually respectful relationship based on consultation, rather than war. Does the US still expect that it will be taking the lead in the traditional way, meaning that the others like China should just yield? In recent years, US officials and scholars have repeatedly stressed the need for their country to maintain its leading position in the world. I for one, wonder whether the US's anxiety about its leadership role has its roots in the country's inability to adapt to internal and global changes and the fluctuations in China-US relations are serving as a barometer for these changes.

If we take Asia-Pacific security as an example, the US-led military alliance only incorporates some of the countries in the region, so by definition it cannot represent the will of all Asia-Pacific countries. It is not very convincing to say that protecting its allies' interests equates with the protection of peace and order in the whole region. Should the United States believe that its leading role for the alliance gives it leverage over the security interests of all other Asia-Pacific nations, the countries outside its alliance may find this hard to accept. Therefore, it is not the case that China or any other country is challenging the US's leading position, but rather that the United States itself needs to reflect and try to abandon its old thinking. The US, as suggested by Dr. Kissinger, may consider building a world order

based on shared responsibilities, a new order to remedy the lack of inclusiveness in the current one.

The very essence of the concept “a new model of major country relations,” as proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping is to avoid confrontation between the major powers like China and the US, and instead, blaze a new trail of mutually beneficial cooperation. This would equip the established and emerging powers with a new set of protocols to guide their cooperation.

Despite our differences, China and the US have never been hesitant in building our ties. Currently, the cooperation between China and the US is more extensive and intensive than between any other countries worldwide. In 2014, bilateral trade surged to \$555.1 billion, and two-way investment stock exceeded \$120 billion. On average, 17,000 passengers fly between the two countries daily, and it’s expected to grow at a rate of 15%. (China and the US opened their first direct airline on 7 January 1981.

Thanks to the US’s new visa policy that extended visa validity to 10 years, which was put in place in November 2014, the number of Chinese going to the United States for tourism and study has increased by 50%. In 2015, an estimated 2.6 million visas were issued to Chinese citizens. I can only imagine how overworked the US embassy visa officials must be at present.

Thus it can be seen that the level of interaction and cooperation serve as a strong counter to the pessimism expressed about China-US relations.

And the economic interaction between China and the US accounts for a third of the global total and therefore is already a vital part of today’s world economy.

President Xi Jinping will pay his first state visit to the United States in September 2015. The fact that it was announced seven months in advance shows the importance and expectations both sides have placed on this visit. It is time for scholars specializing in China-US relations to focus on the positive direction and offer solid analysis on how we can address the issues in our bilateral relations.

To improve bilateral relations, here are a number of important concerns need to be addressed:

Firstly, we need to communicate more effectively. At present, neither side can convince the other when disagreements arise. It may be necessary to better clarify our respective policies and strategic intent at all levels in a more timely, calm and reasonable manner. It is important that the two sides should not only clearly present their positions but also listen to the other side with an open mind. Should there be an agreement, it needs to be kept. As China-US relations have gone far beyond bilateral scope, the two countries should not only work on bilateral concerns but also engage in effective dialogue on regional and global issues, to reduce misunderstanding and miscalculation.

It's also important to keep the public of the two countries informed of the content and outcomes of these dialogues, as their understanding and support is vital for the success of China-US relations. If the media continues to be antagonistic, allowing public sentiment to grow more negative, it will inevitably undermine the official dialogues and cooperation.

Secondly, we need to avoid provoking each other and improve our risk management, to prevent matters from spinning out of control. As was pointed out by the Chinese Ambassador to the United States Cui Tiankai recently, the United States is obviously attempting to draw China's ire by

flying a reconnaissance aircraft with a CNN news crew onboard, close to the Chinese construction site, in the Nansha area in the South China Sea.

Such brinkmanship and provocations will only make matters worse. While the United States remains skeptical about China's intentions in the South China Sea, in the eyes of the Chinese, the US's behavior is like a eagle breaking into a china shop. It risks undermining the delicate process for settling disputes and addressing differences through dialogue, which China and its neighbors have worked so hard to create. US scholars have always maintained that tension in the region is not related to its Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy, which we surely hope is true. In the post-Cold War era, the US approach of resolving regional confrontations through coercive means has already led to much confusion and poverty in different parts of the world.

The US government has in recent years drawn lessons from past failures, and now tends to refrain from using force unless their vital interests are at stake. But some US scholars have doubts about whether such an approach can work and suggest that the country should return to its previous hardline policies. It is interesting to observe whether the US would try to introduce the policies that have so resoundingly failed in the Middle East into Asia-Pacific? Shouldn't they consider fresh ways to work with this region? To address these concerns, the two countries, need to communicate more.

Thirdly, in China, we need to adapt more quickly to our new role as a major power and learn to explain our intentions in a way that can be understood by other nations across the world.

China is big, but not strong, and its strength does not match its size. It is on its way and learning to become a global player. In recent years, we

have often heard from Americans and Europeans who have insisted that China should play “a leading role” in some international affairs. “A leading role” to the ears of many in China, is quite an alien phrase. It will take time for us to master the steps necessary to waltz gracefully on the global stage. Domestically, we have so many of our own issues and challenges to address, and these are still our priority.

As a country on the rise, China needs to be philosophical and magnanimous. We can learn much from observing a seasoned superpower like the United States, to avoid making mistakes. Chinese academics need to study the United States thoroughly, as their policy toward China is not always based on straightforward logic, but a multi-dimensional and complex set. It is important that at this crucial time as US think tanks believe the United States should be reviewing its China policies that we play a more active role in making our voice heard. We need to avoid the situation where judgments about China are based on incomplete and inaccurate information.

In cooperation, theory and practice should go hand in hand, but over the last 40 years of China-US relations we have seen that practice has always proceeded theory, which is not abnormal. However, given the changes in priorities, sequencing, status and scope of our relations, and the widening gap in expectations, there is a need to proactively plan the future course. Academics from both countries should think outside the box and help policymakers draw up a well thought out roadmap for bilateral cooperation.

As President Xi Jinping remarked, the past years of China-US relations have shown that a sound China-US relationship serves the fundamental interests of both peoples and benefits Asia-Pacific and the world.

I am confident that the 2015*Annual Report on Research of US* will play an important role in deepening our understanding of the US. It will work not only as a good reference for the upcoming China-US strategic, economic and humanities dialogue but also for the highlevel China-US meeting in the fall. It is hoped that academics and think tanks will be continuously striving to serve the need of national development and foreign-policy decision-making.

1. This was a speech at the book launch of the Annual Report on Research of USA (2015) on 4 June 2015. The full text of the speech was released in the Chinese Social Science Today (Issue 749, 10 June 2015).

How Chinese and Americans Are Reading Each Other and Why It Matters

While speaking at a dinner of a forum in Beijing, I was asked by an American participant about what the Chinese disliked about the United States and Americans. Being among friends, I spoke my mind: it is Americans condescendingly lecturing others. What astounded me was that many of the Americans present were actually surprised by this comment. What seems obvious to one group may be seen as a surprise to another.

Later, I posed the question to a number of my WeChat (a Chinese mobile service software for social contact) groups to seek comments. I received many messages back, including from Peggy, a mother, who wrote that the Americans are too sloppy with their diet and their restaurants are stuffed with greasy and salty food. Shu, a grade school student, commented that American parents give their children more freedom, letting them do what they want. Hui, a businessman from Western China, said he liked the toll-free American highways. Among the many responses, there were both heartfelt praise and sharp criticism. Let me summarize the “likes” and the “dislikes” as follows.

Many Chinese admire the achievements and the strengths of the US. Rui, a veteran media anchorman, wrote that America has high standards for service and management, and their movies and higher education are first-rate. Lin, a scholar, thought America’s crisis management, investment management, social coordination, standardization, and regulation are all admirable. Hou, a mother, feels the Americans are warm, humorous and full

of humanistic sentiments; and they respect and love nature and life, with a great spirit for exploration. Hai, a senior diplomat, said that America leads and changes the world with a superb ability for innovation and an unlimited supply of scientific and business talents; while the world should not be dominated by the US, it cannot do without the country either. Si, Yong and Kun, all university professors, like America's rule of law, equality, melting pot culture, tolerance and its doing-it-first spirit. Jun, a scholar, was impressed that the Americans always think what they are doing is not good enough and they strive to improve themselves all the time. And Min, who lives overseas, said, we should never forget the American help during World War Two.

On the other hand, the Chinese also have reservations about America's foreign policy.

First, many believe that a lack of understanding about China has led to misguided American perceptions. Lan, a media person, is convinced that while China is huge and diverse, the American media pays attention to only a few issues and certain individuals. As a result, they give slanted coverage to the public. Wei, a journalist, sees that the Chinese, especially the youth, do not like it when Americans see China as uniformity when in fact the Chinese society is very diverse. Xu, a businessman in Zhejiang, wrote that he did not like Americans always picking on China's domestic politics and human rights, ignoring the differences in culture and development. Hua, a retired official, believes that prejudices and criticisms from America have stimulated rising resentment against the US and increased Chinese nationalism.

Yao, a doctoral candidate, wrote that America is not treating China as a real partner; its export regime is restrictive towards China and is based on

suspicion and mistrust. And Wang, a young civil servant, observed that for many Americans, there are only two kinds of people in the world, US citizens, and others, with a presumption of innocence being applied to the former, and the presumption of guilt to the latter.

Second, many Chinese see Americans not doing what they preach. They hope the US will behave more responsibly in promoting peace and development in the world. Guo, a young entrepreneur, wrote that Americans are very arrogant and always think they are right. Misha, a senior diplomat, said “my way or the highway,” American way is the only way. The US is determined to deal harshly with anyone who dares to deviate. Chen, a retired general believes that American thinking has become rigid, like assuming that its allies can do no wrong; it is also weird that any international commitments it makes can be arbitrarily voided by the US Congress. Hong and Ying, both civil servants, appreciate the emphasis given to humility in traditional Chinese culture and do not like the American way of talking down to others. Zhao, Ming and Lei, all junior diplomats, think that Americans are hypocritical, one way for themselves and another way for others; they promote democracy, freedom and human rights as universal values in other countries, but are constantly engaging in power politics for their own interests. Yang, a high school student, born in 1999, observed that American movies contain too much bloodshed and violence, with no respect for life, which is contrary to the values Americans preach. Zheng, a college professor, thinks that America wants to keep its world leadership without bearing sufficient responsibilities on global issues. Wu, a university lecturer, says, I like my American friends, but I don’t like the US foreign policy and actions, which are often too assertive. Yang, a retired sports administrator, said that America believes in “might is right,” but this can lead to more international conflicts.

While my WeChat groups are far from representative of the Chinese society, this simple survey does show how diverse and complex the Chinese views are on the US. If we take a similar poll in the US about China, the results might be diverse too. This leads to the question: Do people in China and the US really know each other? To what extent is this impacting the ever expanding China-US relations, and the world as a whole?

I observe that what the Chinese like about America is sometimes what they hope for in their own country. China has benefited tremendously from the past 30-plus years of economic reform and development, including from American capital, technology and know-how. This learning process will go on. At the same time, what many Chinese “dislike” about the US may come from the structural difficulties in the China-US relationship, which are also some of the root causes of the so-called strategic distrust between the two countries.

The core of the matter

A pronounced aspect of the structural difficulties is the impact caused by America's prejudice and rejection of China's political system. Countries have different cultural traditions and political histories and they tend to view and judge others by their own experience. In the eyes of many in the US, China values collective interests and lacks democracy and human rights. While in the eyes of many in China, the Americans, who believe in their individual rights, have inclined to engineer political transformation of other countries, and therefore we need to be on our guard. These oversimplified perceptions have put the two countries poles apart, running in parallel and never seeming able to come together.

I remember in the 1980s when I was working as an interpreter, I was once accompanying a Western delegation visiting Shanghai. During the tour, a member of the delegation asked me: Have you realized that you Chinese have no freedom and human rights? You see, Shanghai is such a great city, and you like it very much. But you can't move and stay here because the Chinese don't enjoy the freedom of movement. I thought about his words that night. The next morning, I gave him my answer: You are right that I can't move to Shanghai because I would need local food coupons to buy food and my coupons are only for Beijing. How am I supposed to live in Shanghai? In addition, the train ticket to Shanghai is quite expensive.

This situation soon changed. China's last food coupons were printed in 1993 as the country's food supply had improved. Most of China's youth born in the 1980s and 90s grew up not knowing what hunger was. They learned about and understood the world from a perspective very different from that of my generation, and they enjoy greater freedom to travel and move about. Of course, they still have to wait in a long queue for visa interviews if they want to go to the US. The new 10-year US visa policy introduced in November 2014 has brought about a new wave of applications from Chinese wishing to visit or study in the US.

What I learned from this is that everything happens for a reason and will change over time when progress is made. Therefore we should not view everything as a political issue. *Freedom* is a great word but not an absolute concept. The freedom and human rights that the Chinese people enjoy have expanded, but can and will get better. At a constitutional amendment in 2004, the following is incorporated into the Constitution: "the state respects and preserves human rights," and since then all laws and regulations are guided by it.

Software power

America is the most powerful country in the world and what it says is heard. Recently, there have been many criticisms about China over cyber-related issues, and even such words as “cyber theft” were used. I do not fully grasp the technical evidence, motivation or logic related to the charges. But these charges have also prompted a question in the minds of many: Are Chinese Internet users safe? As reported in the *China Daily*, a sampling test conducted by National Internet Emergency Center shows that in 2014, over a period of 60 days, “2,077 Trojan horse networks or botnet servers in the US directly controlled 1.18 million host computers in China”.

At present, American software, equipment, products and services are widely used in China’s internet infrastructure and important information systems. If the US regards China as a country to be wary of instead of a partner, many in China who use American softwares may reasonably ask: Are we safe?

Therefore, I believe that the US needs to be cautious when using the rhetoric of accusation and confrontation, as it will often be counterproductive. Cyber is a new frontier where new rules and regulations need to be made. Cyber security needs to be an area of cooperation between the two countries. If there are difficulties, they should be handled properly instead of being politicized.

Exploring each other’s intentions

As a matter of fact, there exists common ground between China and the US in terms of values. For example, a sense of greatness, family values,

patriotism, admiration for heroes and professionalism. The two countries also share a desire for world peace and development. The Chinese people also attach great importance to the building of democracy, although the way to build the democracy in China may be different from that in the US. But as the saying goes, all roads lead to Rome. Just as the US succeeds in its way, China is also gaining great vitality in Chinese development.

A newer cause of structural contradictions between the two countries is that the US has felt the impact of China's rise. America is taking a critical view of China's strategic intentions, especially relating to China's territorial disputes with its neighbors, believing that China may want to drive the US out from Asia. The engagement policy toward China followed by the eight successive US administrations is now coming under question, as there is rising concern about China challenging the US-dominated rules and order.

When I visited the US this year, almost everyone asked me about the South China Sea, but not many seemed to know the answer to my simplest question: How big is the South China Sea? What the Americans care about is not necessarily who are right or wrong in the territorial disputes, but the imagined question of whether China is driving the US out of Asia.

In the real world, China and the US share extensive interests in maintaining peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. Compared with other parts of the world, our region is in quite a good shape. Asia has maintained general stability and economic prosperity over the past two decades. This has everything to do with China's good neighborly policies and China-US cooperation on Asian affairs.

2015 marks the 70th anniversary of the end of World War Two, when China and the US fought on the same side against Japanese militarism. After World War Two, the Chinese government resumed the exercise of sovereignty over the South China Sea islands and reefs according to international legal instruments. This episode in history has made the ownership of the South China Sea islands and reefs very clear, as even those countries now in dispute with China previously recognized China's sovereignty over them, through diplomatic notes or officially published maps.

As for the current disputes, China, out of genuine hope for maintaining peace and stability in the area, has agreed to resolve them through peaceful negotiation and proposed to shelve the disputes and jointly develop the area. But China cannot give up its sovereignty, and the Chinese people will never allow it. China's construction on some of the Nansha reefs will benefit the Chinese personnel stationed there by improving their living and working conditions, while also strengthening China's capability to safeguard the stability of the South China Sea. In China, many are disappointed that the US always stands with China's neighbors when they challenge China over territorial matters and maritime rights, regardless of cause and merit. People in China are concerned that the US wants to make things difficult for us and attempts to form a circle of containment against China. Many have asked, what is the US military trying to do by conducting close-up reconnaissance missions near China's territory?

Another puzzling point is America's hesitance about the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), an international financial institution initiated by China. The AIIB did not have to become a focus of competition. But the US sees the AIIB as an attempt to start a new order outside the US-dominated global economic and financial system. What

China intends is to provide help to developing countries in Asia and beyond by overcoming the funding bottleneck of infrastructural development.

A case of containment

By opposing the AIIB, the US is only added to the existing concerns in China about the US' containment of China and has created more difficulties for those trying to argue against the conspiracy theory. China's rise is accompanied by strong national pride. But when the pride is hurt, it gives rise to the sense of victimhood, which in turn sours the China-US relationship.

The US and China were like sharing the same boat when they had to fight the 2008-2009 financial crisis together. Now, the world economy is not fully stabilized after the crisis. China's economy is in a period of difficult structural transition, and the US is struggling to return to healthy growth. So, there is every reason for the two countries to cooperate and meet challenges together instead of undermining each other.

I believe the speed and scale of the shifting balance of power between China and the US is being exaggerated. In China, few think that the US is going to decline. And America's worries about China are derived more from anxiety over its own relative weakening economy. What the Chinese want is to simply have a voice in world affairs that befits its strength and interests within the framework of existing rules. It is unwise to try to snub this natural desire.

China and the US are both big and complex countries, trying to cope with an ever changing world. We can try to promote mutual understanding by reining in the negativity and maintain the dynamism and stability in our

relationship, which is at an important stage of adjustment. We should make the adjustment easier by enhancing communications, especially through people-to-people exchanges.

There is already extensive traveling between the two countries. According to the Civil Aviation Administration of China, the number of people traveling between the two countries exceeded 6 million in 2014, and it is expected that there will be a 15% annual increase in the years to come. Meanwhile, more and more Americans come to China for business or tourism. Some simply do not want to leave. They have found jobs here and are building their lives as residents. I have even seen on Chinese TV young Americans speaking fluent Chinese. Such significant exchanges and cooperation point to the fact that we have a mutual connection and many of the misunderstandings between us can be resolved through more effective communication.

Many Chinese have the impression that the American understanding of China is often disconnected from reality. As Americans are now paying more attention to China, we hope they will be more willing to try to understand China. Of course, the Chinese should also reflect on ourselves. Americans are passionate and very good at selling their country's stories. The Chinese are not. So we must think about how we can better present ourselves to the world.

Knowledge of each other and strategic choices between us do not always follow straight lines. That is why Chinese President Xi Jinping has called for building a new model of major country relations between the two nations. China is committed to building a cooperative relationship with the US, which will not easily be disrupted by political factors or any single issue. A constructive China-US relationship serves the fundamental

interests of both peoples. If China and the US can enhance mutual cooperation and promote better understanding, the world will benefit greatly from it.

1. This article was published on Huffington Po on 9 September 2015. Its Chinese version appeared on guancha.cn. Part of this article was printed in the Opinion Column, on Page 5, People's Daily, 11 September 2015 under the title "Advancing Mutual Understanding and Promoting Coordination between China and the US Will Benefit the World"

China and the US: Rebuilding Consensus? 注

Before coming to the US, I did my homework and realized how different our perceptions of each other are. Reading what is said in the media here, you get the impression that the South China Sea is now a new geopolitical battleground for our two countries. Some are even predicting conflict.

However, if you look at what is really happening, you would see things are quite different.

President Xi Jinping and US President Obama have had six long meetings over the past three years, covering a wide range of subjects and strengthening the relationship by initiating a number of important cooperation programs. China has become the biggest trading partner of the US on a monthly basis, with nearly 5 million people traveling between our two countries last year. There are 500 flights each week, about one flight every 16 minutes, and almost 15,000 people are travelling daily. Even our two armed forces, which appear to have difficulties, are actually engaging in more exchanges and discussions than ever before. The two countries are working in partnership to play a leading role on global issues, such as climate change and nuclear security.

So what is the actual state of the China-US relationship? Or are both statements true?

There is no denying that the ground is shifting in our relations. The need for cooperation and the impact of competition are both growing. So,

maybe the gap between perception and reality does reflect the underlying need for us to rebuild consensus. Let me try to outline the main concerns, as I see them.

For the Americans:

Firstly, many are expressing doubts about the constructive engagement policy that eight successive US administrations have followed. They argue that the policy is based on the assumption that, by supporting market-oriented reforms, the US would see political changes in China. As this is not happening, the constructive engagement policy must have failed. Therefore, a new grand strategy is needed.

Secondly, the confidence in China's economic prospects is declining as its growth slows down, creating concerns that there could be a knock-on effect, which would affect US recovery. Although large US businesses are still attracted to the Chinese market, some are disappointed that their dividends are shrinking.

Thirdly, there is increasing anxiety about the global role China is going to play. A view we often hear from the US is that China is seeking to dominate Asia-Pacific and replace the US as the leader. However, we see this more as a reflection of the US's own fears of losing its primacy in the world.

At the same time, there is no shortage of optimistic voices in the US. They believe that China's future role will be determined by its own culture and policy, as well as its interactions with the outside world. Compared with their American colleagues, Chinese academics are relatively positive.

Firstly, they see China opening its doors to the US at the same pace as it is opening them to the rest of the world. The policy objective for its relationship with the US is in line with that of its overall foreign policy, which is to improve its international relations to aid development and raise the living standards of its population. It involves no desire to export values or seek world power. China has achieved its purpose, and the US has also gained tremendously benefit from the relationship.

Secondly, with the Chinese economy undergoing significant restructuring, the China-US relationship needs to move to a higher level. While Chinese businesses have become interested in entering the US market and are capable of doing so, they are often constrained by the lack of political trust between two countries. China will be hosting the G20 Summit this September, where it is hoped we can agree on some new opportunities and work towards balanced global growth. Thirdly, Chinese academics tend to look at changes in China-US relations from the perspective of the evolution of the international structure. Many see the status of the relationship as no longer being the weak versus the strong. However, they do not see it as between two strong powers either. In the past 30 years, China and the US were friendly, but never very close. We've had problems, but the relationship has been strong enough to withstand them. Now with our stronger, closer relationship, we are capable of making a difference. If we fight, we will bring disaster to the world.

The challenge for China, as the second largest economy, is probably two-fold: one is how to work with the US within the existing order while not falling into the traditional trap of power collision, known as *the Thucydides Trap*; the second is how to adapt and contribute to changes to the international order.

But the message from the US is confusing, as seen in its reluctance to acknowledge China's effort to help improve the existing order when it has provided new public goods and services like the AIIB and the Belt and Road Initiative. Remarks like "China should not be allowed to make the 21st century rules," inevitably affect the views Chinese people hold about its international position and its future role and its relationship with the US.

So the question is: will the current US policy towards China change as it becomes more anxious and will it take a more aggressive approach? If so, would it lead to a reckless urge to throw down the gauntlet and encourage spiraling tensions?

Recent tensions in the South China Sea are a good indication of the risks involved. The concern is that the US' open involvement in the disputes and its imagined dispute with China may sow the seeds of a self-fulfilling prophecy. Reading what is said in the US media, it is not difficult to see impression that many articles are lack of factual basis. Take for example the assertion that it is China which is trying to make new claims and coerce its neighbors which are certainly not true. Some who write about the South China Sea are not even able to tell the difference between the Nansha and Xisha Islands.

So let me spend a little more time on this. The South China Sea issue is basically a set of disputes on sovereignty territories and maritime rights and interests between China and some of its neighbors. There are four archipelagos in the South China Sea. they were returned to China at the end of World War Two following the surrender by Japanese, with the dotted lines drawn on maps in 1947 by the then Chinese Government, an American ally at that time, to indicate Chinese ownership. The US

government recognized China's sovereignty, and this was reflected in the maps and encyclopedias published in the US up until 1971.

Unfortunately, from the 1970s to the 1990s, more than 40 islands and shoals were taken by China's neighbors. One of the driving forces for this was the discovery of oil and gas deposits in the area. China has never stopped reclaiming its territories back. In the 1990s, China's relations with the neighbors improved, and it worked with the ASEAN countries to build a regional framework for dialogue and cooperation. The Nansha disputes remained an important issue, and after repeated discussions, China finally accepted there were disputes within the Nansha islands. The neighboring countries also accepted China's proposal to "shelve the disputes and seek joint development."

One important milestone was the signing of the China-ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) in 2002, which confirmed the commitment of all parties to solve disputes through peaceful means and to maintain stability. And to some extent, the DOC curbed further attempts to take islands in Nansha. China faithfully followed the principles in the DOC, but ASEAN failed to constrain some of its members, who have continued high profile activities on the islands they occupied. This included upgrading, renovating and expanding facilities. After the US launched its "Pivot" to Asia, there were more provocations against China's sovereignty, thus heating up the disputes. People in China have become increasingly anxious about the violations.

One incident that occurred in April 2012 was the "turning point". Some Philippine navy boats entered the Huangyan Island lagoon and harassed the Chinese fishermen, and forcing them to stay on deck under the blazing sun. The photographs of the scene grabbed the headlines in China and resulted in

a nationwide outcry for the government to protect its citizens and defend the nation's interests. The Philippines was acting as if it owned the Island and refused to talk, so China decided it had to take back control. When the Philippines subsequently moved without any consultation or discussion with China to unilaterally initiate a request for international arbitration, China decided not to participate.

The real challenge for China was how to prevent further losses in the South China Sea and protect the country's sovereign interests while cherishing the hope that someday we would be able to negotiate a peaceful settlement. But in light of the developments, China decided to enlarge the islands and shoals under its control and undertake construction on some of them. They included lighthouses, automatic meteorological stations, ocean monitoring centers and facilities for marine science. These functional improvements will help not only enhance China's ability to defend its sovereignty, rights and interests, but also to maintain regional stability, and offer services to others.

The role of the US has created a new dimension to this issue. Its Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy has demonstrated in both its rhetoric and actions that it has targeted China. In China, most people believe that the US' growing interference is complicating the situation in the South China Sea and turning what is essentially a regional dispute into geostrategic rivalry.

The ASEAN countries have come to realize that this power rivalry risks undermining the regional stability they have painstakingly cultivated over many years. And they have stepped up talks with China to reduce tension and negotiate a code of conduct aimed at developing a rule-based order. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has proposed a "dual track"

approach, meaning that disputes should be addressed directly by claimants through peaceful negotiations, while at the same time China and the ASEAN countries should work together to safeguard peace and stability in the South China Sea. This idea has been supported by many.

So, what is China's policy objective? According to the US, China is vying for dominance in Asia-Pacific. But this is far from the truth, and the US is only trying to create a projection of its own hegemonic image. China's intentions in the South China Sea remain to safeguard its national interests and territorial integrity and to maintain regional peace and stability. When observing China, one should not lose sight of the historical context. Though China is growing into a strong country, the painful memories from its history are still fresh. The country's capital was under the occupation of the imperialists' armies in the early 20th century. And for over a century China suffered the humiliation of repeated foreign aggression, bullying and occupation. This has made the Chinese people very sensitive about anything relating to the loss of territory, and this is why they will not allow the loss of even an inch of land again. This is something the outside world needs to bear in mind when trying to understand China's behavior.

Now as China drives forward to achieve its national rejuvenation, it needs a peaceful international environment and more specifically a good regional environment. The South China Sea offers the most important international transport route, which is also a lifeline for China. Our policy objective includes ensuring freedom and safety of navigation. China needs to shoulder this responsibility with the other countries concerned.

President Xi Jinping has proposed that China and the US should move towards "a new model of major country relations," which avoids conflict

and confrontation through cooperation and mutual respect. To achieve this, we need to learn. China is a newcomer to the world stage, but it should not try to copy the US. The US also needs to learn to work with countries like China which are neither an ally nor an enemy.

So, can we accept and respect each other and build a new consensus? That is the question I will leave you with, as a salute to Stanford University, which is known for its excellence in addressing difficult questions.

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1. Speech at the Institute of International Studies, Stanford University on 11 May 2016. The full text was included in the “National People’s Congress” magazine, No. 11 2016.

Three Aspects of China-US Relations to Watch on the Eve of the G20 Summit in 2016

The 2016 G20 summit will be held on 4-5 September in Hangzhou China. As the host, China stands ready to work with other members under the theme of building an “Innovative, Invigorated, Interconnected and Inclusive World Economy” to hold open discussions over several key priorities, namely, “breaking a new path for growth through strengthened policy coordination,” “more effective and efficient global economic and financial governance,” “robust international trade and investment,” and “inclusive and interconnected development”; for future international collaborations.

During the summit, Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Obama will have separate meetings—their eighth since 2013. This will be Obama’s last visit to China as US president, so it is likely that there will be a lot of attention on how their meeting will sum up the progress made in the China-US relationship. Coincidentally, back in 1972, Hangzhou was also where the China-US Shanghai Communique negotiations were concluded.

As China and the US play critical roles in the transformation of global governance, it will be worth watching to see how agreement between them can be reached in the following three areas.

Can China and the US send clear signals about their willingness to help with world economic growth?

The establishment and development of the G20 mechanism itself can to some extent be credited to the joint political will of China and the US, who closely cooperated at its founding. Emerging economies China in particular, have been active participants in the institutional effort to respond to the world financial crisis that originated in the US and Europe, since 2008.

As the then Chinese Ambassador to the U.K., I remember the G20 leaders, meeting at the second summit in London in April 2009, managed to bolster the overall world economy by pulling together a \$1.1 trillion package to rescue international finance, credit and employment. For China, that was also for the first time, as a developing country, to participate in international financial aid by pledging to buy \$50 billion of the IMF bonds. This significant step brought China onto the world stage as it became involved in stabilizing global finance.

Now, the world's economic recovery is not stable yet, with emerging markets encountering serious challenges. Differences also emerged among countries on how to boost growth, with some believing that those who can take measures to stimulate demand should do so. Others emphasized fiscal discipline and supply side or export reform as the way forward. The Western developed countries are also pursuing different monetary policies. New developments call for new consensus, and the major economies meeting in Hangzhou are expected to find consensus on how to use fiscal and monetary policies, along with structural reforms, to promote "strong, sustained and balanced growth."

Understanding between the world's two largest economies, the US and China, will be at the forefront in setting the tone for the multilateral consensus needed to rebalance the global economy.

During the 8th China-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue held in Beijing in June 2016, the two sides acknowledged the importance of structural reform to the sustained economic growth of the two countries as well as the world at large. China pledged to further its supply side structural reforms while expanding domestic demand. And the US has committed itself to taking full account of the spillover effect into the international financial markets, and improving policy transparency and predictability when normalizing its monetary policy.

Will China and the US be able to signal that they will lead efforts to reform global governance?

One of the highlights in China-US relations in recent years is that the two countries have rapidly extended their cooperation to the global level, as seen when China and the US took the lead by agreeing on emission reduction programs, which paved the way for the success of the Paris Conference on Climate Change in 2015. China and the US also jointly set up the Center of Nuclear Security Excellence in Beijing, creating a model for global nuclear security cooperation. The two countries are also cooperating on pandemic prevention by working together in Sierra Leone and other African countries to improve local public health systems.

China and the US have achieved visible results in counter-terrorism, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, anti-piracy and drug control. They also engage in cooperation on hot spot issues that affect international security including the nuclear programs of Iran and the Korean Peninsula, as well as on Afghanistan and Sudan. Even on cyber security, where they have disagreement, the two sides have managed to establish a hotline and agreed on the guidelines to jointly fight against cyber-crimes.

Meanwhile, China's growing role on the world stage has raised some concerns in the US. At the G20 summit in 2010, the IMF agreed to reform its quota and governance to reflect the increasing importance of emerging market economies, however it was not until the end of 2015 that the US Congress approved it. This finally enabled the IMF in October 2015 to agree officially to include China's currency, the renminbi, into its benchmark Special Drawing Right currency basket.

As China has risen to the second largest world economy, the country has grown in awareness and sense of responsibilities to do more in the world. Its initiatives and proposals have mainly come in the economic arena where it has been successful and therefore has more expertise. Its Belt and Road Initiative, which is about facilitating infrastructural development both on the land from China westward as well as maritime cooperation eastward. This initiative is creating a new form of international economic cooperation for the 21st century. To support the idea, China has also promoted mechanisms such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which is intended to add to the world public goods for improving global governance.

The US, however, became uneasy and saw these initiatives as a big challenge to the dollar-led global financial system. The US administration viewed them with suspicion and antagonism, even tried to dissuade their allies from joining in. Nonetheless, as the Chinese efforts start to show positive effects, US think tanks have quickly moved to adjust their views and criticized the shortsightedness of the US administration. It is possible that the US may even join these efforts in the future.

During President Xi's visit to the US in September 2015, the two countries agreed to ensure an inclusive, resilient and constantly improving

international economic architecture for meeting challenges now and in the future; and to be committed to strengthening their cooperation in the IMF by continually improving the IMF's quota and governance structure. The new consensus reached by two countries are positive:

“...for new and future institutions to be significant contributors to the international financial architecture, these institutions, like the existing international financial institutions, are to be properly structured and operated in line with the principles of professionalism, transparency, efficiency, and effectiveness, and with the existing high environmental and governance standards, and we should recognize that these standards continuously evolve and improve.”

It can be anticipated that at the G20 Hangzhou summit, the international financial architecture, particularly the reform and development of the international monetary system, will be important subjects to be reviewed by the leaders. It is expected that the summit will achieve important conclusions in how to build a more resilient national financial architecture, open and prudent financial systems macro-prudential policy tools and frameworks, and inclusive finance. Information coming from China and the US shows that the two sides are already engaged in thorough consultations.

China and the US need to go beyond their differences and nurture the habit for cooperation, as they are increasingly aware that global problems cannot be solved without their joint efforts.

Can China and the US send the signal that they are willing to manage strategic differences and avoid security conflicts?

In the eighth year of Obama's presidency, there have been ups and downs in China-US relations. Yet with joint efforts, the two countries managed to keep the relationship constructive through coordination and collaboration. Recent years have seen economic ties expanding quickly and cultural and people-to-people exchanges increasing. Even the two militaries have increased regular contact and agreed a code of conduct for close encounters at sea or in the air. Moreover, working with China in addressing global challenges will be an important foreign policy legacy of the Obama administration.

There are also negative assets. The most remembered will be the Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy, which has only deepened mistrust between China and the US. It is noted in China that the American military has continuously reinforced deployment in the West Pacific and reemphasized its exclusive military alignment. Against this background, the US appear to be taking sides in the South China Sea disputes and has decided to deploy an anti-missile system in South Korea. The US is also perceived to be condoning Japan's move toward "military normalization," which is aimed at moving away from the framework created post-World War Two. All these signals are strategically important and will influence the perceptions and judgment of the US — especially as many in China have growing concerns and doubts about America's intentions.

In the past four years, President Xi Jinping and US President Obama have held long and intensive meetings, often focusing on building a new model of major country relations between China and the US, overcoming resistance and cultivating cooperation. Although the US remains apprehensive about China's initiatives, the two sides are not far apart in their belief that they should not move towards confrontation or conflict and that they should pursue win-win cooperation.

As the US presidential election approaches, China-US relations will move into a new political cycle and consequently the top-level strategic dialogue is even more important. It is hoped that the ChinaUS presidential meeting in Hangzhou will offer guidance to ensure the two countries can better manage their differences and pave the way for the next stage of a fruitful bilateral relationship.

China and the US need to manage differences over the South China Sea

Relations between China and the US in the run-up to the Presidential meeting in Hangzhou have hit some rough patch caused by the South China Sea arbitration. The question is: what exactly are the US and China competing for in the area? Can the two countries find a mutually acceptable way to move forward? There is no doubt that the two countries perceive and handle these issues will define the future of the evolving situation in the South China Sea.

The US claims that its interest in the South China Sea is to ensure freedom of navigation. Indeed, critical shipping lanes run through the area, and keeping them open is important to all countries. China, a major global trading power, attaches no less importance to freedom of navigation than the US does, perhaps even more.

Obviously, however, that's not all the US is concerned about. Its worry mainly goes to preserving freedom of navigation for American naval warships and other non-commercial vessels. Admittedly, there is a gap between how China and the US each interpret the relevant provisions in the

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), as well as corresponding customary rules of international law.

In particular, the two sides have significant differences on the kind of military activities allowed within another country's 200-mile exclusive economic zone, or EEZ. China, as a developing country, highly values its national sovereignty and security. It holds that under UNCLOS, the principle of freedom of navigation should not be used to undermine the security of coastal countries, and that military activities in a country's EEZ should be under certain constraints.

On the other hand, the US, as global maritime power, has traditionally believed that its military is entitled to absolute freedom of navigation in other countries' EEZs, including oceanographic surveying, surveillance and military exercise.

Now, just as there's no dispute over the freedom of navigation for commercial ships in the South China Sea, there's no reason why the two sides could not also wisely manage their differences over the rules for naval vessels. What the US really wants, though, goes beyond its expressed concerns.

In fact, the US views frictions with China from a geo-strategic perspective, seeing the South China Sea dispute as a test of which power will predominate in the Asia Pacific. Ever since US leaders started talking about a "pivot" or "rebalance" to Asia, they've worked under the assumption that a stronger China will inevitably pursue expansionism and thus needs to be countered by the US and its allies.

Against this background, any move by China naturally looks like an attempt to weaken US strategic primacy in the region. At the same time,

American rhetoric and activities clearly targeted at China are bound to trigger a strong Chinese reaction. Given such a “security dilemma,” the risk of escalated China-US confrontation or even conflict is rising and the international community is growingly worried about the possible geo-competition between the two nations, which China also need to pay attention to and avoid.

The countries bordering the South China Sea surely appreciate that tension stands in the way of regional integration and economic cooperation, to no one's benefit. Both China and the ASEAN countries hope that the page of the South China Sea arbitration can be turned, so that tranquility can return to the region. Recently, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte appointed former President Fidel Ramos as a special envoy to China for an ice-breaking trip. When I was invited to meet with Mr. Ramos privately in Hong Kong, I clearly sensed the new Philippine administration's willingness to improve relations and re-launch cooperation with China. China and the Philippines are both Asian countries and I believe that as long as there is good faith, it's not beyond our reach to find ways to overcome difficulties and restore a relationship of friendship and cooperation.

Whether the South China Sea can be peaceful again is, to a large extent, dependent on what postures China and the US take as well as their interaction with each other. Specifically, when China's sovereign rights and maritime interests are seen as against what the US calls its “top national interests,” such as ensuring freedom of navigation, it is vital that the two countries have an accurate reading of the situation. The US lacks experience in dealing with powers that are “neither ally nor foe,” while China has never interacted with the world's super power from the position of being a major country. Both sides are still exploring, and what they say and do will shape

their opinions and behaviors. They both need to remain humble, keep learning and avoid returning to old beliefs and behaviors.

The South China Sea which is 3.5 million square kilometers in area is too vast for any country to control it exclusively. Any attempt to build an absolute exclusive sphere of influence will only lead to geotragic confrontation or even military conflict. Being the biggest coastal state bordering the South China Sea, China has sovereignty over the Nansha archipelago. It's only fair that China is entitled to legitimate maritime rights and interests in the area. The US should respect these and shouldn't hamper efforts by China and the neighboring countries to seek peaceful ways to address their differences.

In the meantime, China and the US must continue to pursue meaningful dialogues, based on a shared commitment to ensure the maintenance of peace, security and unimpeded access to shipping lanes in the South China Sea. The best way to address their differences on maritime rules is by dialogue, instead of posturing or dangerously testing each other with their military forces. Now that both have expressed support for peaceful settlement of disputes and the two countries have also restrained their reactions, it can be hoped that China and the US can move towards taking measures to stabilize the situation. And the key is for them to have effective dialogue and prevent mis-judgment when handling specific issues, especially when their interests come into conflict.

Thinking beyond the “Thucydides Trap” complex

About 2,400 years ago, the Athenian historian Thucydides wrote the great book *History of the Peloponnesian War*, offering a powerful account

of the rise of Athens and how “the fear that this inspired in Sparta,” made war between a rising power and an established power inevitable. In 1980, American writer Herman Wouk first used the concept of the “Thucydides Trap” to warn about potential conflict between the US and the former Soviet Union. In 2012, Harvard Professor Graham Allison conducted quantitative analysis of this historical metaphor and drew an analogy between the “Thucydides Trap” and the structural difficulties in the China-US relationship. Professor Allison and his team found that in the majority of the 16 cases in human history in which a rising power confronted a ruling power, the result was war. Only in four cases (including the Cold War), the powers managed to handle their conflict of interests in ways other than war. This research seems to suggest that war is predestined for major countries that are going through power shift.

On December 2015, I had the opportunity to discuss this with Professor Allison when we were attending a forum in Singapore. I suggested that if China and the US become enemies, the future of the world would be altered. He fully agreed and expressed concern over the possibility of war between China and the US be triggered by the question of Taiwan or the South China Sea issue. If either becomes true, it would be a textbook case of how a rising power and a ruling power fall into the “Thucydides trap.” During the forum, Professor Allison said in his speech that for the US, the dominant geostrategic challenge of this era or time is not violent Islamic extremists or a resurgent Russia. It is the impact of China’s ascendant, and an underestimation of the inherent risk in China-US relations that has increased the possibility of war.

I offered different views in my comments. I said that economic globalization, the development of international institutions, interdependence among states and nuclear deterrents all point to the fact that today’s world is

totally different from those of World War I, World War Two and the Cold War. It is also a far cry from the isolated small world in ancient Greece, where Athens and Sparta fought over the Aegean. The “Thucydides trap” cannot be simply transported from then to now. What we should consider is how from the heights of our modern civilization, we can use our knowledge to more wisely address the complex factors that may trigger tension, competition and conflicts between major powers.

At present, when people talk about the major power security dilemma, their attention is on China and the US. It is widely acknowledged that how the two countries shape their bilateral relationship will define the general direction of the world in the 21st century. President Xi Jinping, when speaking during his visit to Seattle in September 2015, said, “There is no such thing as the so-called Thucydides Trap in the world. But should major countries time and again make mistakes of strategic miscalculation, they might create such traps for themselves.” In their meeting in Washington later, President Obama remarked that he did not believe in the “Thucydides trap,” and that major countries, in particular the US and China should avoid conflicts. He also said he was confident that the US and China have the ability to manage their differences.

China is a growing power with a population four times that of the US. The US is a super Power which claims it will “continue to lead the world for a century to come,” and its difficulties with China appear to be complex. This could be seen during the American presidential election, as every candidate tries to blame China for America’s economic problems and plays up conflicts of interest. But in the real world, difficulties in this area are not impossible to manage given the two countries’ deeply integrated interests.

The political differences are harder to resolve because of America's rejection of China's political system. However as China has become too strong to be undermined by outside powers, the two sides should be smart enough not to challenge each other on this front. The main concern currently is the rising mistrust in the field of strategic security, which may lead to misjudgments on both sides and increase the possibility of confrontation and conflict. The two sides need to face the issues candidly and work to build mechanisms to prevent escalation.

A persistent concern troubling the US is that China is attempting to replace it as leader of the world order. But the question is: Do China and the US have the same understanding about what the world/international order is? It's important that we understand what our differences are, and how to resolve them. What the US strives to preserve is a "US-led world order," which rests upon American values, its global military alignment structure as well as the international institutions centering on the UN.

But China is excluded from this order system in at least two aspects: first, China is rejected politically for having a different political system; and second, the US-led exclusive collective of defense arrangements do not cover China's security interests. It also stands in contrast to China's common and cooperative security concept. What China identifies with is the international order underpinned by the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. China was among the first signatories of the UN Charter and has been one of its beneficiaries and contributors.

Nonetheless, China and the US do not necessarily have completely opposing views on "order." As they largely agree on the world's need for peace and development, as well as the importance of multilateral institutions with the UN at its core. Should China and the US wish to avoid

sliding into the historical trap of a head-on clash between powers, a new concept of “order” is needed. It must be all inclusive and accommodating the interests and concerns of all countries.

The world has been witnessing sweeping economic globalization, which has resulted in diverse interests and structural changes. This new phenomenon also calls for China and the US to lead in reforms where they have most agreement, for example, in the economic and financial areas. The two countries should be able to take the lead in mobilizing the international community to improve global governance and keep pace with globalization.

Post-Cold War economic globalization has been characterized by the free flow of capital, technology and market factors. The US and the West promoted and facilitated the rapid expansion of globalization, from which they also profited. The emerging countries not only gained from globalization but also contributed with their own growth. As a result, globalization greatly boosted the expansion of human wealth, benefiting both developed and developing countries. But its flaws have also been increasingly felt. It is criticized for causing inequality, widening the poverty gap and inadequate oversight of the financial systems, which in turn has resulted in a rise in protectionism and populism.

We can regard this as the initial stage of globalization or “globalization 1.0” which is not yet well regulated. There are already some developments going against the trend of globalization and regional integration. We are seeing the weakening of East Asian integration due to friction among nations; the US-led TPP is viewed with concerns over its lack of inclusiveness; Brexit has also presented new challenges for the European Union. Obviously, globalization cannot be reversed, but its flaws must be

addressed. To upgrade to “globalization 2.0” requires the concerted efforts of all countries and it need to be in line with the idea of building a community with a shared future for mankind. China and the US, in particular, must provide leadership in pursuit of a win-win instead of a win-lose endgame.

For the Chinese, it is imperative that we make ourselves better understood by the rest of the world. China has grown from a poverty-stricken country into the world’s second biggest economy in about 30 years. Compared with the developed countries, the time taken by China to modernize the country has been significantly compressed. However, changing the way people think can take time and it is harder to compress the time. We must change our way of thinking more quickly and form a broader international vision. We need to be more persuasive in expressing ourselves and more convincing in our behavior.

In doing so, we will enable the rest of the world to better understand why our traditions and history have led us to conduct ourselves the way we do. In turn, this should also help their comprehension of China’s foreign policy, in this new era of China as a major country.

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1. The article was published on China’s Reference News on 31 August 2016. The English version appeared later on the Huffington Post on 1 September 201

Dialogue with Dr. Henry Kissinger (I) :Growing Anxieties: How Overestimation of China is Affecting the US Views 注

There is no real brother-like partner for the US

Henry Kissinger: You've met many people during this visit to the US. What's your impression?

Fu Ying: Yes, I listened to many people here and made some observations. The US is at an interesting time. The 21st century is very different from the 20th. The US, though still the most powerful country, can't keep everything under its thumb. Watching the US, the word I may use to describe the atmosphere is "anxiety". It has so many problems of its own while trying so hard to handle many of the world affairs in the old way. This is not going to work and the US needs to learn to adapt to the new world environment where the ground is shifting. In this changed world, countries have to work together, and accommodate and even make compromises when needed. The US may need to change its way of looking at the world issues.

Henry Kissinger: Indeed, the world has changed and the US is in a very unusual time. For a long period in history, the US enjoyed absolute superiority and its foreign policy was based on such a premise. Thus, this new century is a challenge not only for the US, but also for China, isn't it?

Fu Ying: Yes, but very different challenges. For the US, it is the need to learn to work with equals. From my observation, the US, in its traditional world, had either allies that followed the US and relied on its support, or enemies which should be fought against and crushed. There were no equal partners like brothers. Has the US ever had a brother-like partner?

Henry Kissinger: (laugh) No, I have not thought that way. You should write about this for more people to read and think.

Fu Ying: Am I right to say that in the US political culture, there is no such a concept of working with real equals. That's one of the reasons why the US finds it uncomfortable to deal with a country like China who is neither its ally nor its enemy, and who wants to be treated like an equal partner as brothers would expect. This is not because China wants to get on a par with a power like the US. In China's world view, countries, big or small, should all live like brothers.

For China, the challenge is huge too. To be, all of a sudden, pushed to such a high world central stage and to be given so much expectation, Chinese cannot but feel certain bewilderment and have not yet grown into it. It is like a new actor on the stage with its back to the audience most of the time. For China and for its people as a whole, it takes time to learn to be a world player and to play a bigger role.

Actually, China just came out of poverty and its accomplishment is very basic. You can't imagine how we were faring just 20 years ago. I still remember at that time how difficult it was for my family to cover the expenses especially in the last few days before receiving the next monthly salary. Now the young generation in China is doing much better but many of them still find it hard especially at the starting years to achieve a decent

life. Therefore, it takes time for the ordinary people to build up an international awareness and cultivate the ability for sharing and partaking.

Of course, Chinese have already started to build the sense of international interests, and our international concept is non-exclusive in nature.

Henry Kissinger: Ordinary Americans don't know what kind of life you came out of. They don't know what Chinese are thinking and what kind of life they are having. They could see Chinese are more and more wealthy and China has become rich and powerful. So it will be more and more like the US. The younger generation of Chinese may take it for granted about what they have and place growing expectations on their government. Many people in the US see the heating up of the China-Japan island dispute and China's disputes in the South China Sea and feel worried. They think it's because China wants more. I personally think what China wants is not to take over from the US but the respect from the US. As China is getting more prosperous and strong, the desire to be respected would inevitably grow stronger.

Both China and the US believe in its uniqueness. The US sees itself as exceptional. It's above others and can do things it wants. China believes in its cultural superiority. From historical point of view, China for a long period of time believed it was the center of the world and had superior culture over others. Isn't it true that its "tributary relationship" with neighbors in history was formed around China's cultural superiority? So, for many, what the future of China will look like remains an open question.

The risk of war

Fu Ying: China regarded itself as at “the center under heaven” only before geographical knowledge grew and proved otherwise. That was not based on pursuing world power. It is true that in China there is lots of pride in its cultural richness and influence which went beyond its boundary. But there is no such ambition in Chinese culture to rule the world. Actually, the historical China knew little about the outside world and had not much interest. Expansionism finds no place in Chinese cultural thinking. China’s door was forced open by the imperialists in 1840. Now China has grown fast and has come above the level of subsistence, but far from reaching the living standard of Americans. China confronts many difficult challenges at home. The American lifestyle is quite extravagant and the fact that there is a huge population in China means that the Chinese would not be living luxuriously like that, as the earth would have difficulties to support it. The Chinese leaders are well-experienced including having worked at the grassroots level. They are fully aware of how the country is doing and what the people want, and are committed to building a better and safer country. Compared with the international issues, the domestic issues, though very tough, are relatively predictable and within sight. The challenges at the world level are very new not only for the leaders but also for the general public as there has been no precedents.

But we have to all face this crucially important choice, that is, should we bring the 21st century to peace or to conflict? Are we capable of keeping peace? The history of international relations has not seen a century without wars, has it?

Henry Kissinger: There was a period, between 1815 and 1914, for 100 years, there was no big war. It was after the French Revolution when leaders of all major countries wanted peace. By meeting regularly and by keeping to dealing with problems through negotiations, they overcame the

risks of wars and managed to have kept peace. Do you think the US and China will go to war?

Fu Ying: In theory, I think, the possibility of a world-scale war is small as countries are economically highly interdependent. There is too much at stake. More importantly, in a globalized world, countries can access resources, market, capital and technologies without resorting to means of war. There is no longer the urge to make war for economic gains. Besides, the form of war is not the same as the world has seen. Modern science and technology have so much advanced, the new means of war can easily go out of control. Just through the internet, a country or even the world can be brought to standstill and even paralysis. The danger now, I think, is that there are still people who think war can be an option for solving differences among countries.

Henry Kissinger: Not all wars in history had economic reasons. Now, though it may be unlikely that the major powers would fight each other, the risk of war still exists. Looking at Europe in the decade prior to World War One, though there was no war but crises were occurring almost every year. People got used to them and tended to subconsciously neglect them, which left the possible space for these crises which were not addressed in a timely and proper way. They grew out of control and lead to war. The danger now is that countries when issuing a threat may not know how to get out of it in a face-saving manner. From my experience, some countries may be playing a game between the US and China and we need to keep a sober mind about it and not to be manipulated.

Misperception: A root cause of many problems between China and the US

Fu Ying: Some countries are good at swinging between major countries. But I think these problems are manageable. The real issue that should be watched carefully is the Japanese Prime Minister who has made a big story out of the Diaoyu Islands dispute and exaggerated it into a major military threat from China to Japan. He wants to use it as an excuse to adjust security strategy and even to amend Japan's peace Constitution. If the US does not see the risk and gets dragged in, just because it is an ally, that would affect how the trend goes and how every party judges the situation. Some senior politicians from the US made comments tinted with emotion and were not well thought over. During my visit in the US, many questioned China's handling of maritime issues to which I gave explanation. I found most people drew their conclusion based on unchecked facts.

The current China-US relationship is indeed in a sensitive period. One of the prominent problems is the big gap between the two sides' perception of each other. Americans over-estimated China and got into a kind of anxiety syndrome about China trying to overtake the US preeminence, which is the least on the mind of the Chinese. On the Chinese side, the public perception of the US is growingly negative, because they see that whenever China got into some difficult situation caused by provocations from its neighbors, the US would be on China's opposing side, regardless of who started the trouble. As a result, a popular resentment against Americans in China began to emerge. It is also quite incomprehensible that US politicians need to be critical of China in order to get votes. So I think it is important to encourage direct communications including at the public level.

Henry Kissinger: The current imperative for the US and China is to avoid visible conflict. Though on many occasions China was compelled to react to provocations, it should not give the outside world the impression

that it is threatening its neighbors. One common challenge for our two countries is: can we join hands to work on certain things? This will be good not only for the two countries but also for world peace and stability. The US and China need to seriously consider what they can do together. Just like the trans-Atlantic relationship was brought closer through genuine cooperation after World War Two, the US and China may link up closer by cooperation. For example, we may find something new to do in Northeast Asia. Of course, it should not be in a way to make China's neighbors uneasy. President Obama and President Xi Jinping proposed to build a new model of major country relations, on which I believe there are a lot more things that the two sides can do.

Nowadays people take information from television screens and the internet. Their way of thinking is not like in the past when learning things from newspapers and books. So we need to draw a line to separate the problems and to reduce the temperature. There are many important things the US and China need to work on and we should not be distracted.

The US and China also need to keep good communications not only about the current issues but also on the strategies of two countries. Future cooperation can be better pursued with clear understanding of each other's strategic direction. For example, the US does not need to use the South China Sea issue to threaten China. Modern strategists would not consider containing China by some small islands some hundreds of miles away from the mainland.

Fu Ying: Many difficulties in the China-US relationship arise due to misperceptions. Therefore, the two sides need to improve communications at both strategic and public level to reduce misperception, enhance the understanding, cultivate trust and avoid strategic misjudgment. I have heard

many suggestions coming from both China and the US about how the two countries should carry out some specific cooperation to build the new model of major country relationship. I think, in order to put together some meaningful initiatives with sufficient impact, we need first to cultivate the habit and spirit of cooperation. The trans-Atlantic cooperation was, in essence, assistance by US to support Europe and you also had a common enemy at that time. The 21st century China-US trans-Pacific cooperation will be between equals and based on mutual needs. Its success takes not only proactive efforts from both sides, but also mutual accommodation and compromise when necessary.

Maybe we can identify some base lines of common interests and try to start working on them. Climate change is an area of common interest. The key is to have real and equal cooperation in which there is give-and-take on both sides.

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1. On 19 June 2014, Fu Ying called on Dr. Henry Kissinger in New York and had a dialogue with him which lasted for one and a half hours. Part of the dialogue was released in the World Post October 2014 and its Chinese version was published in Global Times on 21 November 2014.

Dialogue with Dr. Henry Kissinger (II) : China's Options and Impact on a New Order^注

Americans generally believe in rightfulness of American model

Fu Ying: Your new book *World Order* has attracted wide attention, including in China. Here are some questions for you: What would the future world order be like and how would it evolve? As a matter of fact, America's comparative strength will shrink further while the facts have proved that the old method is no longer working in addressing many world affairs. Therefore, what would the US do to keep its global leadership? And what kind of new changes would its actions bring to the world order? What kind of gesture should the US take toward the late comers like China? Would the US stand for an inclusive or an exclusive new world order?

Henry Kissinger: In our last conversation, your Chinese perspective was quite inspiring. On these questions, I would like to hear your ideas first.

Fu Ying: The evolution of the future world order will be closely related to China and the United States. The extensive cooperation between two countries will be the embodiment and practice of establishing a new type of relationship among major powers. What will be the impact of the China-US new power relations on the future world order? I hope to hear your thoughts.

Henry Kissinger: I should say, most Americans do not agree with my book. Most Americans think that our values are applicable to the rest of the

world. Insofar as they are concerned with foreign policy, they think our model is the right one. Now among the policymaking elite, I think my view is now becoming more accepted. And the response to my book has been far more positive than I expected. Even so, I still think most people who have influence on US foreign policy believe the current international system should continue to play its role for a long time to come.

Frankly speaking, any fundamental philosophical assessment of the US-China relationship has to wait for the next US administration. Be it the Republicans or the Democrats, they will have to face this issue. The current administration will still work on the specific issues. It is impossible for us to solve the fundamental philosophical problems on the US-China relationship in the next two years, but possible to create the basis for that solution.

We should do two things. First we should avoid confrontation; second we can choose one or two or more subjects to work on.

In the post-World War Two period, the US proposed a series of major initiatives on its relationship with Europe, including setting up many layers of dialogue mechanisms, the Marshall Plan etc. These formed close ties between the US and Europe. It would be good if this happens with China too.

Fu Ying: The US and Europe have many dialogues and communication platforms. I attended some of them and observed that the US and Europe have nurtured a habit of dialogue to discuss issues of each other's concerns, thus building solid trust between each other. Especially when there are serious differences, the in-time communication can always be carried on. Of course there is also unique historical background for that.

Even with different situation, China and the US also can build more platforms for effective dialogues and widen visible cooperation. Especially on issues of major importance to the two countries and to the world, China and the US should be able to work calmly for solutions.

In the political and security spheres, the US still divides the world into “us” and “them”

Fu Ying: Regarding the future world order and what you describe as the philosophical aspect, my observation is that, the existing Western-led international financial and economic system has opened up during globalization to more countries, including China, which are now not only important part of it but also participating in its reform. But in the political and security spheres, from the US point of view, the world is still divided into “us” and “them”, “us” referring to members of the US alignment and “them” to those outside. Such a divide may not have an obvious impact on world economic and trade exchanges for now, but security-wise, it’s giving concerns to countries outside the alignment.

If the US does intend to continue leading the world, the questions will be: In the Asia Pacific re-balancing strategy, there is repeated emphasis on taking the US-Japan alignment as the cornerstone of security in the Asia-Pacific and yet, Japan has openly turned on China as its source of threat. In this kind of circumstances, will the feeling of China and likewise that of countries outside the alignment be taken into consideration by the US? What is the US thinking for the future? Will it take an open attitude or prefer to reject countries outside the alliance? Notably, the Chinese public’s view of US-Japan alignment is turning more negative. Will this trend push

China into forming its own group? These are questions the US needs to face.

Henry Kissinger: At the operational level, the re-balancing has not brought changes of substance in the US military deployment in Asia. There may be some increase as a result of the US withdrawal from the Middle East. The US military deployment in Asia in itself has not changed much. As I wrote in my book, China's strategy is to push the US military as far away as possible from the Chinese border and is developing capabilities of doing so. That is understandable. Any rational government would do so.

Since the US and China signed "the Shanghai Communiqué" in 1972, the US side has made it clear that it is firmly opposed to any attempt to seek hegemony in Asia or in the world. So the question is: how can we both achieve our unilateral objective without creating tension to the other? In other words, how can China meet its legitimate needs for security without looking as if it is trying to exclude America from the South China Sea, and how can America meet its security needs without approaching too close to the border of China? To me, this seems to be the strategic puzzle. But I don't think that the United States is trying to drive China into a corner where its freedom of action is eliminated.

During the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union had two arrangements. One was a hotline directly reaching the Kremlin. The other was to notify each other of major movement in the sea and each side followed the rule of avoiding bumping into each other. We didn't use the hotline to the Kremlin very often. But when we did, it was real. If China and the US can make similar arrangement, it would become useful when crises occur.

Fu Ying: The Chinese military is probably one of the most independent of the US in the world. This has resulted from the long rejection and exclusion by the US. From the American point of view, when you assess threats to the US in the world, where do you put China? Since the US will not invade China and vice versa, then, where comes the basis of China's threat to the US?

Henry Kissinger: In the strategic circle, on such discussions, there is always concern of China as a major threat. I'm totally opposed to any military confrontation between China and the US. That will be disastrous for both countries. Neither will win and both will be exhausted, like the situation during World War One. I have never heard anybody, even those with the most extreme ideas, talking about that the US should invade China. The basic argument is that if China exerts military pressure on its neighbors, the US must step in, for example in the South China Sea. Judging by the history of China, I don't think military invasion is China's way of dealing with other countries. In the US, in debates about China, no one talks about defeating China and no school of thought believes US should attack or weaken China militarily.

Fu Ying: China is constitutionally bound to a defensive military policy. That is why the recent US behavior and tones sound more threatening. If the concern of the US strategic analysts mainly comes from China's "showing muscles to its maritime neighbors," the feeling of threat the Chinese have sensed also comes from the seas. What made the people in China most displeased about the US is that, in recent years, every time a neighbor had disputes with China regardless of the reason and the cause, the US would side with and support the party which provoked China.

If the US is determined to support its allies with no respect for principles, it will only make the Chinese side all the more suspicious of the US intention.

Henry Kissinger: At an international forum, I heard from a Chinese official talking about the South China Sea issue and he said if it can't be solved by this generation, it can be left to the next generation. This I think represents the official position. On this basis the parties may discuss how to avoid actions which would worsen the situation and reach agreement about maintaining the status quo. Before that, they need to clearly define what the status quo is.

Moreover, many here in the US believe that China regards the freedom of navigation as a prerogative by China granted to the US. Can China make it clear that freedom of navigation is an international right, independent of the goodwill of China? These two points will be useful to take away the sting of the South China Sea issue and reduce its negative influence on the US-China relations.

Fu Ying: Freedom of navigation in the high seas is of course an international principle. The commercial navigation in the Western Pacific has never been affected. The fact that the shipping price has remained low shows that it has not been affected by any security concern. China is a major trading country and maintaining freedom of commercial navigation is highly important to us. However, from my observation, "the freedom of navigation" that the US side keeps on talking about is actually the US Navy's freedom of navigation. Is it not?

Henry Kissinger: But there are regular United Nations Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) principles by which the navy moves. Whatever those principles are, they should be applied in the South China Sea. **Fu Ying:** We

should separate the two issues. It's misleading to mix them up. For the navies of China and the US, they could agree on mutual notification of major movements and establish a code of conduct on the sea. That would address much of the concern.

Henry Kissinger: I think both sides have philosophical difficulties. Take a problem anywhere in the world, say the Middle East. American newspapers and commentators would always say that has to be solved by American leadership. They don't say that can be solved by any principle. This has become part of the American thinking. We have to modify that ourselves. But it will take some time.

Fu Ying: Can the world order led by the US open up more or be amended?

Henry Kissinger: Unlikely. That's what Americans are used to. That's how the world is organized in their minds. Foreigners always think there is a master plan in America somewhere that is to be executed by the government. This is almost never true. The American government is organized to deal with problems as they arise. The Chinese are very different. You have a very conceptual approach. So you always ascribe motives to us, ways of thinking which you would have, but which we don't have.

Fu Ying: China needs time to gain international experience and we are not very effective in communicating our views and why we think and behave the way we do. We need to explain ourselves to the world in a timely and more effective way so as to avoid misunderstanding or being misread.

Henry Kissinger: In our upcoming presidential election, it is highly possible that some Republican candidates would criticize President Obama for whatever he has agreed with China. So you shouldn't worry too much if some presidential candidates say Obama has given away too much. You should understand that it's not the collective view.

Fu Ying: I believe China gives importance to discussion and cooperation with the US side on major international and regional issues. But the US should not behave by shaking hands with China over the table while trying to tread on its feet under the table.

In today's world, foreign policy making is not a matter only for the leaders and the elite. The public and the media are also playing a part. They also develop ideas on issues based on what they know and their opinions need to be taken into consideration at the policymaking level.

Henry Kissinger: It's one of the problems of modern foreign policy. I mention this only with the wish that people can understand some of the domestic problems in America.

Fu Ying: What do you think of China-Japan relations?

Henry Kissinger: The US wants to avoid a war between China and Japan. Though there is an allied relationship between the US and Japan, the US will not knowingly encourage any military moves or policy by Japan that would lead to war. We will not use Japan against China. What I believe, and what people like me believe, is that we should encourage closer relations between China and Japan. Then we should try to create an Asia-Pacific Community having the involvement of all relevant countries, with the coordination and cooperation from the US and China.

Fu Ying: How does the Pacific Community on your mind take into consideration the US military alignment? The Chinese leader has also talked about the idea of building a community of a shared future for mankind. Does your thinking have overlapping ground with that?

Henry Kissinger: The essence of the Asia-Pacific community is the US-China understanding. It typically would include all the major powers. If you have that, you don't have to deal with conflict as before WWI, where countries got lined up on the basis of balance of power.

What concerns me most is the changes that have happened in the world order. Since the 19th century, the center of the world order has been in Europe and North America, while the center of the world order in the 21st century will be in the Asia Pacific. The biggest variable of Asia is the continuous growth of China in the next 20 years. China's choices will affect and change the world.

The United States must consider how much time and space is left for maintaining the existing order and we need to consider and design the future world order in that interval of time.

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1. On October 13 2014, Doctor Henry Kissinger hosted a lunch attended by Fu Ying, Wu Jianmin, Huang Renwei, Lv Benfu and Dai Qingli at the Brook Club in New York. The excerpt of their dialogue on the world order and China-US relationship was released in the World Post and its Chinese version was published in Global Times on 16 April, 2015.

Dialogue with Dr. Henry Kissinger (III) :The World Order and China-US Relations 注

Fu Ying: I enjoy reading your book *World Order*.

Henry Kissinger: So next time you come, we will give you an exam.

Fu Ying: Actually I'm going to speak in the University of Chicago, and I'll start from your book, with the theme of the Debate on World Orders. I'm going to follow your point that there were many other orders existing around the same time as Westphalia. I will then talk about where China was in 1648, 1919 and 1941 respectively and then come to the order issue from the perspective of the Chinese history.

Henry Kissinger: In 1648, big events happened in Europe.

Fu Ying: In 1648, the new emperor of the Qing Dynasty, China's last dynasty, had just come to the throne, I think it was his fourth or fifth year.

Henry Kissinger: I bet your GDP at that time was much larger than that of Europe.

Fu Ying: The population was larger than that of Europe, too. It was around 50 million. But the serenity of the Chinese life was broken in 1840 by the Opium War.

Henry Kissinger: That's true. It was a tragedy.

Fu Ying: To conclude my speech, I'm going to say, "Henry ended his book tellingly with a question: Where do we go from here?" This is a question for China and the US as well: Where shall we move to next? What is the future direction of us? I will say, there are discussions on the future international system and world order in China too. Currently, our understanding is: First, in the current world, there is no possibility for separate orders to co-exist anymore. Second, it is not likely that countries would try to achieve power transfer through war. Third, globalization brings many new challenges. Therefore, here comes the conclusion—it might be the right time to build a new world order.

Henry Kissinger: That's a very profound view, seriously. Those would be the questions I should ask, too. Because as you said, you and we have different orders. But there are two possibilities. One is that we have a new Westphalian system with different orders. So there will be various roles that states play in Westphalian system. The other is rather than order, there will be a sort of chaos.

And a third possibility, I would say, is to have one order. That will be hard to accomplish. So I think even if you believe that there should be number three, the road to it probably would be a Westphalian system with different components. The Westphalian system originally composing of religious countries was based on European states and was confined to Europe. A new order would have to be based on units like China, which is not only a state but also an expression of civilization, plus other civilizations, like the Islamic civilization and other units. But the obstacle will be: as there is no Islamic order yet, and there are conflicts in the Islamic world, they cannot be included in the one-order system in a short time.

Fu Ying: In our last conversation, you talked about the Pacific Community, and I was intrigued by the idea. From our perspective, the world has reached a new level. Whether it is for China, the US or Russia, the world is very different now. More challenges have emerged and the threat is beyond the scope of sovereign states, like climate change, terrorism, Ebola, ISIS. With these new issues, new problems, there arises the need for a bigger framework beyond the states with the aim of collaboration to address the issues. When Ebola broke out, at the beginning, countries reacted separately. Then the US and China had a very good communication and China made a proactive move to offer help. Next time when big issues happen, countries should move forward together. So, as for the order you talk about, is it for the controlling and leading other countries? Or you are talking about an order that can address the issues collectively? In the past, “order” was meant to control the main powers so that they could behave and refrain from fighting wars. But now, preventing war is not enough.

Henry Kissinger: It’s a very profound point. But in the meantime, how do you handle the South China Sea or North Korea?

Fu Ying: The two are different issues. For South China Sea, a fundamental problem is the mistrust between China and the US. China thinks the US is behind the provocations while the US thinks China wants to control the region. If the US does not fully understand the issue, it may make decisions based on insufficient information. As for China, we also need to know our neighbors better. What we both need to do is to keep the issue under control and prevent it from further deterioration. The feeling given by the reports from the US side, is that the US is reading more out of the issue.

Henry Kissinger: China is building airstrips on disputed territory. So how these actions can make China contribute to world peace and the prevention of war?

Fu Ying: Without the airstrips, China even have difficulties sending airplanes for search and rescue missions, because the planes would not have enough fuel to complete the missions.

Henry Kissinger: I have no doubt China has its rational reasons to build airstrips, but you should not build them in disputed territory.

Fu Ying: We are building constructions on our own reefs which are under China's control, not on reefs which, though belonging to China, are under the actual control of other countries. As a matter of fact, before China, the Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia all had done certain constructions on the disputed islands and reefs. Some even have airstrips. But, we heard no response from the US about those countries' behaviors. The Chinese reefs used to only have bungalows which were mostly in critical conditions under the harsh weather—extremely high temperature and constant huge waves. People who stay on them shared small bungalows for months. China really needed to do some improvement about them.

I understand that the US side thinks China should have communicated with them and told them what was going to happen. For major countries, there should be more in-time information communicated between each other.

Henry Kissinger: I think—this is myself, not the US government—I think there should be a pause in controversy over the South China Sea. We should agree among ourselves that for maybe ten or twenty years, we will leave the present situation unchanged. Neither side will take provocative

action against the other. Secondly, countries need to come to an agreement on freedom of navigation through the area. It should be a basic principle. Thirdly, a consensus should be reached that any disputed incidents can be settled. But right now the Americans think you are trying to take over the whole area, everything up to the dotted line, that you treat the dotted line like your national boundary on land. You think we are trying to get the South China Sea as a base against China, and that way, we would be very close to battling Chinese vital interests.

So what is the outcome? We should not treat the South China Sea as American strategic territory. You should not treat the whole South China Sea as a Chinese geographic territory. Remember I'm only speaking for myself. But I think we are now in a dangerous situation. Because I find whenever I talk to American politicians, they think the Chinese are trying to take the whole South China Sea, and it will be the beginning of a Chinese empire or whatever. Of course, you are entitled to some serious respect for your historical views, but I don't think it is possible to take them to apply to the whole area and to every island in the area. I think we should have an understanding about the South China Sea like we had about Taiwan. The importance of the Shanghai Communique was that we deferred any public confrontation.

Fu Ying: The complicated part of the South China Sea is that many American officials look at the issue from one fragment of history without the ability to look deeper into history. On the South China Sea, if the US wants to seriously discuss this with China, whoever is coming to discuss it should go back to US files and learn about the history. Without a common knowledge, it's impossible to have a serious conversation. The Chinese would think the US has changed its position and is trying to take advantage.

In the 1940s, the US knew very well that Nansha Islands belonged to China. In the 1950s, you regarded them as under the Taiwan authority. In the 1960s and 1970s, some of our neighbors started to take them over, and you thought it was better than being taken away by the People's Republic of China. In the 1980s, China began to react to the encroachment activities, and from the 1990s to 2000s, China started negotiations with ASEAN countries and reached certain agreement. And in 2010, when the "Pivot" started, it became an issue. Have you ever heard of the issue before the "Pivot"? It was not a problem for the US. Why did it become a problem after the "Pivot"?

Henry Kissinger: Frankly, I think in my period, it was not a problem because nobody ever thought that China would claim these islands.

Fu Ying: Two occasions of maritime gunfights occurred in the 1980s between China and Vietnam. China had to stop the expansion of Vietnam's occupation activities. The last was in 1988. It wasn't a problem for the US at that time because you were not paying attention to it. So is it true that the US started paying attention to it after the "Pivot" ?

Henry Kissinger: No, no no, that isn't right. Starting from the early period of the 1970s, I have been following it closely. Nobody paid any attention to Chinese claims in the South China Sea because they probably thought it was communist thinking and did not notice the historical background. I don't think it is related to the "Pivot." You have to understand, the "Pivot" is really an explanation for our withdrawal from Afghanistan. If you look at it, it is the distribution of forces. The number of forces in Asia has not increased. The proportion of our forces to the total number of forces is greater now because we have withdrawn forces from the Middle East. Our capacity to intervene in the Middle East has

decreased. That's the reality of the "Pivot." There is no real increase in the objective threat. To China, the mentality is different by making Asia the chief target. I have no solution for the South China Sea problem. I think the ideal situation is that nobody should make any claims that they have made before. Remember now, I haven't thought it through. Nobody should make any claims, that means all the other countries, too. Nobody should implement anything that he has done before. That means to undo what has already been done. And we should take a neutral position on specific claims. And then you and we should agree on freedom of navigation in the defined area without making the national border around every island. Of course, China gets its two-hundred-mile exclusive economic zone.

Fu Ying: 90% of China's energy supply comes through the West Pacific navigation route and about 80% of China's trade goes through this route. So it's a lifeline for China. Of course, it has to be kept free, and for Japan, too. So freedom of navigation is very important and now is of no problem.

Henry Kissinger: If we can agree that this is open sea where everybody has free navigation rights not because China permits it, but because international law requires it, if we put it that way, then the navigation issue between us and China can settle. All we want is freedom of navigation. We do not want the right to interfere with your navigation. And we shouldn't have that right.

Fu Ying: President Xi Jinping is coming to visit the US in September. What kind of things can derail the visit from your point of view?

Henry Kissinger: My impression is that there is great goodwill on the American side. And from my experience with China, I'm certain that there is goodwill on the Chinese side to have a successful visit.

Fu Ying: The impression I have is that in Beijing there is the feeling that the messages from the US have been inconsistent. So should people take them seriously? Would the US keep on changing the tone and messages?

Henry Kissinger: I think, your problem is China, as you said at the beginning of our conversation, is trying to think through what is its international position now that it lives in the world with its strengths growing, but it has to take into account other countries in a way it didn't have to in the past. And I think the Chinese are thinking about it with extreme seriousness.

On the American side, the problem is that this administration only has its last 18 months. So while I can make a speech to them, and they may say yes, they are really thinking on the term of 18 months. That's human nature. There is no short of good will for China in this country. But there are many candidates there who need to make speeches when talking about China, they would mention their views about Beijing's influence. For example, a governor sent me a speech today. Let's take a look at what he says about China. He asked for my opinion last week. It's not conciliatory. Nobody would guarantee what these candidates would say next month. That's the nature of the primary system. I don't like that. But you can count on your number of friendships in this country, people who have worked with China for many years. There are hundreds of scholars doing research on China for many years. They will make efforts for improved ChinaUS relationship.

What all Americans need, and you have to learn to understand it, you come from a society with 4,000 years of history with at least 2,000 years of strategic history. So you know that you need longterm thinking. Americans have two big oceans, they never had to do this. When I give speeches about

strategy, people agree that they need long-term thinking, but they don't know what it means. I'm now thinking about setting up an institute to study strategic issues for that reason. So you are not going to be able to get from any American administration the assurance you want, particularly not from this administration. I think what you can get from them is a solution to visible problems. And you should make your case. I thought President Xi Jinping, in his conversation with me, and other leaders, made very eloquent explanations of the Chinese Dream, the world in 2020, and the world in 2040. Those I think are what people should hear, even if they might not fully understand or implement it. I think the visit is very important, because I am afraid we are going to start drifting into a series of adversarial discussions.

Fu Ying: In China at this moment, the article by Shambaugh and the speech by Lampton talking about the crisis in the relationship have attracted a lot of attention. Are you worried? Lampton said we have come to a turning point of the relationship.

Henry Kissinger: I don't know Shambaugh. Lampton is a China watcher. There are two separate views. One view is that China may be disintegrating under the impact of the massive reforms that China is carrying out, that a lot of opposition is building up and that will lead to the collapse of China.

The other kind of view is that China has never really collapsed except under foreign military occupation. There have been periods in the Chinese history of some temporary disorganization, but you cannot speak at any point of a collapse of the Chinese identity. So I think China will have a difficult time, but what worried me personally more is not the difficulty, it is that a balancing element in China now is nationalism. And therefore,

nationalist pressures may force the leaders to do things they would not normally do. My basic approach to foreign policy is let's deal with a foreign manifestation of a country, let's not try to meddle with domestic affairs. But I think China will get through this period. I think China will be stronger after this period and we should concentrate on dealing with a growing China, not with a collapsing China. And I think a collapsing China is absolutely against American interest.

Fu Ying: That's a very important point. There are also two views in China about the US. One is that the US can work with us. The other is that the US wants to finish us off, see the collapse of China. So like in the US, people with the two views can always find reasons to prove their points. Last time, we talked about the public angle of the relationship. The US has that angle, and China now, too. So, foreign policy is more complicated now. And it's a very important task for the diplomats to do public education. Your appearance in China was a telling statement of the US's consistent view of China. You should speak more to Chinese public. When I published our dialogue in the newspaper, I received so many comments. Such a direct engagement in a manner of in-depth thinking is very important. And there is not enough Chinese voice in the US directly explaining Chinese positions. So people jump to conclusions about China, which is very dangerous. Because that reinforces the concern in China that the US was deliberately humiliating China.

Henry Kissinger: I'm not worried about America trying to humiliate China, because I don't know any senior person who wants to do that, in either party. I'm worried that Americans doing things day by day that they normally do, say something or maybe even do something that will be conceived as humiliation in China. I don't think there is a long-term strategy to humiliate China. I would think most people in the policy-making

world agree with me about the desirability of a cooperative relationship. But there is a significant percentage who think that I'm overly friendly to Chinese, and they point out to what China does in the South China Sea and now the discussion starts on the Silk Road Initiative and other things. I would say to them: try to think about what a normal government would do. For example, trying to keep the Americans far from Chinese shores is what Chinese government would do. That is in the nature of Chinese national interest. That's not a bad intention. The bad intention would come if we are competing for global supremacy. We shouldn't try for it, and you shouldn't try for it.

Fu Ying: What do you think China's doing can be explained as competing for global supremacy?

Henry Kissinger: What people say is not global supremacy, but that you are trying to push us out of Asia. And they quote phrases like "Asia for the Asians."

Fu Ying: My understanding is that this means the Asians should try to solve problems in the Asian way, by talking in stead of resorting to military means. Regarding the China-US relations, the President Xi Jinping said that the Pacific is big enough for both China and the US

Henry Kissinger: Yes, but that could also mean you stay on your side of the Pacific, and we stay on our side of the Pacific. I've spoken to Chinese leaders many times, so I think I have a pretty good idea of what they think. I believe they speak frankly to me because there is no point otherwise. But I'd say I don't know what Chinese intentions are, and what will worry us next ten years. And I think the biggest drawback is, in my opinion, we settle day to day problems more or less well and we say reasonable things about the long term. But what we haven't done well is working together for a, say,

five-year project. There are not enough Americans and Chinese who have the shared experience of joint projects.

Fu Ying: I think there is one under-the-table concern in China, that is US condoning Japan. Japan is trying to be freer in the military sense, and Abe is not apologizing on history—this year marks the 70th anniversary of the end of WWII. I think there is a concern that the US would like to free Japan militarily for its own purposes.

Henry Kissinger: One problem countries have when analyzing each other is that they think of the other country on their own terms. So when Chinese look at American action or statement, they think it reflects some kind of ten-year plan. Usually it's a reaction to a contingency. I think if you and we have a clear understanding of where we are going, you will reject the temptations to believe that the US is playing countries against one another.

Fu Ying: I think China and the US need to talk about it in a candid manner.

Henry Kissinger: If you look at the records of our early conversations with Zhou Enlai in those years, it sometimes sounds like current affairs professors talking about the nature of international politics. On your side, it was because you always do it. And on our side, because Nixon was a special kind of president, in most of the times he just wanted to see where we are trying to go. So if you look at the first meetings between Zhou Enlai and me, the only concrete issue that was mentioned was Taiwan. All the others were philosophical issues about the nature of international relations. He took from Mao that “there is turmoil under the heavens, but the situation is excellent.” What does that mean? Now we are in a different period. But we

should try to get some agreement. I think it will be easier to do with a new administration than with the current administration. But it should be endeavored to with this administration.

Fu Ying: I have discussed with a number of US think-tank people. Maybe after the September visit, the two sides should sit down and work on a number of issues which are real concerns to China and to the US and compare notes. If we disagree, that doesn't matter, but at least we should put everything on the table to preempt future misunderstandings.

Henry Kissinger: Also, what does it mean, "adversaries cooperate with each other"? Because it's a new situation, it has never happened before in history, if the people on August 1, 1914 had known what the world would look like in 1918, they would never have done it. And we know what would happen if China and the US drifted into conflict. I wouldn't even know how you define "victory."

Fu Ying: We've talked for some time now. We once talked about organizing a roundtable with young Chinese scholars, but you were always too busy when you were in Beijing. China is now building new types of think-tanks, and we have a new generation of scholars who are hard-working and productive. When we are more ready, I hope they can come to the US to have a roundtable with you.

Henry Kissinger: That would be great. It would be even better if you could also bring the Mongolian food.

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1. On 18 May 2014, Fu Ying met with Dr. Henry Kissinger in his office in New York and had a dialogue with him on the world order and China-US relationship.

Dialogue with Dr. Henry Kissinger (IV) : A Discussion on World Order 注

Fu Ying : Dr. Henry, you are probably among the first from the Western world to try to truly understand China for what it is, and you not only followed the modern progress of China, but also went very deep into the history of China in order to better understand China today. I am utterly delighted to chair your dialogue. I will probably ask the first question, and we will then get questions from the audience and see how time goes.

I remember during one of our conversations in your office in New York, you said something that keeps me thinking. You said what occupied your mind the most was about how much time and space that remained for the US, and how much the US could think and move forward to design the future order. You also wrote in your book, “A reconstruction of the international system is the ultimate challenge to statesmen in our time.” So can you share with us, from your point of view, what kind of qualities, conditions and performances are expected of the statesmen of our time, in order to meet this “ultimate challenge”?

Henry Kissinger: First of all, every country has to make its own adjustment. And I wrote somewhere that history is sort of the character of a nation. So that every country has the tendency to translate events into terms that they have experienced as a country. The experience of America, historically, is of isolation. Only with relation to overwhelming events like World War One and then World War Two, America started to adjust itself and got actively involved with the world affairs.

Secondly, at the end of World War Two, China was in civil war, Europe was devastated, Russia was rebuilding itself, so we were rising as a country of dominant economic and military potential. That is changing, and America has to adjust to this new reality.

I don't want to tell China what to do, but China too is living in a new world. Historically, China has been a great empire, the center of the regional exchange, which meant that China was the strongest country in Asia. And that was changing on a global basis. The leaders of both China and the US cannot consider only their own interests but also the interests of international community. In September 2015, President Xi Jinping visited the US and the joint statement made by the Presidents from both countries were very positive, especially in terms of long-term goals. We also need more active cooperation on middle-term goals.

Fu Ying: Right. As you said, there are many challenges China and the US are facing. The general observation is that the US is not prepared and it is anxious about changes. There is not yet a clear line of thinking about how the US is going to work with the newly rising countries like China.

Henry Kissinger: But there is one clear line of thinking that the US and China will settle disputes peacefully.

Fu Ying: I agree. The challenge for China is probably to reach out to the world, to understand the world better, and also to express itself better. It is an issue of perception. When China is defending its interests, the US tends to take it as threatening. Here comes the second question, how we can put our interests under one roof and how we can work together?

Henry Kissinger: Of course, every country will attempt to vindicate that it will settle differences without force. For example, when China speaks

about the Belt and Road Initiative, to me, it looks like an idea which we can cooperate in. That's an issue of "how countries can participate" rather than "which country can have the control and dominance." Take the issues on South China Sea for example, these issues have direct connections with security and should be dealt with in a constructive manner.

Fu Ying: Agree. I think the US, which has a longer experience on the world stage, needs to realize that other countries have security concerns, too. Security should become a commonly shared interest instead of absolute security for one party at the cost of others.

Henry Kissinger: No country should insist on absolute security, because it could mean absolute insecurity for everybody else, but it should feel secure enough when things can be negotiated. But then there are issues like the turmoil in the Middle East, the spread of nuclear weapons, which can be a threat to all of us, even if it takes a different form for each country.

Fu Ying: Can we take some questions from the floor.

From the audience: What worries the US regarding the new model of major country relationship? What is the focus of the US concern? **Henry Kissinger:** There are different points of view in the US on these issues, so I speak for myself. I have great sympathy for the new model of great country relationship, as it has been put forward by President Xi. As I understand it, he is saying, that countries, who by historical experience would be adversaries, should deal with each other and learn from each other as partners. I know there was a study by Harvard University that showed that in eleven out of fifteen cases involving rising countries and established countries, it came to war. So we have an obligation to do something. I have repeatedly said, and also in this book, that this concept should be taken up favorably. But we are going to have a political campaign next year so you

may have been hearing other points of view. But at the end, you should remember, there have been eight American administrations since my first visit, and in the end, they've all come to the conclusion that China and the US should cooperate.

From the audience: To the extent that the current world order will be reshaped, in the formulation of the future world order, what is the biggest difference between China and the US?

Henry Kissinger: Firstly, the differences have come from the fact that the general opinion in America was formed by the so-called Westphalian system of equal nation states. But in the future, what will happen is, in my opinion, that these clear divisions of an order confined to Europe are hard to establish because there will be countries that have a concern beyond their immediate borders, so that you have the emergence of overlapping areas. Therefore, the foreign policy over these disputed areas become an important issue. Secondly, the US tend to create a genuinely global economic system. So I feel that it should be made possible for China to enter the TransPacific Partnership that has been created, and that we should deal with the whole Pacific on a communal basis. We, both countries have agreed on issues of climate, we are beginning an important dialogue on cyber security, we have a common problem about weapons of mass destruction. So there are many areas where China and the US can work closely together. There will always be points that we don't fully agree. And then the issue is, whether we can lift them to a level where we can tell each other what we are really worried about and what we are trying to solve is, and not to do it by mutual threats.

Fu Ying: If I understand correctly, your book aims at inspiring American thinkers to consider the fundamental challenge of the future

world order. And you used the phrase “ambivalent superpower” to describe the US, which is struggling between “idealism” and “realism”, trying to search its soul about the moral worth of its efforts.

Henry Kissinger: I had a conversation with the students from Peking University. Chinese tend to think that everything in America is carefully designed to achieve absolutely fixed objectives. But Americans have been torn, and if you see it in the history, between intervention and withdrawal; and when we intervened, we often did not quite know what the end would be. So this is an experience for a country that has never had global foreign policy. And therefore in its end, it's ambivalent, and it's been torn between trying to manage things and trying to withdraw from the world. This has been the trauma of America. When I speak to American audiences, I am trying to help them to think through a clear line, and tell them we can't dominate, but on the other hand, we have to participate. History is long and therefore we have to be patient.

Fu Ying: I remember once when we talked about China and you asked me: What is the Chinese view of the world? And I said, generally speaking, we believe that all countries under heaven should be equal, countries should be like brothers. From the US perspective, this ambivalence, does it also apply to its view of China? Because when I was in the US, some scholars would say why can't China just accept what the US has created? Just submit. And otherwise the US would need a new grand strategy about China. But others would say: Well, we can work together. So, what do you think is the ideal role of China, most Americans from their experience of history, would want to see?

Henry Kissinger: If I may tell the audience, Madam Fu Ying comes to visit me about once a year, and she has very perceptive questions. And just

to make sure that I really learn from them, she then sends me a summary of our conversation, and I have to say it is always very accurate, and I have never modified it in any significant way.

It's very hard to have a precise answer of what is the role of China. When our relations have been excellent, from my point of view, it was when Chinese and American leaders talked to each other openly, here is what we think of the world, and then try to adjust it in such a way that they recognize that each leader has to justify the decision to its own public. And if we look about 40 years back, the efforts we have made, we will see amazing progress.

China is a country with a great history and with a long experience. And we have very different experiences. But there are some problems that affect us both that I've mentioned. So the role of China is that of an equal and respected partner with which we will try to agree on general philosophies. We may sometimes disagree on specific points. And when we disagree, it is the duty on both sides to manage it in such a way that it does not impair the overall. That is not always easy, but I think it is achievable. I have now known five generations of Chinese leaders, so I am very optimistic that we will find a common solution.

Fu Ying: Here in China, academics are also developing their theory about the future world order.

For example, Professor Yan Xuetong, went very deep into the Chinese ancient philosophies and came up with moral realism. He thinks the world is going to be bipolar - China and the US, not multipolar.

Professor Qin Yaqing tried to embed Chinese concept into the theory of international relations with the emphasis on the relationality and

processual construction.

Professor Wang Jisi agrees with your idea of the China and US coevolution, and he argues that fundamentally speaking, “mutual respect” means that the US should respect China’s internal order maintained by Chinese leadership, and in turn, China should respect the international order maintained by the US. He recently wrote about this.

Professor Huang Renwei, believes that the new model of major country relationship will be at the center of the future world order, and China and the US should choose to develop a more stable relationship.

The Chinese would like to search for a theoretical foundation for the future world order. My question is: as China has no historical experience as a world power, you have any advice?

Henry Kissinger: When I first came to China, I knew very little about Chinese philosophy. And I tried to study it and learn something from it. There is no big difference between these concepts. But there is a sort of cultural difference. We are both countries who believe that our country in a way is unique. But the Americans think that other countries can be brought along by conversion, by teaching them our values and our principles. But Chinese, in my observation, believe that China can teach by example. But they don’t send out missionaries. You can’t become a Chinese if you are not part of the culture. So the Chinese look for respect and the American look for converts.

Americans have not historically studied Chinese thinking. We tend to translate things into a legal issue, and you tend to translate them into a historic process. These are all challenges we have to deal with.

In America, I am described as a realist. It's not a phrase I like particularly. I have studied the European evolution of balance of power and equilibrium and so forth. I'm convinced of the need for a broader perspective, not because I suddenly became soft, but because I think those concepts of confrontation are very dangerous when applied to countries like China and the US. So this is a new evolution of thinking that we both have a need to produce, if it fails, then we will both go back to traditional concepts. But it will be, in my view, very dangerous. I am looking forward to a world order in which all countries can be treated equally. From a historical perspective, this trend will be inevitable.

1. On 31 October 2015, at the "World Order and China's Role: the 2015 Beijing International Forum", Fu Ying chaired an open dialogue with Dr. Henry Kissinger who answered questions from the audience. Content of the dialogue is published here for the first time

Dialogue with Professor Francis Fukuyama 注

Fu Ying: Is the development in the election out of your expectation?

Fukuyama: In United States? I don't think anybody expected Donald Trump would be there today. I think people are still getting adjusted to that fact. But I actually have an article on the next issue of *Foreign Affairs* on what this election means for the US political system, something I have been thinking quite a lot. My basic argument is that Trump is not just a freak phenomenon, but it actually represents some more important social trend. You know in the US as a result of globalization, technology, immigration and deindustrialization, there is a big decline among the working class in their social status. I think that many Americans who are not part of that could not understand how deep this decline has been. It's not something that's started recently, it's been going on for the last 30 years. In terms of income, especially for the working class, that means for a man who has a high school education or less, there has been an actual decline of his real income. Meanwhile, in their communities, you get all of other problems like single parents and rising crime, and there is a huge drug issue. In fact, an economist named Angus Deaton, who won the Nobel prize last year, published an article with his wife Anne Case, which estimated that between 1999 and 2010, there were an increase of half a million excess deaths among white men in the US with the main cause of drug addiction. The death rate of the middle-aged white men had a rapid increase while the global life expectancy enjoyed a steady increase. This had been the same with African Americans in 1980s and that situation tailed off, but this big problem in the middle aged white men has not been generally recognized.

So, I think Donald Trump understands that group of people, and he is basically an economic nationalist, so he wants to protect American workers and jobs, and he wants to stop immigration. In general, he doesn't like changes of globalization. I think even if he loses the election, which I expect would happen, he has really changed the American politics in a way and the effect would continue for years after this election. And the results, who knows, it's been such a crazy year so far, you can imagine a scenario which Hillary Clinton would actually lose the election.

Fu Ying: In China, some people also follow the American election very closely. The older generation tend not to have any preference, but the younger generation tend to have their own views. Apparently, there is a lot more interest in Trump than in Hillary. Among the younger generation born in or after 1990s, some find Hillary Clinton's presentation sounds so much 20th century, and Trump's is easy to understand. On many issues, people put them to comparison and find that Trump's statements are straightforward and one can understand what he is saying, while Hillary sounds a bit stereotype.

Fukuyama: I think that is a big mistake. Whatever the stylistic differences are, Trump is a protectionist, he said clearly he will impose tax to Chinese goods coming into the United States, Hillary Clinton will not do something like that.

Fu Ying: It is obvious that protectionism is also harmful to the US.

Fukuyama: It is no good to anyone, but the world is full of the voice of economic nationalism nowadays. The United States has established the existing global trading system to prevent other countries from adopting

protectionism. If the US itself begins to implement protectionism on a large scale, the others will soon respond.

Fu Ying: How do you see the political divide between China and the US? Ever since 1970s, when we started diplomatic relations, US saw China as politically incorrect. You are among those who started to analyze the Chinese political system. Deep down on the mind of the policy makers, they always knew there was such an obstacle and a kind of guardedness, I mean it's very hard to build real trust. I wonder if you agree with me that countries should be responsible for their own political systems. So, knowing there is such an unnecessary obstacle, do you think that will be removed?

Fukuyama: Oh you mean, for example, the US constraint on democracy and human rights?

Fu Ying: I mean the condescending attitude about China's political system.

Fukuyama: It really depends on who you are talking with. I think in terms of the actual policy, that really had not much effect. You know there is a lot of criticism, for example, when we have a presidential election the candidates always criticize China. Then once they are elected, they become pretty pragmatic, because they understand that those countries have a lot of common interests, and they are not going to change China's system, so they settle down and try to think about the pragmatic relationship. I think if the question is: will some American citizens be concerned about democracy and human rights in China, the answer is yes, because part of the American identity is to worry about these issues. It's not just the United States, but globally. There is a group of people who believe these are universal values. But the actual relationship is shaped more by business, personal interaction between the Chinese and Americans. And our government is not that kind

of government which could just tell people to stop criticizing China. They are not able to do that. I don't actually think it is a big problem in anything regarding Chinese domestic issues. I think it's really over foreign policy.

Fu Ying: In 2014, when I was attending the Munich Security Conference, though there were subjects for discussions, the real focus was Ukraine. People were discussing about the future government of Ukraine and who should be the prime minister or president, like the possibility of Wladimir Klitschko. All these happened before the Ukraine government fell down. So it's very hard to convince people that the US and Europe had not premeditated it when the "Color Revolution" actually happened in Ukraine. I asked some Germans about it and they said, if there is an opposition in the government in another country who seek help from the US or Germany, they can't resist. But where do we draw the line?

Fukuyama: It's hard to counter this perception. My personal view is that everybody outside the United States has overestimated the power of the United States to undermine anybody. The reason there is a fall down in Ukraine has nothing to do with those active supports from the United States. The fact is that there is a bunch of young Ukrainians, they didn't want to associate with Russia rather than the European Union, so they got organized. The American role in supporting any of that was really quite marginal. In September 2013, I attended a Stanford's summer academic exchange program in Ukraine and most of the people invited were Ukrainian activists. The US government did not pay for the program and we had our own source of fund, financial source. Although what these Ukrainian activists opposed were precisely what the US government opposed, the US government did not participate in subverting the Ukrainian government. The reason for the coup is that the Ukrainian people prefer the European Union to the corrupt Russian government.

Talking about the “Color Revolution”, there was a period, in the first 15 years after World War Two, there were actual cases the United States’ foreign policy was trying to overthrow foreign governments. And this happened in Guatemala and Iran in 1954. In Guatemala, CIA conspired to remove a democratically elected left-wing government, and I think it was a terrible mistake, both of those countries and the American interests suffered from the result of that. At the time of the Vietnam War, there was the thinking about whether we should try to manipulate other people’s politics and the decision was always kind of reluctant to do this. The United States stopped doing that in 1960s. On the Iranian nuclear deal, there were voices on overthrowing the Iranian government, but I don’t think anybody is seriously interested in that since our previous experience was not very happy. The problem in Iran was partly due to the legacy of what we did in 1954. It is a matter of explicit policy to try to format in regime change. I just don’t think the United States has done that for a very long time.

Fu Ying: But in Libya and Syria, don’t you see the same thing?

Fukuyama: That’s a good example, we decided to do nothing in Syria, so now 300,000 people have died, and there is immigration crisis. So a lot of Americans blame Obama for being so passive, because it just created huge crisis. Somebody estimated more people have been killed in Syria than people were killed in American invasion in Iraq.

Libya is a different case. That was done in peaceful weans and with approval of the UN Security Council. It was done cooperatively with a number of countries. There the problem was really the followthrough. The countries that supported the initial invasion could not make any kind of commitment to help rebuild Libya. And that was a huge mistake. In fact, Obama made a mistake quite similar to the one George Bush did in Iraq,

invading this country, getting down that dictator and then doing nothing on the country's planning. Even if there was a plan, we really did not have the power to put a stable government to the place. The lesson I draw from this is we should not do this sort of things anymore, but it is very hard. We participated in the stabilization of political situation in Libya but the result was negative. In Syria, we decided to do nothing but the result was even worse. Sometimes, it is really hard to recognize when you have to exercise power and when not to. The Middle East is a very complicated part of the world and if you don't understand it very well, all this invasion is very tough and we tend to get stuck there deeper and deeper. You got to be very careful before you get into it.

Fu Ying: I think it will be useful if the political scientists from our two countries sit down and talk about the different narrative and how we see this. Because on the US side, very few people know how the other side is thinking, likewise in China.

Fukuyama: I think that will be good. If we have that kind of meeting, one of the first things to find out is actually political scientists in the United States really don't view this event the same way, there is a huge argument going on right now, that's actually what's interesting about Trump. He is actually articulating a very different view of American foreign policy, which really hasn't been pushed by major candidates since the 1940s. He is much more restricted about how you use the American power, and much more isolationist with the circumstance.

Fu Ying: Do you think it is just the election rhetoric?

Fukuyama: No.

Fu Ying: So you believe if Trump wins the election, he will carry out this kind of policies?

Fukuyama: He has been very consistent. He has been saying something like this in the last 30 years.

Fu Ying: Who do you think is more likely to win?

Fukuyama: I think Hillary is going to win, but I hesitate to make that too firmly because people have been surprised by Trump this whole year, most people said he will disappear last fall, then October, November. Now it's a little bit dangerous to make a prediction.

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1. This conversation with Professor Francis Fukuyama was held at Stanford University on 10 May 2016. Professor Francis Fukuyama has been a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies since July 2010 and a Mosbacher Director of the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law at Stanford University.

China-Russia Relations

Are China and Russia Partnering to Create an Axis? 注

At a time when Russian relations with the United States and Western European countries are growing cold, the warm ties between China and Russia have attracted renewed interest. Scholars and journalists in the West find themselves debating the nature of China-Russia partnership: Does the thriving China-Russia relationship mean a new axis?

Since the end of the Cold War, there have long been two arguments on how to assess and predict the future development of China-Russia relations. One holds that these relations are vulnerable, complicated and filled with uncertainties. Supporters of this argument characterized China-Russia relationship as a “marriage of convenience” guided by expediency, seeing it as unlikely that the two will grow much closer and quite possible that they will soon drift apart. The other argument is that strategic and even ideological factors serve as the foundation of China-Russia ties, and it is inevitable that the two countries will eventually create an anti-US, anti-Western alliance due to heavy pressure on both countries from the United States.

Neither argument accurately captures the true nature of the relationship. China-Russia relationship is a stable strategic partnership and it is complex, sturdy, and deeply rooted. Changes in international relations since the end of the Cold War have only brought the two countries closer. Some Western analysts and officials have speculated (and perhaps even hoped) that the ongoing conflicts in Syria and Ukraine, in which Russia has

become heavily involved, would lead to tensions between Beijing and Moscow— or even a rupture. But that has not happened.

Nevertheless, China has no interest in a formal alliance with Russia, nor in forming an anti-US, or anti-Western bloc of any kind. Rather, Beijing hopes that China and Russia can maintain their relationship in a way that will provide a safe environment for the two big neighbors to achieve their development goals and to support each other through mutually beneficial cooperation, offering a model for how major countries can manage their differences and cooperate in ways that strengthen the international system.

A history of China-Russia relations

On several occasions between the end of the 19th century and the middle of the 20th century, China entered into an alliance with the Russian empire and its successor, the Soviet Union. Every time, the arrangement proved short-lived, as each amounted to nothing more than an expediency between countries of unequal strengths. In the decades from the 1960s till 1980s, the two communist-led countries had an eventful relationship riven by rivalry and mistrust, with only occasional cooperation. In 1989 and then in the waning years of Soviet rule, they finally resorted to normalcy in their relations. The two jointly declared their commitment to developing bilateral relations, which should be based on the principles of “mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.” Two years later, the Soviet Union disintegrated, but the Russia’s relationship with China was able to carry on with the principle of “no alliance, no conflict and no moves targeting any third country.”

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the reborn Russia was facing new choices in foreign relations. The idea of a return to “Atlanticism” was the predominant view in the beginning. To win the trust and help of the West, Russia made concessions on major issues including economic reform, reduction of strategic nuclear weapons. However, things did not turn out the way the Russians had hoped, as the country’s economy tanked and its regional influence waned. From the Russian perspective, their passion for the West turned out to be wishful thinking, as they received no more than lip service when they were in extreme economic difficulties. Disappointed with unfulfilled pledges of the West and irritated by talk of NATO’s eastward expansion, Russia sought to rebalance and diversify its foreign relations by resuming a more active relationship with its neighbors and countries in East Asia. In 1992, China and Russia announced that they would “regard each other as a friendly country” and issued a joint political statement stipulating that “the freedom of people to choose their own development paths should be respected, while differences in social systems and ideologies should not hamper the normal progress of relations.”

Ever since, for over 20 years or so, China-Russia relations have gradually improved and deepened. Bilateral trade and investment have expanded on a massive scale. In 2011, China became Russia’s largest trading partner. In 2014 alone, China’s investment in Russia grew by 80 % —and the momentum to increase investment remains strong. To get a sense of the growth in economic ties, consider that in the early 1990s, the annual bilateral trade amounted to around \$5 billion. In 2014, it came close to \$100 billion. In 2014, China and Russia signed a landmark contract to construct a natural gas pipeline. Starting from 2018, Russia will start a 30-year contract to supply natural gas to China. Both countries are making great efforts to improve their trading arrangements and are planning more big deals in fields including finance, nuclear power generation, aerospace

manufacturing, high-speed rail and infrastructure development. Moreover, they are cooperating on new multinational financial platforms such as the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, the BRICS 注 Development Bank and the BRICS foreign exchange reserve pool.

China-Russia defense and security cooperation has improved as well. China has been the largest importer of Russian arms for many years. Over recent years the two countries have moved beyond the initial stages of arms trading to a more advanced collaboration involving joint research and production. Extensive bilateral defense cooperation covers defense consultations, joint training and exercises, and personnel training. Over the past decade or so, the two sides have conducted more than 20 joint counter-terrorism exercises within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Thousands of Chinese service personnel have studied in Russia, and Russia, in turn, has sent senior military personnel to the National Defense University of China for short-term study.

As economic and military links have strengthened, so have the political ones. The two countries finally completed the 40-year marathon-style border negotiations in 2008, peacefully resolving territorial disputes that had troubled the two neighbors for decades. By defining the 4,300km border, the two countries had eliminated the biggest obstacle to their bilateral relations. They have also established a full-fledged cooperation mechanism, consisting of regular annual meetings between heads of state, prime ministers, top legislators and foreign ministers. Since 2013, when Xi Jinping became President of China, he has paid five visits to Russia, and the Russian President Vladimir Putin has traveled three times to China in the same period. All told, Xi and Putin have met 14 times, making President Putin the foreign head of state that President Xi has most frequently met since assuming office.

Managing difference

For all this progress, differences still exist between the two neighbors. China and Russia have different focuses. Russia is traditionally oriented towards Europe, which is also its current foreign policy priority, whereas China is more focused on Asia. The two countries' diplomatic styles are different as well. Russia is more experienced on the global theater, and its foreign policy style tends to favor hawkish, active and often unexpected diplomatic maneuvers.

China's rise has produced discomfort among some in Russia, who are not used to the change in the relative strength between the two, and the China Threat Theory also has some believers. A poll conducted in 2008 by Russia's Public Opinion Foundation showed that around 60 percent of those who took the poll expressed that they worry China would sooner or later put forward territorial claims and Chinese immigrants might effectively prevail in Russia's far east; 41 percent believed that a stronger China would harm Russian interests. Moreover, in quest for new investment and trade opportunities abroad, China in recent years has continued to deepen cooperation with other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and this might have given Russia the impression that China is competing for influence. Partly as a result, Moscow initially hesitated to support Beijing's Silk Road Economic Belt initiative before ultimately embracing it in 2014. Meanwhile, some Chinese continue to nurse historical grievances regarding Russia. Despite the resolution of the border issue, sometimes comments still appear on Chinese media talking about the 1.5 million square kilometers of land annexed by Tsarist Russia in the late 19th century.

However, these differences hardly support speculation in the West that Beijing and Moscow are drifting apart. When Russia's relations with the United States and the EU have deteriorated over the past two years owing to the crises in Syria and Ukraine, there have been occasional stories in Western media about China and Russia having difficulties in their relationship. But the truth is that despite differences over some issues, China and Russia share the same political consideration about the need to firmly develop their bilateral relations. They must join hands to achieve national security and development. They also have great opportunities for international cooperation. Their bilateral relationship is beneficial to the balance of the international system, as well as useful in facilitating the solutions to many international problems. Sometimes they agree; sometimes they do not. But they are able to acknowledge and manage their disagreements while continuing to expand areas of consensus. As Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said, China-Russia relations have demonstrated a new approach for conducting country to country relations.

The crises in Syria and Ukraine illuminate the ways in which China and Russia have effectively managed their partnership. Some in the United States see China as adopting a vague attitude toward the situation in Ukraine, or suspect that China has sided with Russia. A spokesperson of Chinese Foreign Ministry issued statements immediately after the crisis broke out, clarifying China's stance and made it clear that Ukraine's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity should be respected. China emphasized that all the parties involved should resolve their differences through dialogue, and put forward a proposal that called for expediting the establishment of an international coordination mechanism, refraining from actions that may aggravate the situation, and helping Ukraine safeguard economic and financial stability. Indeed, Beijing did not

take sides, as impartiality has been a commitment that China has consistently honored when dealing with international affairs.

But Chinese diplomats and leaders also give more attention to the factors that led up to the Ukraine crisis. These include “color revolutions” repeatedly staged in CIS countries and external factors behind them, along with the security pressures put on Russia in the wake of NATO’s persistent eastward expansion. It is worth noting that complicated historical, ethnic, religious and territorial issues still exist between Russia and fellow CIS members. The Ukraine crisis is a result of all these factors. As President Xi Jinping put it, the crisis is “not coming from nowhere.”

On Syria, the view of Beijing is that Russia launched its military intervention at the request of the Syrian government in order to combat terrorist and extremist forces. Although Washington has called for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to step down, it shares Russia’s goal of striking the Islamic State (ISIS). While accusing Russia of taking this opportunity to deal a blow to Syria’s moderate opposition and inflicting civilian casualties, the United States expressed its willingness to work with Russia to combat terrorism. The Russian move, then, was not exactly what the United States wanted to see but was not an entirely bad thing for US interests, either. From China’s perspective, Russia and the United States have shared interests in confronting the brutal terrorists of ISIS. The hope in China is that the Vienna peace talks among Russia, the United States, Iran, and a number of other regional powers will make progress in resolving the conflict.

But it is difficult to know how far US-Russian cooperation in Syria can go without a common understating about what will lead to peace and order. And many in China find it perplexing that US and Russian perceptions are still so heavily influenced by the Cold War. When talking about Russia, US

politicians and media tend to describe it as the loser in the Cold War rather than making the distinction that Russia is a separate entity from the Soviet Union. Criticism of America's hegemonic actions are frequently heard in Russia. Some people have suggested that the standoff between Washington and Moscow over Ukraine would lead to a new Cold War. But from a Chinese perspective, the current confrontation is more like the prolonged ending of the Cold War. It remains unclear if parties in the ongoing confrontation are smart enough to finally put an end to the Cold War.

Getting past Zero-Sum games

The relations of China, Russia and the United States are so intertwined that no analysis of China-Russia ties would be complete without a consideration of where things stand between China and the United States. Compared with the China-Russia relationship, Beijing and Washington's relations are wider and more complicated. Combined, China and the United States account for one-third of the global GDP. In 2014, trade between the two countries reached \$555 billion and accumulated mutual investment exceeded \$120 billion. Thirty-seven years ago, when the People's Republic of China established diplomatic relations with the US, no one expected such a strong partnership to emerge.

Nonetheless, there are underlying structural problems that exist between the two countries and need to be addressed. Significant differences remain between the Chinese and US political values and between the governing systems in the two countries. To some Americans, who believe that a strong nation is bound to seek hegemony, China's growing economic strength and its correspondingly stronger international influence constitute a potential threat and challenge to the US' global leadership. China is now

growing into the world's second-largest economy. When US troops invaded Iraq in 2003, China's GDP was roughly one-eighth that of the United States. By the time the Americans pulled out of Iraq eight years later, China's GDP had grown to about half that of the United States. According to many estimates, China's GDP will approach the US' by 2020. These changes have provoked fears in Washington that the two countries are on a collision course. Many think-tanks and media outlets in the United States were involved in a discussion on the intentions behind China's construction activities on the Nansha islands and reefs in the South China Sea, fearing that China is attempting to drive the United States out of Asia. They demanded tough measures from the US to resist China's "expansion." Meanwhile, Beijing regards the presence of US military vessels near Chinese territory in the South China Sea as an act of provocation. Some are worried and believe that the United States may shift its China policy from constructive engagement to intensive containment.

Against that backdrop, in September 2015, President Xi made his first state visit to the United States after assuming office. As some in the US believed that China's development constituted a challenge to US global leadership, President Xi responded during the visit by saying, "China will unwaveringly follow a win-win strategy of opening up, and unswervingly follow the path of peaceful development. People should move ahead with the times, and give up on the old concepts of 'you lose, I win' or 'zero-sum game,' and establish a new concept of peaceful development and win-win cooperation. If China develops well, it will benefit the whole world, including the United States. If the United States develops well, it will also benefit China as well as other countries in the world."

China's rapid economic development should be attributed to its successful integration into the world economy. China is also one of the

major participants, supporters and beneficiaries of the current international system with the UN at its core. China is a strong advocate of such principles as sovereign equality and nonintervention in internal affairs of states, which are included in the UN charter. China will remain focused on domestic development for a long time to come and thus needs a stable and peaceful international environment. Determined to safeguard its interests, China would respond firmly to any acts of provocation and encroachment onto its sovereign territory or rights and interests. This should be seen as an important element of regional peace and stability. China is committed to safeguarding the international order and the regional order while it becomes further integrated into the globalized world.

Improving China-US relations represents an important part of China's diplomatic effort. Xi Jinping and Obama have met five times since 2013 and have spoken over the phone on three occasions. In July 2013, when the two leaders met at the Sunnylands summit, they talked for more than seven hours. After the meeting, Xi Jinping proposed the concept of "a new model of major country relations," which he defined as a relationship based on non-conflict non-confrontation, mutual respect, and win-win cooperation. The leaders of two countries have since continued their conversations on that theme: in November 2014 in Beijing, they held the Yingtai dialogue^④, which lasted nearly five hours. And during Xi Jinping's state visit to the US, he and Obama spent nine hours exchanging views and attending joint activities. The long conversations between the two leaders have helped them build understanding which is very important for the two countries to ward off the possible confrontation that some US analysts believe is inevitable.

The state visit was very productive. The two sides reached agreement on a wide range of issues, including macroeconomic policy coordination,

jointly promoting world economic growth and supporting financial stability. Additionally, both countries focused on working together to cope with climate change and enhance global health security, as well as meeting challenges in the fields of antiterrorism and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Cybersecurity was one of the prominent points of contention between the two countries before President Xi Jinping's visit. The two leaders held candid talks on this issue, during which they clarified their intentions and agreed on creating a high-level dialogue mechanism to crack down on cybercrime. Both countries agreed to cooperate bilaterally and jointly push for the establishment of cyberspace codes of conduct in the international community. This cooperation shows that China and the United States can engage in wide-ranging cooperation on matters of vital importance on a global scale.

Of course, the two countries are still confronted with challenges in many areas such as the South China Sea, Taiwan, human rights, business and trade. The intentions of the US military alliances in the Asia-Pacific have remained a particular source of concern for China, especially since Washington announced its "Pivot" to Asia in 2011. Some of the US' Asian allies have spared no energy in challenging China and gain support from the United States, when exerting their claims on China's sovereign territory and maritime rights, with the purpose of involving the US-led military alliances into their territorial disputes with China. These practices are dangerous, reminiscent of the bloc politics of the Cold War.

Some Chinese scholars as well as some from other countries even hold that if the United States insists on imposing bloc politics on the world, China and Russia should consider adopting Plan B, meaning they should face up to the US threat by creating some form of alliance. But this thinking is not shared by decision-makers in China. China does not pursue policies of

bloc or alliance politics, nor do we have such a political culture. Russia does not intend to form such a bloc, either. China and Russia should stick to the principle of strategic partnership rather than alliance. As for China and the United States, both should move in the direction of building a new model of major country relations and allow dialogue, cooperation and management of differences and conflicts to prevail.

China-Russia-US relations: a scalene triangle

The unbalanced development of relations between China, the United States and Russia positions the three countries as a scalene triangle, in which the greatest distance between the three points lies between Moscow and Washington. Within this triangle, ChinaRussia relations are obviously not only more positive and stable but also on the rise. China-US relations have continually fluctuated, and Russia-US relations are in extreme difficulties as Russia is heavily sanctioned by the US. Meanwhile, both China and Russia disagree with the US practice of using force and sanctions to threaten other countries and the double standards applied on itself and its allies as opposed to the others.

The US and its allies could easily cite the closer ties between China and Russia as evidence of an alliance that could be a force to disrupt or challenge the US-led world order. But from Chinese perspective, though there is no longer a tripartite relationship, it is important that two players should not ally against the third. The wide-ranging development of China-Russia relations is not aimed at the United States, nor will it be affected by the US. Likewise, China's cooperation with the US will not be affected by the Russia factor, nor by tensions between Moscow and Washington. China

will not engage in forming an alliance based on bloc, as a foreign policy objective.

The current international order is the cornerstone of global stability—but it is not perfect. In 2005, China and Russia issued a *Joint Statement on a New World Order in the 21st Century*, which called for the current world order to move towards a more just and reasonable direction, drawing its legitimacy from commonly acknowledged principles and norms of international law. The statement made it clear that Beijing and Moscow see the evolution of their relations—from mistrust and competition to partnership and cooperation—as a model for how countries can manage their differences and work together in areas of agreement in a way that supports global order and decreases the chance that the world will descend into great-power conflict and war.

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1. The 2016 January/February issue of *Foreign Affairs* published in December 2015 carried a signed article by Fu Ying with the headline of “How China sees Russia: Beijing and Moscow are close, but not allies.” Reference News published the Chinese version on 17 December with the headline of “China and Russia are partners, not allies.” The full version could be found in the 2016 fourth issue of *Contemporary International Relations* on 30 April, headlined “Are China and Russia Partnering to Create an Axis?”
 2. BRICS is the acronym coined for an association of five major emerging national economies: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.
 3. On 10-12 November 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping hosted President Barack Obama of the United States who was on a state visit, attending the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Economic Leaders’ Meeting. President Xi welcomed Obama’s attendance at the APEC Economic leaders’ Meeting held in Beijing and his state visit to China at Yingtai, a waterfront imperial garden within the Zhongnanhai compound.

Peace in Asia

Northeast Asia Security Cooperation: The Role for China

After World War Two, East Asia was turned into a frontline of confrontation between the two power blocs led by the US and the former Soviet Union respectively. The region experienced hot and cold wars. The security landscape was able to improve only after the end of the Cold War, particularly by the end of the Cambodian War, general peace and stability prevailed. Countries in East Asia have captured the opportunities brought by economic globalization, prioritizing economic growth and the improvement of people's livelihoods.

Over the past 20-plus years, in spite of the two major economic and financial crises, the regional countries joined hands and worked in close cooperation with the rest of the world and created economic miracles that improved employment, and achieved national development and therefore reinforced regional security and stability. The average growth rate of East Asian economies has been over 8%, far higher than that of most parts of the developing or developed world in the same period of time which was around 3%-4%. The aggregate economy of East Asia has surpassed that of North America and Europe, becoming one of the three important economic pillars in the world economy.

The early years of the 21st century saw active regional integration as demonstrated in the establishment of free trade zones, increased connectivity projects and accelerated economic cooperation, which has turned the region into one of the most vibrant and economically promising

places in the world. When global recession occurred near the second decade of this century, East Asia maintained relatively rapid economic growth and therefore played the role of an important engine for the world economic recovery.

Admittedly, the region also faces multiple security challenges. On the one hand, traditional security problems such as the Korean nuclear issue and disputes over territorial and maritime rights and interests are yet to be resolved; on the other, non-traditional security challenges such as terrorism, maritime safety, cyber security and energy security are giving rise to growing concerns.

Some western media even predicted conflicts in East Asia. But, there is good reason to be optimistic, because countries in the region are already highly interdependent and the region has grown into a community with shared interests and future. The East Asian countries are committed to jointly maintaining regional peace and stability, promoting development and prosperity and pursuing win-win cooperation. Gone are the years when the region was characterized by bloc confrontation and regional conflicts in the Cold War, and there is no more life-and-death power rivalry which would split the region. Peoples in the region prefer to see enhanced mutual understanding and deepened cooperation while welcoming dialogue and negotiation as the primary means to address disputes. The transnational nature of non-conventional security challenges also calls for collaboration among countries in the region in addressing them.

Ever since the 1970s, China has played a significant role in addressing regional security difficulties such as the Afghanistan and the Cambodian issues. But its involvement in multilateral security cooperation started only when the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was established in 1994. ARF

gathered countries in East Asia and Asia-Pacific together for the first time, for consultations on maintaining regional security regardless of their sizes.

Until then, for many people in Chinese government and military, *security* had been purely a domestic concept, and it did not seem necessary or meaningful to participate in multilateral security mechanism. During our inter-departmental coordination, many expressed concern that participating in a regional multilateral mechanism might erode China's right in making its own security decisions. Despite these misgivings, Chinese government ultimately accepted the invitation to participate in the ARF as a founding member and joined discussions on formulating the guiding principles for the ARF.

20 years on, the ARF has grown into the most inclusive and influential security dialogue and cooperation mechanism in the Asia Pacific. China, through its role in the ARF, has made important contribution in promoting the ideas of comprehensive security, common security and cooperative security as well as regional security cooperation. China has also proposed that the old security idea of zero-sum game characterized by military alliance, display of force, and power politics should be replaced by a new type of security thinking featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination, which needs to be jointly cultivated by all the regional players.

The essence of the new security thinking is equal participation in security affairs and coping with security challenges through cooperation. As security is common, all countries should be allowed to play a part in building the regional security architecture to prevent the kind of spilling-over effect caused by the insecurity of individual countries. As security is mutual, a country should not seek absolute and exclusive security for itself,

and no country should try to build its own security at the cost of that of others. As security is comprehensive, economic security and non-traditional security challenges deserve greater attention. Addressing these problems require comprehensive means, and countries should be discouraged from highlighting military security and resorting to arms. Today, those proposals and ideas have been increasingly accepted and appreciated by countries in Asia Pacific.

China, which promotes and practices the idea of cooperative security, believes that it should first and foremost manage its own affairs well first and not to add to the regional difficulties. This in itself is a contribution to general peace and prosperity of the region. China's population accounts for 1/5 of that of the world's total and two thirds of that of East Asia. Today, 1.3 billion Chinese people are not only enjoying happy and prosperous lives, but also providing market, capital, experiences and jobs for other nations. China's change is historic and means a lot for the region as well.

At the same time, as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, China is also aware of its international role and is willing to shoulder its due responsibilities and obligations for maintaining peace, security and development of East Asia and the world.

East Asia is very important for China and there is high interdependency among countries in the region for security and prosperity. Therefore, China has played a constructive role and has been committed to promoting peace talks and easing tensions. The Korean Peninsula is in China's close neighborhood and China has been actively promoting denuclearization and peaceful solution to the differences on the peninsula. It has helped to open the Six Party Talks on the nuclear issue on Korean Peninsula in 2003. Despite the difficulties the talks faced at the moment,

they made important contribution to advancing the denuclearization process and maintaining stability.

The security of a region is usually determined by the weakest link on the security chain. Obviously, the asymmetrical defence capabilities on the peninsula made the weaker party feel very insecure, and outside pressure and containment only exacerbated its feeling of being threatened. Its backfire led to a security dilemma that is more difficult to untangle. Therefore, to build a security order on the Korean Peninsula, no party should be isolated or excluded, and empathy is needed in order to avoid pushing any party into extreme insecurity.

China stands firmly for a nuclear-free peninsula, but we do not support any unilateral provocative behavior. We urge all parties to respect others' security concerns while safeguarding their own interests. China's hope is to build a multilateral security framework in which all stakeholders can equally participate. We believe that the overall security should encompass all nations and should not be at the cost of the security of any individual party.

There are some outstanding disputes over territory and maritime rights and interests in Asia and they are mostly legacies from the western colonists and the Cold War. China shares land borders with 14 countries and maritime borders with 8. When the People's Republic of China was founded in 1949, it had more than 22,000 km of land borders that were not formally demarcated with the neighboring countries. China tried to seek mutually acceptable solutions with them through dialogue and negotiations based on the principles of mutual understanding, justice and equality. After many years of consistent efforts, China successfully resolved land boundary issues with 12 neighboring countries.

As for maritime borders, China and Vietnam finalized the delimitation in the Beibu Gulf through years of negotiations. But the maritime disputes in the East China Sea and South China Sea are still outstanding. Given the complicated and historical nature of these disputes, China put forward the proposal of shelving the disputes and seeking joint development. This was based on the acknowledgement that the disputes could not be settled overnight but the region needed to move forward with cooperation. While China has stood firm on its territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, it did not want the outstanding disputes stand in the way of regional cooperation. This gesture is a strong reflection of the idea of common security and cooperative security.

China and the ASEAN members engaged in close and consistent dialogue over the disputes on Nansha Islands and agreed that there should be peace and stability in the South China Sea in spite of the differences. In 2002 We finally concluded and signed the ChinaASEAN Declaration of Conduct in the South China Sea (DOC), which has become a cornerstone for peace and stability in this part of the world. The DOC stipulates that the disputes over territory and jurisdiction in the South China Sea should be addressed by directly concerned sovereign states through peaceful dialogues and consultations, and that before the resolution of the disputes, relevant parties should actively conduct maritime cooperation to pave the way for the ultimate resolution of the disputes.

At the China-ASEAN Senior Officials' Consultations held in September 2013, a consensus was reached to start drafting the "code of conduct(COC)" while furthering practical cooperation within the framework of DOC. To draw up COC in due time was part of the agreement in DOC and it was China's sincere hope that the process of "COC"

discussions can also deepen trust with the ASEAN countries over the South China Sea issue.

In order to promote maritime cooperation, China invested 3 billion RMB to establish the China-ASEAN maritime cooperation fund and a set of joint projects had been planned. When Chinese leader visited Southeast Asia in the following years, consensus over jointly developing resources in the South China Sea was reached with Brunei and Vietnam respectively. It can be expected that steady progress will be made in these cooperations.

With regard to the territorial disputes with Japan over the Diaoyu Island, the older generation of the Chinese and Japanese leaders were in agreement upon the normalization of the bilateral relations and that the disputes be shelved pending a solution. However, in recent years, the Japanese side has kept intensifying unilateral claims and even denying the existence of any disputes. Such attitude is unacceptable to the Chinese side. Against this background, the Chinese side while exercising maximum restraint, insisted on holding consultations with the Japanese side. It is hoped that Japan can face the historical facts and the reality and agree to manage the differences in good faith and resolve the Diaoyu Island issue through dialogue and consultation.

Major powers play a pivotal role in maintaining peace and security. As the biggest developing country in the world today, China has been actively involved in positive interactions with other countries. In early 2013, when paying a state visit to Russia, Chinese President Xi Jinping had in-depth discussions with President Putin in Kremlin on how to advance the China-Russia comprehensive strategic partnership. A series of important agreements were signed and consensus reached, which set an example for mutual trust and cooperation between major powers in the new era.

In June of the same year, President Xi Jinping and the US President Obama met at Sunnylands in the United States. The two leaders agreed to build a new model of major power relations between the two countries featuring no conflict and confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation. The new model of major power relations does not mean co-governance of world affairs. Rather, it means to make complementarity and all-round cooperation in order to safeguard world peace and stability.

Building a new model of major power relations between China and the US is something new. There is no precedent to follow and it will not be plain sailing. In particular, the two countries have different perspectives and concerns about East Asia, which have led to many of their differences and misunderstandings. Therefore, both sides should make effort to build mutual understanding and cultivate the habit of cooperation, which is also the common expectation of countries in the region.

Recently, the US has highlighted security agendas in the Asia-Pacific and increased its investment in military alliance in the region. This has caught the attention of Chinese academia as well as Chinese media. People in other Asian countries have also been following this issue closely. Some believe that China is the targeted “elephant in the room”, while others are concerned about the possible return of the Cold War. On the part of the US, it has reiterated that its “Pivot to Asia strategy” is not aimed at containing China, but is a strategic “rebalancing”. Nonetheless, maneuvering to preempt major power conflicts may only lead to a “self-fulfilled prophecy”.

The non-exclusive new regional security mechanisms are already making progress. They include not only the ASEAN Regional Forum(ARF), but also ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMMPlus), Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and

Armed Robbery against ships in Asia Information Sharing Center(ReCAAP ISC) and the Malacca Straits Cooperation Mechanism.China has been an active participant and advocate for cooperation within these frameworks.

Take the ARF as an example. China initiated the Security Policy Conference at the vice defense ministerial level, which provided an important platform for high-level defense officials to have indepth discussion within the framework of the ARF. China has also been an active supporter for practical cooperation in areas such as peacekeeping, preventive diplomacy, disaster management, maritime safety and cyber security. Up to now, China has hosted over 30 projects, more than any other member. China has already announced it will co-host the fourth disaster relief exercise in 2015 with ASEAN countries, which will be the first large-scale activity China has co-hosted overseas. It will be participated by both the military and civilian disaster relief forces.

As China grows in strength, it is also willing to shoulder more international security obligations and provide more public goods for East Asia and even the world. Among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, China has sent the largest number of peacekeepers. It has also sent the largest number of engineers and medical personnel among the 115 countries that participate in the peacekeeping missions. It is also about to send permanent peacekeeping police squad to Mali for the first time.

Under the auspices of UN, the Chinese navy has dispatched 15 task force groups to the Gulf of Aden and the waters off Somalia since 2008, conducting over 600 escort missions and escorting over 5,000 vessels, more than half of which are foreign vessels, including those from East Asia.

The Chinese navy is not alone in the Gulf of Aden. They joined the NATO-initiated Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE)

coordination mechanism for information exchanges among navies forces, and have closely aligned with the navies of South Korea, Japan and India in intelligence sharing and zoned escort.

As most of the East Asian economies are export-oriented, the maritime passage that starts from the Middle East and goes through the Indian Ocean and the West Pacific to North East Asia is the common shipping lifeline for all. China is willing to explore various forms of regional cooperation with other East Asian countries in maintaining the safety of maritime passages and freedom of navigation, and shoulder its due responsibilities in this regard.

At the moment, East Asia has already had a relatively complete framework arrangement in regional economic cooperation, but the security architecture is still in the making. The region is in need of a regional security architecture that suits the realities and satisfies the needs of all parties concerned.

Should we build such an architecture, there are some conditions and principles that must be respected. For example, it should be built according to the concepts of comprehensive security, common security and cooperative security. It should be open, transparent, inclusive and widely representative with all parties joining on equal footing. It should encourage candid dialogue and cooperation in both traditional and non-traditional security areas.

When Chinese Premier Li Keqiang attended the 8th East Asia Summit in Brunei in October 2013, he used the example of chopsticks to demonstrate the importance for East Asian countries to safeguard regional security through cooperation. He said: “Chopsticks are commonly used in

many East Asian countries. One single chopstick won't do the work of putting food in the mouth. A pair of chopsticks are needed. And when a bunch of chopsticks are tied together, they won't break easily." He went on to say: "Every EAS member has a responsibility for security and stability in the region. Mutual trust and coexistence is our common belief as well as the way forward in today's world."

Comprehensive security, common security and cooperative security should become the shared belief of East Asian countries. These concepts also represent the global trend of the times.

Chinese President Xi Jinping said in his speech in April 2013 at the opening ceremony of the Boao Forum for Asia: "Peace and security are like air. We may not feel it, and yet we cannot live without it." There will be no development without peace and security. As a major power in East Asia, China will continue to make our own contribution to peace, security, development and prosperity of the region along with other neighbors.

1. Speech at the 16th Aspen Ministerial Forum in Seoul on 15 November 2013.

Harmony Is a Blessing for China and Its Neighbors^注

Today's theme is "China and its neighboring countries: Towards common prosperity and development." Given the great attention the relations between China and its neighbors receive both at home and abroad, this theme strikes home and is quite relevant.

Let me share with you some of my observations.

Firstly, how the regional situation look like?

During the 1990s, I was engaged for a long time in Asian diplomatic affairs. When I look back at the changes over the past two decades, I do feel that China and its neighbors have taken the lead in safeguarding peace and promoting development. This is something we should be proud of.

When we talk about the region, it includes China and the whole neighboring area. I still remember when the Cold War ended; many countries here were still caught up in serious mistrust caused by their various differences and long-term divisions. Countries drew on the lessons from their bitter experiences and conducted patient and meticulous dialogues to build confidence and dispel doubts. Cooperation gradually blossomed, and has grown strong.

I served as an interpreter when I was young and had the honor to observe closely how Chinese leaders patiently communicated with our

neighbors and responded to their concerns. Through their unswerving efforts, China has built consensus with its neighbors and moved into win-win cooperation.

A sound international environment has allowed China to concentrate on developing its economy and improving living standards. The entire region has also embarked on a healthy development track. By dealing with financial crises together, developing free trade zones and properly managing our differences, we have gradually developed mutual dependence, trust and a habit of cooperation.

In the past twenty years, the Asian share of the global economy has grown from 17.6% to 27.5%. Economic, trade and financial cooperation within the region has created leapfrog growth. Countries now have interwoven interests and mutual dependence. China is now the largest trading partner and an important source of investment for most Asian countries, contributing over 50% to Asian economic growth.

China and its neighbors are now known as a region of great vitality and potential for development that is attracting increasing attention and investment. Even America's "Asia Pacific Rebalancing" strategy, whatever its connotations, fundamentally reflects the fact that the US is attracted by the robust growth and lively cooperation in the region and values its importance and potential. However, whether the rebalancing will ultimately strengthen or weaken this great momentum remains to be seen.

Secondly, what are the security challenges and existing problems for this region?

In today's world, non-traditional security threats have become more real to the ordinary people. Statistics show that half of the world's human and property losses are caused by natural disasters. Modern media can show in a direct, simple and visual way the consequences of natural disasters and accidents and the fragility of mankind. On this increasingly small planet, non-traditional security touches each and every one of us, and it, therefore, calls for joint efforts to address the challenges.

Meanwhile, some traditional security issues and disputes have also shown a tendency to heat up. The regional consensus of settling disputes through consultation and negotiation, which has been formed over the past twenty years, is at risk of being violated or abandoned. For example, in 2012 the Japanese government announced a plan to "nationalize" the Diaoyu Islands, unilaterally breaking an understanding reached between previous Chinese and Japanese leaders of shelving the dispute over the islands. When confronted by China's strong reaction, Japan changed its tune and described China as a regional security threat. By so doing, it has not only expanded the scope of the dispute but has also provoked antagonism between the peoples in both countries that continues to this day.

Recently some Vietnamese ships harassed operations by a Chinese company in waters off Zhongjian Dao, in the Xisha Islands. To be clear, Xisha is not even in the disputed area. Vietnam recognized China's sovereignty over Xisha long ago, and exploration activities have been going on there for a decade. The hyping up of these issues has caused new anxiety both regionally and internationally and is posing a new challenge to this peaceful region.

Lastly, how to safeguard peace and harmony in our region?

Some people argue that Asia is facing a paradox of economic prosperity and a security dilemma. But economic prosperity in Asia has been achieved only when security and stability are maintained jointly by China and its neighbors. To further this peace and stability, we will still have to rely on the collective efforts of countries in the region. For non-traditional security issues that are confronting modern society, countries must unite. To avoid the consequences of further Cold War style tensions, we must remain on high alert and effectively contain them.

In handling disputes over territory, sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, China has insisted on resolving differences peacefully. We also oppose any attempts to provoke or intensify existing disagreements. This is why when some countries deviate from the peaceful track and challenge regional security, China must give a strong yet restrained response. On the one hand, China must safeguard its sovereign rights and interests. On the other, it must also prevent the security situation from escalating out of control. We need to steer the issues back onto the track of consultation and negotiation, to safeguard overall peace and stability.

At the summit Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) in May 2014, President Xi Jinping delivered an important speech titled *An Asian Security Concept for New Progress in Security Cooperation*. He stressed that the positive situation in Asia had not come easily and it should, therefore, be cherished all the more. The common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security concept for Asia which China advocates is based on Asia's diversity and the current security situation which reflects its spirit of equality, cooperation and inclusion.

Peace and development remain the direction of today's world. Pursuing peaceful development has been a choice made by China based on objective assessments of the past, present and the future. This is a requirement for the Chinese nation to realize the Chinese Dream of great rejuvenation. We must remain on this path and must not be led astray.

1. Keynote speech at an international academic forum titled "China and its Neighboring Countries: Towards Common Prosperity and Development" on 27 May 2014. The forum was hosted by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), and co-organized by the Bureau of International Cooperation, Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) and the National Institute for Global Strategy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (NIGS.CASS). The contents of the speech have been edited and published for this book.

Can East Asia Continue the Momentum of Regional Cooperation? 注

During Chinese President Xi Jinping's recent visits to Vietnam and Singapore, China agreed to connect its Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road initiatives with Vietnam's "Two Corridors and One Economic Circle" plan, while China and Singapore approved the launch of negotiations to upgrade their bilateral free trade agreement. These agreements show that China's Belt and Road Initiative is providing fresh momentum for regional cooperation.

At the Sixth Trilateral Summit of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea on November 1st in Seoul, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, South Korean President Park Geun-Hye and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe vowed to "continue to unwaveringly develop trilateral cooperation."

In the next few days, Chinese leaders will be attending the APEC summit in the Philippines and China, ASEAN Plus China (10+1), ASEAN Plus China, Japan and ROK (10+3) and the EAS in Malaysia, where they will be sending a strong message of peace and cooperation. The expectation of Chinese people is to see further regional cooperation based on the trust and understanding being built among the countries in the region.

Meanwhile, the upcoming launch of the ASEAN Economic Community before the end of the year will be Asia's first subregional community, bring fresh impetus to the integration of Southeast Asia and that of Asia as a whole.

However, we cannot ignore the fact that the momentum of these regional frameworks is often diverted by contentious issues. While regional cooperation continues to flourish, as demonstrated by 10+1 cooperation, the progress in some other regional frameworks, notably 10+3, the EAS, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus), have been slowing down or is even stalled. So, the question is: can East Asia maintain the momentum of regional cooperation?

East Asia is proud of its regional cooperation. In the 1990s, East Asian countries arrived at the common understanding that they should not be held back by differences. They started by upholding the principles of inclusiveness when building a set of frameworks with ASEAN at their center. With the 10+1 and 10+3 frameworks, followed by the East Asia Summit radiating out from the ASEAN core, all are contributing to successful regional cooperation.

Between 1985 and 2014, global gross domestic product (GDP) has increased by 6.2 fold. The figure for the East Asian economies(10+3) over the same period is 9.3 fold. Thirty years ago, East Asian economies accounted for less than 17 % of the global economy. They now account for 25 %.

If European integration is a process of alliance building among countries that share similar political and value system, East Asian cooperation is all about exploring a path of multi-layered integration among countries with different political institutions, values and development levels. In this sense, the success of East Asia is no less important than as that of Europe.

China has established the policy of promoting good neighborliness, security and prosperity across Asia since the 1990s, and has been a staunch advocate for, and a major contributor to East Asian cooperation. China's support for ASEAN's centrality in East Asian cooperation shows not only its respect for the ASEAN initiative but also how it effectively avoids the potentially negative impact on regional cooperation caused through competition among major countries. Following the model of "a small horse pulling a big cart," ASEAN exercises an active role in a region crowded with large countries in a way that has served the region well.

Although China's regional policy goals remain the same, other factors are negatively affecting the region. Apart from the global financial crisis, there are territorial and maritime disputes, as well as inter-state water sharing issues and disputes that are also upsetting regional cooperation, which in turn lead to negative agendas dominating regional meetings.

The emphasis on military and security agendas in the US Pivot to Asia has further complicated the situation. The agreement among countries in the region to prioritize cooperation and economic development has been distracted by the United States' stress on the role of their exclusive military alliance, which is at odds with the region's inclusive cooperation.

Another factor is that, in 2009-2010, the Japanese government appeared to be giving greater emphasis on Asian coordination, even ahead of its relationship with the US. It seemed that this crossed a red line in the US's Asia-Pacific strategy, forcing Japan to change direction. Now as a major regional country, Japan is distracted, torn between treating a rising China as a threat and embracing it as an opportunity. So what we have seen is that, while supporting Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership

(RCEP) negotiations, Japan is also distracted by investing in the negotiations of the TPP led by the US.

Is it fair to conclude that one fundamental reason for the slowing momentum in regional cooperation is the decline in common interests among the four stakeholders: China, the US, Japan and ASEAN? If yes, should we not reflect on our respective policies, and make efforts to find a balance between national interest and the bigger picture of regional cooperation?

For ASEAN, the priority is to maintain its resolve and its capability to drive forward regional cooperation. The establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community will equip ASEAN to play a more significant role in regional affairs, though ASEAN's integration still has a long way to go. ASEAN needs to win continued support for its centrality by being able to accommodate the wider interest of the region.

China-ASEAN relations have been strained by the escalation of territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Some ASEAN members have disregarded the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and initiated provocative statements and actions. China reacted firmly, not only to safeguard its legitimate rights and interests but also to prevent further provocation. China supports ASEAN unity, but it cannot support ASEAN countries uniting against China's national interest.

As part of Asia-Pacific, the US should conduct sincere dialogues with countries in the region to build bridges, instead of walls. In doing so, they will help to create an environment that is inclusive, cooperative and mutually beneficial, instead of a vicious competition built on mutual hostility.

As for Japan, it needs to learn to pay attention to its neighbors and refrain from looking at issues purely from its own perspective. Japan should try to achieve real reconciliation on issues related to its historical behavior and work for greater mutual understanding with its neighbors, as these are major obstacles to regional cooperation. China and Japan must return to the spirit of mutual benefit and enter into strategic cooperation.

What should China's responsibilities be? China needs to remain firm in its belief in East Asian cooperation, and not be distracted by other factors. China's Belt and Road Initiative and move to establish the AIIB were to a large extent inspired by its experiences in regional cooperation. They are aimed at providing a broader platform for common development across the region. As China regards this region as crucial to its security, development and prosperity, it, along with the other countries in the region, needs to persevere in maintaining good relationships with their neighbors, avoid pursuing interests that collide with those in the region, continue to be practical and opt for balanced, negotiated solutions to disputes.

As responsible players in the region, we should not allow any reversal in East Asian cooperation. It is necessary for us to reflect on our responsibilities and get the region back onto its positive agenda, rather than allowing it to be dominated by negative issues and disputes.

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1. Speech at the Luncheon on the 11th Beijing—Tokyo Forum, “China-Japan Relations and Regional Cooperation in East Asia” on October 24, 2015. Part of the speech also appeared in the Expert Opinion Column of the People's Daily on October 26 2015, under the title “Maintaining Cooperation Relies on Mutual Understanding”. This article was later rewritten for The Strait Times and published on 16 November 2015.

The Korean Nuclear Issue: Past, Present, and Future^注

Introduction

The Korean nuclear issue is the most complicated and uncertain factor for Northeast Asian security. It has now become the focus of attention in the Asia Pacific and even the world. Now, as the issue continues to heat up, one frequently raised question is: Why can't China take greater responsibility and make the DPRK stop its nuclear weapons program?

China started to mediate on the Korean nuclear issue and host talks in 2003, at the United States' sincere request. As a developing country, China upholds the five principles of peaceful coexistence.^注 On the Korean nuclear issue, which has a direct bearing over regional security, China's position is to strongly oppose nuclear proliferation. Upon taking up its role as a mediator, China firmly requested the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to stop its nuclear weapons development while requesting other concerned parties, especially the US, to address the DPRK's legitimate security concerns. But the deep mistrust between the US and the DPRK made it very hard for any consensus or agreement made during the years of negotiations to be effectively implemented. China had been working hard to play its role both as a mediator and a implementer of the UN sanctions, but it did not have the leverage to force either the US or the DPRK to assume their respective responsibilities.

Without holding the key to the DPRK's security concerns, China has no leverage to convince another nation to stop its nuclear program. The US, which the DPRK sees as the source of threats to its security, has been neither interested nor willing to consider responding to the DPRK's security concerns. As the two sides reached an impasse, the DPRK took the opportunity to move forward with its program and, since 2005, has carried out five nuclear tests and numerous missile tests. In the meantime, the UN Security Council has stepped up sanctions, and the US and the Republic of Korea (ROK, commonly referred to as South Korea) have been carrying out heightened military exercises to exert greater military pressure on the DPRK. Consequently, tensions are now running high and the channel for talks is closed, and the situation is increasingly dangerous.

On the international stage, the main players are nation states who enjoy sovereign rights endowed by the UN Charter and international law. Powerful states may have greater influence over the international situation, but they should also bear the consequences of what they say or do. Smaller or weaker states may counter or respond to pressure from powerful states, but there is a price to pay for doing so. The international situation often evolves as the result of actions and counteractions by states over specific issues, whereby tension between states can rise and even intensify, leading the situation towards in an unexpected direction. That is why China believes that peaceful negotiation is the Pareto optimal path. ④ Although it may not meet the optimal demands of any party, it would bring maximal benefits to all parties with minimal cost. This would of course call for all parties, the US included, to take their due responsibilities and make the necessary compromises. The reason that no results have been achieved to date is precisely because of the failure to implement negotiated agreements and the suspension of further negotiations.

China remains committed to a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. It has been and will continue to work to safeguard regional peace and stability. China stands for dialogue as the right route to address the Korean nuclear issue. The DPRK and South Korea are geographically connected and both are China's close neighbors; the DPRK, in particular, shares 1,300 kilometers (808 miles) of border with China. Any military conflict or disturbance in this region will endanger peace and stability, inflict huge damage on innocent people, and may even escalate tensions beyond control. The international community has witnessed enough bitter outcomes caused by the unwise use of military action over the past decades.

This article intends to revisit the recent history of the Korean nuclear issue, including how the Three-Party Talks evolved to Six-Party Talks and then broke down—a process in which I have been personally involved at its early stage. The goal is for readers to better understand the origin as well as the trajectory of multilateral efforts regarding the Korean nuclear issue: How did things reach this point? How and why were potential moments of successful resolution missed? Hopefully recounting this period of history can be of some guidance for making wiser choices in the future.

As the Chinese saying goes, “He who tied the bell should be the one to untie it.” To open the rusty lock of the Korean nuclear issue, we should look for the right key.

The US-DPRK agreed framework and the first Korean nuclear crisis

The year 2003 was a watershed for China's role in helping address the Korean nuclear issue. Prior to then, the issue was addressed exclusively by

the US and the DPRK through bilateral negotiations resulting in the Agreed Framework Between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (hereafter, the US-DPRK Agreed Framework). After 2003, however, an international multilateral settlement mechanism was formed, with China as the main mediator. My narrative starts from the visit of US Secretary of State Colin Powell to China in February 2003. I was present at his meetings as a member of the Chinese receiving team in my capacity at that time as the director general of the Asian Affairs Department of the Foreign Ministry of China. His visit came at a time of two significant events. First, on 10 January 2003, The DPRK announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), resulting in the second Korean nuclear crisis. Second, the Gulf Crisis was heating up and US military action against Iraq was imminent. US President George W. Bush sent Secretary Powell to China to ask for help on the Korean nuclear issue in order to avoid confronting pressures in the Middle East and East Asia at the same time.

Hu Jintao, the then Vice President of China, met with Secretary Powell and his delegation, who made it quite clear that the US wanted China to mediate on the Korean nuclear issue. Specifically, Powell said that the US could no longer trust the DPRK, but it could adopt a multilateral approach to seek solutions and suggested that China invite delegates of the US and the DPRK to Beijing for talks. ④

Secretary Powell's visit to China followed the Korean nuclear crisis, which was largely due to the fact that the US-DPRK Agreed Framework had not been honored by either side and that the relationship between the US and the DPRK had broken down. When Secretary Powell arrived in Beijing, the Agreed Framework was about to fail to meet its target date of 2003, by which point the US should have replaced the DPRK's graphite-

moderated nuclear reactor and related equipment with two 1,000-megawatt light water reactor power plants but did not do so. The DPRK also appeared to fall short of completing all its commitment in the Agreement. And this was happening against the backdrop of over half a century of ups and downs in the Korean Peninsula and the entangled relationship of the parties concerned. But one thing was clear: As reflected in the name of the US-DPRK Agreed Framework, the US and the DPRK were the two protagonists in this phase of history.

To understand the Korean nuclear issue, one needs to trace back to the settlement of the Korean War—a war which in a legal sense has not yet ended.

On 27 July 1953, the Korean Armistice Agreement and the Interim Supplementary Agreement of the Armistice Agreement were signed in Panmunjom between, on one side, the supreme commander of the DPRK's Korean People's Army and the commander of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army and, on the other side, the commander-in-chief of the United Nations Command. But these were only armistice agreements, not peace treaties, leaving all sides in a state of truce, which is one of the root causes of prolonged instability on the Korean Peninsula.

After the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement, the Korean Peninsula remained divided along the 38th parallel north between the ROK in the south and the DPRK in the north. Supporting the South were the Western powers headed by the United States, while the socialist camp led by the former USSR supported the North. The Korean Peninsula became a front of the Cold War, at which the US and the USSR battled for hegemony. Nonetheless, the Peninsula was relatively calm over a period of time as the two superpowers were in relative equilibrium.

However, generally speaking, the military presence on the Peninsula after the war was stronger in the South. While the other parties to the war gradually left the Peninsula, the US preserved its army garrison in South Korea, and since 1957 had deployed an array of offensive weaponry, including tactical nuclear weapons. In the early 1990s, with the implementation of the US-USSR Nuclear Disarmament Initiative, the US withdrew all its nuclear weapons from the Peninsula, with its Pacific Headquarters undertaking nuclear protection of South Korea.

In the early period of the Cold War, the DPRK believed that it was under tremendous threat and chose to rely on the USSR for security, economic, and energy guarantees and assistance. It also received assistance from the USSR in conducting limited nuclear research. In 1959, the DPRK, with the help of the USSR, established the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center for peaceful use of nuclear energy. In 1965, North Korea had its first 2-megawatt small light water reactor, after which the Soviet experts returned home. It may be worth noting that the USSR did not appear to have the intention to help North Korea develop nuclear weapons. While passing on nuclear physics technology, it did not provide uranium enrichment or plutonium production technology.

From the beginning of the 1980s, the DPRK started to construct a 5-megawatt natural uranium graphite gas-cooled reactor, which would be able to produce 6 kilograms (13 pounds) of weaponsgrade plutonium each year after its completion. From this point, the US started to pay attention to the growth of the DPRK's nuclear capabilities. In 1985, the US pressured the USSR to force the DPRK to accede to the NPT. In exchange, the USSR signed an economic, scientific, and technological agreement with the DPRK and pledged to provide it with new light water reactors. But the USSR failed to live up to its obligations in this agreement, and the DPRK did not

performed its duty to accept inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in accordance with NPT requirements.

At the beginning of the 1990s, the decline and disintegration of the USSR and the end of the Cold War broke the balance on the Korean Peninsula. The DPRK, having lost its main backer, felt extremely insecure and the whole country fell into a “systematic predicament”. Without assistance and support from the USSR, the DPRK’s industrial and agricultural production plummeted. In contrast, the economy of South Korea soared in the 1970s, and continued to maintain high growth over quite a number of years.

On 17 September 1991, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution of accepting both the DPRK and the ROK as members of the UN. When the DPRK-Soviet Union Agreement on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance expired in 1991, Russia, the successor state of the USSR, did not declare an automatic renewal of the treaty (and in 1994 annulled the agreement). Soon after, the DPRK President Kim Il-sung visited China and discussed with Chinese leaders about the disintegration of the USSR and its consequences. Deng Xiaoping, in his meeting with Kim on 5 October 1991, commented on the current situation and stated that China needed to “mainly observe, hide light and cope with the situation with composure” when dealing with international issues. ④ “To keep a low profile” became an internal guideline for China’s diplomatic behavior, which in essence means not to go beyond one’s capability. China had broken away from the Soviet Bloc long before and did not see the end of the Cold War as an event that placed China in a leading position within the so-called socialist camp.

China and the ROK established diplomatic relations in August 1992, but well before then, the two countries' exchanges and cooperations had already grown full-fledged. The DPRK was unhappy and disappointed at this development and felt ever more isolated. It halted most high-level exchanges with China until 1999, when Kim Yong-nam, president of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly, visited China.

It is perhaps still hard for most people to appreciate how profound the DPRK's sense of crisis was at that moment. It looks like that the events of the early 1990s deeply upset the DPRK and led to its decision to go its own way, including by making the "nuclear choice" as far as its security was concerned. Following the 1988 Seoul Olympics, the USSR/Russia and China decided to improve and develop their relationships with South Korea. In sharp contrast, the US, as one of the direct parties to the armistice, took no visible steps to improve relations with the DPRK, nor did its ally Japan. The opportunity for cross recognition and simultaneous establishment of diplomatic relations was missed.

Around 1990, the US discovered, through satellite imagery, that the DPRK was secretly developing nuclear weapons. The IAEA decided to carry out inspections as required by the NPT. From May 1992 to February 1993, the DPRK received six irregularly scheduled inspections by the IAEA but disagreed on the objectives and results of the inspections. In March of the same year, the US and the ROK resumed their joint military exercises, dubbed "Team Spirit," while the IAEA proposed a "special inspection" of the DPRK. Regarding these as a doubling down of pressure, the DPRK announced its withdrawal from the NPT, triggering the first Korean nuclear crisis. The IAEA submitted a report on the Korean nuclear issue to the UN Security Council that April, and the DPRK disregarded UN involvement,

stating that it was essentially a problem that could only be settled with the United States.

After President Bill Clinton came into office in 1992 and the age of confrontation between the US and Soviet camps ended, the US regarded the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction as its most realistic and direct security threat. In this context, resolving the Korean nuclear issue became the Clinton administration's primary concern in Asia and the US started to reexamine the situation on the Korean Peninsula. For some time, the prevailing approach of the US was to exert pressure and take a hard stand on the DPRK. The US Senate adopted a resolution on 16 June 1994, to urge President Clinton to take action and get the US Army ready not only for "deterrence," but also for "repelling an attack from the DPRK when necessary." However, after evaluation, the US realized that military action would trigger the DPRK's attacks on South Korea, which would cause heavy civilian casualties. At this time, former US President Jimmy Carter visited Pyongyang. He met with President Kim Il-sung and confirmed that North Korea was willing to negotiate with the US on the nuclear issue. This development prompted the Clinton administration to change its attitude and reverse its approach in favor of negotiation.

From June 1993, the DPRK and the US conducted three rounds of high-level talks in New York and Geneva, which culminated in the two parties signing the US-DPRK Agreed Framework. ⑨ Its main contents included the DPRK's agreement to give up its two graphite-moderated nuclear reactors that were under construction. The US agreed to lead an international consortium to oversee and finance the construction of two 1,000-megawatt light water reactors with a total value of \$4 billion, and to compensate the DPRK for the energy foregone due to the freeze of the graphite-moderated reactors by providing 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil

annually. The whole course of negotiations mentioned above were held directly between the DPRK and the US.

After the signing of the US-DPRK Agreed Framework, the situation on the Korean Peninsula calmed down. However, the implementation of the agreement was very slow. The US did take the lead in establishing the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), and some funds were raised internationally to transport heavy fuel oil to the DPRK to help overcome the North Korean energy shortage. Over 8,000 spent fuel rods from the Yongbyon reactor were removed and sealed up. But both the planned dismantling of the reactors and the construction of the light water reactors by the US, Japan, and South Korea were consistently delayed, and ultimately never carried out.

It can be concluded that, in his first term, President Clinton managed the first North Korean nuclear crisis quite successfully. During his second term, he attempted to thoroughly resolve the nuclear issue by engaging more closely with the DPRK. In October 1999, the US released an official report titled “Review of US Policy Toward the DPRK: Findings and Recommendations,” which mentioned that it was necessary to “adopt a comprehensive and integrated approach in dealing with the DPRK’s nuclear weapons-and ballistic missile-related programs,” by relying on bilateral talks as essential means, supplemented by trilateral coordination with Japan and South Korea. However, neither party demonstrated sufficient political will or the ability to execute what was committed, with most of the content in the Agreed Framework left hanging in the air.

Toward the end of the Clinton administration, the door to normalizing relations between the US and the DPRK was once again opened slightly. On 9 October 2000, Kim Jong-il’s second-in-command, Vice Marshal Jo

Myong-rok, visited Washington as a special envoy. And on 23 October, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright started a historic two-day visit to Pyongyang, where she was met by Kim Jong-il himself. She forwarded to the DPRK's leaders President Clinton's suggestions about how to improve US-DPRK relations and discussed with them the nuclear and missile issue as well as the possibility of removing the DPRK from the US list of state sponsors of terrorism. The discussions also touched on setting up liaison offices and then lifting the offices to the level of diplomatic representatives at a later stage. The two sides had so much agreement that they even discussed the possibility of President Clinton visiting the DPRK.

After Secretary Albright returned home, the US was expected to plan for a visit by President Clinton to North Korea and a possible return visit by Kim Jong-il. However, as the US was already entering presidential elections, the lame duck Clinton administration had no time to realize this vision. In her memoir, Secretary Albright wrote that on the day before she left the White House, President Clinton told her that he wished he had taken up the chance to go to the DPRK instead of staying in Washington to make a final push toward a peace agreement in the Middle East. 注

Several years later, I discussed this with Secretary Albright, and we agreed that perhaps an important opportunity to resolve the nuclear issue had unfortunately been missed.

From the second Korean nuclear crisis to Three-Party Talks and Six-Party Talks

The Clinton administration had hoped that the new administration could move along with the new situation it had pioneered. However, that

was not the case. The presidential election of 2000 was won by Republican George W. Bush, who was surrounded by neoconservatives. He had been critical of the US-DPRK Agreed Framework even during his campaign. Moreover, he denounced the policy of engaging the DPRK as having helped it avoid collapse. American rhetoric about North Korea often confuses “denuclearization” with “regime collapse” so much, so that the DPRK could not tell which one was the main target. All of these changes in the US were quite hard for Pyongyang to comprehend. As a result, it could only conclude that the US was not serious about making an agreement in the first place.

The new US administration re-examined its policy toward North Korea, and the Clinton administration’s decision to increase contact was reversed. Eight months later, serious terrorist attack occurred on 11 September 2001 and soon the US government declared its war on terror. 注 It is worth mentioning that after the 9/11 attacks, the spokesperson of the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs made a statement that the 9/11 attacks were a “very regretful and tragic incident,” stressing that “as a UN member state, the DPRK is opposed to all forms of terrorism... And this stance will remain unchanged.” 注 This gesture by the DPRK toward the US was completely different from its past hardline posture, but the gesture was ignored by the Bush administration. In his State of the Union address in January 2002, the US president listed North Korea, along with Iran and Iraq, as one of the three states forming the “axis of evil.”

In October 2002, US intelligence agencies claimed that they had discovered the DPRK’s secret nuclear program, and obtained evidence of the DPRK’s purchase of such technology and equipment overseas. They also exposed evidence of the DPRK’s secret nuclear transaction with Pakistan. 注 James Kelly, US assistant secretary of state for East Asian and

Pacific affairs, immediately went to Pyongyang. In his talks with Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju, Kelly presented the evidence of the DPRK's import of materials to be used in uranium enrichment. Kang did not try to conceal anything and admitted that all the alleged dealings were true. 注

This development shocked Washington: the DPRK, having committed to giving up the development of plutonium-based nuclear weapons, was instead secretly developing uranium-based nuclear weapons. The Bush administration deemed North Korea as having violated the USDPRK Agreed Framework and announced the end of bilateral talks. 注 To the DPRK, the US also failed to deliver what it had committed to in the agreement. Thus the relationship broke down, directly leading to the second Korean nuclear crisis.


At about the same time, the US launched the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) with its allies in the East China Sea, the Yellow Sea, and the Indian Ocean. 注 In December, 2002, the Spanish navy intercepted the cargo ship *So San* from the DPRK carrying Scud missiles in the open seas off the Yemeni coast. The ship was later released after the Yemeni government guaranteed that the missiles would only be used in Yemen and that it would not buy them again.

On 14 November 2002, the US-led KEDO decided to stop transporting heavy fuel oil to the DPRK. This move was regarded by Pyongyang as a violation of the US-DPRK Agreed Framework and, on 12 December the DPRK announced that it would restart the nuclear program frozen in accordance with the Agreed Framework. Then on 10 January 2003, the DPRK announced its formal withdrawal from the NPT.

As a signatory state to the NPT, China firmly opposed any form of nuclear weapons proliferation and had been consistently advocating for the comprehensive prohibition and thorough destruction of all nuclear weapons as well as for the peaceful resolution of differences through negotiations. Given that the US-DPRK Agreed Framework was not producing results and that the US sent Secretary Powell to China for help—and that a denuclearized Korea was also in the interest of China—the Chinese government, after careful consideration, decided to accept the US request. The plan was to invite the DPRK and the US to hold trilateral talks in China.

After Secretary Powell's visit, China sent an envoy to North Korea in the spring of 2003 to consult on the possibility of such talks. The mission was successful, though not without difficulty. The DPRK finally agreed to attend the trilateral talks. But their basic position remained unchanged: Pyongyang believed that the matter could only be dealt with through direct talks with the US, as they believed that the nuclear issue was a response to the US threat to the DPRK and therefore must be resolved through direct agreement between the two. China passed this information on to the US side, which insisted it could not talk with the DPRK alone, and that any talks must include China. The North Korean and US conditions for the talks were diametrically opposed, but China took the two parties' willingness to talk as important common ground, and persevered in mediating until they finally agreed to come to Beijing to talk. The US and the DPRK were also ready to meet each other within the framework of three-party talks.

On 22 April 2003, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs released the following statement: "China has always advocated the peaceful settlement of the Korean nuclear issue through dialogue. This is also the consensus of related parties and the international community. Based on such a consensus,

China has invited the DPRK and the United States to send delegations to hold talks in China.” China had managed to bring the parties back to the negotiating table. From April 2003 to October 2007, China hosted one round of Three-Party Talks together with representatives from the US and the DPRK, and six rounds of Six-Party Talks adding representatives from South Korea, Japan and Russia. The path was never straightforward, but with negotiations continuing, the Korean nuclear situation was kept under control. The Six-Party Talks produced three documents, including the September 19 Joint Statement(in 2005), the February 13 Joint Document (in 2007), and the October 3 Joint Document (also in 2007)—laying an important political basis for peacefully resolving the Korean nuclear issue through dialogue and negotiation. Regrettably, however, these agreements, which brought about hope for removing the nuclear problem from the Peninsula, were never implemented. The following section will describe how the talks went and how they were disrupted and broke down from time to time,resulting in spiraling tensions.

The Three-Party Talks

China, North Korea, and the US held the Three-Party Talks in Beijing from 23 to 25 April, 2003. It was opened by then Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi and I led the Chinese delegation in the capacity of the director general of the Asian Department of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, The North Korean team was led by Ri Gun, deputy director of the American Affairs Department of the DPRK Foreign Ministry.The American team was led by James Kelly, assistant secretary of State.

But the talks deadlocked even before they formally began. According to the US side, President George W. Bush prohibited any member of the US

delegation from engaging in any form of a bilateral meeting with the delegation from the DPRK. But the DPRK delegation wanted to talk with the US delegation, alone. 注 During a banquet hosted by China on the eve of the talks, the DPRK negotiator Ri Gun left his seat and approached James Kelly who was sitting on the other side of a round table, and told him bluntly that the DPRK had already conducted reprocessing of spent fuel rods. Kelly turned to me looking upset, and even angry, and told me what Ri said. He said that he needed to call Washington for instructions. The next morning the US delegation stated that it would attend the talks only when the Chinese delegation was present and would not have any separate meeting with the DPRK delegation even under the three-party framework. The DPRK delegation reacted by refusing to attend the talks. After repeated and hard persuasion, China managed to keep them involved in the talks. But in reality, the so-called Three-Party Talks were no more than separate talks between the Chinese and the DPRK delegations, and the Chinese and the US delegations.

The attempt to hold the Three-Party Talks was not easy and the result was far from satisfactory. But the fact that the DPRK and the US were back to the negotiating table sent the right signals to the world, and the international community saw this as a sign of hope for a diplomatic solution. Tensions started to calm down. The DPRK submitted a package plan to give up nuclear development and missile testing in exchange for economic assistance and security guarantees by the US, Japan, and South Korea. This plan reflected the DPRK's basic thinking and served as the foundation of the DPRK's proposals in subsequent rounds of talks. The Three-Party Talks attracted keen attention from the ROK and Japan, and the US requested the expansion of the talks to include its two allies. While China had no problem including them, it also wanted to bring in Russia, which also had a stake in the issue.

There was also growing international interest in the talks. China continued quiet diplomatic efforts to mediate among the parties, traveling and listening widely. The DPRK's attitude toward the nuclear issue had been quite consistent. That is, it could no longer trust the US, and, in the face of hostile American policy, it needed to develop nuclear weapons to guarantee its own security. China resolutely opposed the DPRK's nuclear path. But at the same time, China expressed understanding of the DPRK's security concerns and supported multilateral talks for a peaceful settlement. Understanding the seriousness but also the delicate nature of the situation, China was also willing to take up responsibility for arranging and hosting more talks.

Since the collapse of the USSR, China had become the DPRK's most important partner and foreign aid provider. The DPRK also recognized that it needed China's cooperation and should respect this friendly neighbor's opinion, and therefore could not easily say no to China's proposal for dialogue. The Bush administration's position was to maintain the military option and base its action on how the DPRK behaved in the negotiations. China, while transmitting to the US the opinions of the DPRK, also expressed its own clear-cut position: It would oppose any attempt at resorting to military means and instead support negotiations to find compromise and a peaceful resolution to the nuclear issue.

It was clear that both the US and the DPRK had entered the talks with dual tactics: the US could talk but would attack if the talks did not work; the DPRK wanted to talk and get results, but would otherwise develop nuclear weaponry to protect itself from a possible attack. China's strategy was to make every effort to promote negotiations while resolutely cutting off any disruptive attempts made by the two parties.

I remember during one visit to Washington, the US side stated:“We agree to talk, but the military option is also on the table.” The Chinese side disagreed with this and argued that if the US insisted on keeping the military option, the DPRK would also keep the nuclear option. In a later meeting in Washington, the US told us that the wording had been adjusted to “The military option is not off the table.” It was quite hard to see the difference between the two versions, especially for non-English speakers, but the American side insisted that these were the president’s words. I jokingly asked my counter part in the American delegate, if the military option “is not off the table” and not necessarily on the table, then where it could be? And he said that one could only use one’s imagination. When I conveyed this sentence to the DPRK delegate Ri Gun, he looked at me, eyes wide open, and asked, “Then where is it now?”

In July 2003, Dai Bingguo, then the Vice Foreign Minister of China,who had long association with the DPRK, visited Pyongyang after visiting Washington, where he had already received a US commitment not only to restart the talks but also to include Six-Party Talks. After lengthy meetings with senior officials, Dai met Kim Jong-il, who finall agreed. He said: “Since the Chinese comrades said we should attend the talks, then let’s give it another try.”

Afterwards, the US agreed to send a delegation to Beijing for talks as soon as possible. Formality-wise, the US wished that the ROK and Japan could also join in and did not oppose China’s suggestion of bringing in Russia. The US could also agree to hold another round of the Three-Party Talks if North Korea so wished,but those negotiations should be followed immediately by the SixParty Talks. 注 The Chinese side passed the American proposal to the DPRK side, which quickly responded that they

had no problem with enlarging the talks and suggested that we directly enter into the SixParty Format. 注

However, the sensitive nature of the Korean nuclear issue and the sharply opposing positions of the DPRK and the US made the specific arrangement of the meetings very difficult. Even the seating plan and meeting format became problems. The Fangfeiyuan Hall at the Diaoyutai State Guest House was chosen as the venue. As the six delegations could not be arranged to sit on two sides of a long table given their delicate relationships, we needed a big hall to arrange the tables into a hexagon, so that each delegation would have its own side of the table.

The most delicate part was how to arrange the separate meetings between the DPRK and US delegations. The DPRK attached great importance to bilateral meeting with the US and its stated condition was that the two delegations must talk separately in a private place. For the US, the condition was that the two delegations should not meet “in a separate room,” and that the meeting could be held only when the other delegations were present “under the same roof.” We finally came up with the idea of setting up some private spaces for tea breaks at the far corners of the hall, with screens, sofas, and green plants as partitions. One of the corners was specially reserved for potential direct dialogue between the DPRK and US delegations.

Diplomats from the DPRK and the US embassies in Beijing came to see the venue on separate occasions and both gave their approval, thus removing the final obstacle. In fact, during the later Six-Party Talks, the US-DPRK dialogues went so deep and became so important that they voluntarily moved the bilateral meetings into a separate room.

The Six-Party Talks

The first round of the Six-Party Talks was held in Beijing from 27 to 29 August 2003, and was opened by Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing. Vice Minister Wang Yi headed the Chinese delegation. The heads of other delegations were James Kelly, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Kim Yong Il, DPRK's Deputy Foreign Minister, Alexander Losiukov, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, Lee Soo-Hyuck, ROK's Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and Mitoji Yabunaka, Director-General for Asian and Oceanian Affairs, Bureau of Japan's Foreign Ministry.

The DPRK remained firm in sticking to a package settlement of the nuclear issue. It proposed a four-stage resolution, with each stage requiring simultaneous action from the United States.

The United States, however, did not accept the package idea and stressed that the DPRK should take the first step, and must denuclearize with “complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement” before its security guarantee could be discussed.

It is worth mentioning that later that year Libya made an announcement which was likely to have an impact on the future of Six-Party Talks. In December 2003, Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi announced that his country would “thoroughly give up weapons of mass destruction” and accept inspections by the IAEA. Libya handed over all of its nuclear research and development results. The US then lifted sanctions on Libya and removed its label as a state sponsor of terrorism, and established diplomatic ties. For a time, in the eyes of the Western world, Libya became an exemplar for nonproliferation. The US hoped that this

would also affect the DPRK's thinking. Whether it did or not, the dramatic developments of the Libyan uprising and its aftermath eight years later very likely made a profound impact on the DPRK's attitude.

When the second round of the Six-Party Talks was held in Beijing from 25 to 28 February 2004, 注 the talks focused on resolving the nuclear issue and the measures to be taken as the first steps. During the talks on how the DPRK should denuclearize, the US suggested that Pyongyang should follow Libya's example: to first give up its nuclear program and then accept inspections by the IAEA. China, Russia, and South Korea were more inclined to advocate for the "Ukraine Model" 注 and stressed that if the DPRK took the initiative to denuclearize, its sovereignty should be respected and its security guaranteed.

The Six-Party Talks issued their first written document, the Chairman's Statement, in which each party expressed that it was dedicated to the objective of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and to resolving nuclear issues peacefully through dialogue. All parties also stated that they wished for peaceful coexistence, and they agreed to resort to mutually coordinated measures to address the nuclear issue and other concerns. 注

From 23 to 26 June of the same year, the third round of the Six-Party Talks was held. 注 The DPRK still insisted on "freezing for compensation" but for the first time stated that the freeze was for the final purpose of denuclearization. The US also showed some flexibility and proposed a formula for a five-stage denuclearization. Although no substantive agreement was produced, one important consensus reached was the principle of "adopting a progressive method" and a "'word-to-word' and 'action-to-action' manner" for achieving a solution to the Korean nuclear issue. In other words, the US and the DPRK should take steps simultaneously.

China continued with the mediation efforts and it was not until 13 months later that the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks took place. The main reason for the break was that George W. Bush started campaigning for re-election. Wanting to appear as taking a tougher position toward North Korea, he called the DPRK leader a “tyrant” and referred to the country as “a tyranny outpost.” Pyongyang was concerned about the changes in the American attitude. To add to the concern, the ROK admitted in early September 2004 that it had secretly extracted weapons-grade plutonium and enriched uranium materials, and the IAEA took no action against this development. The DPRK reacted strongly and, on 10 February 2005, announced that it had already manufactured nuclear weapons and would indefinitely suspend its participation in the Six-Party Talks. This in turn led to the US imposing financial sanctions against the DPRK for the first time.

After much coordination including China’s shuttle diplomacy, the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks was held in Beijing and was split into two phases: the first from 26 July to 7 August 2005, and the second from 13 to 19 September of the same year. ④ These lengthy meetings proved to be very fruitful and resulted in the Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks (hereafter, the September 19 Joint Statement). This important document successfully reflected all parties’ concerns. The DPRK, for the first time, promised to give up all of its nuclear weapons and its current nuclear program, and South Korea also clearly expressed that it would not develop nuclear weapons. The US agreed to discuss the provision of light water reactors to North Korea at an appropriate time and, for the first time, together with Japan, promised to take measures to normalize relations with the DPRK. Meanwhile, a peace mechanism on the Korean Peninsula was mentioned for the first time.

As a road map for resolving the issue, the September 19 Joint Statement offered a glimmer of hope. But this was clouded by further US financial sanctions against the DPRK, which were enacted soon after.

On 23 September 2005, almost the same time when the Six-Party Talks were in progress, the US Treasury Department, without any warning, openly accused the Macao-based Banco Delta Asia (BDA) of money laundering and circulating counterfeit bank notes for several the DPRK accounts. The funds, according to the accusation, were used for “supporting terrorism.” On September 9, the US requested that the DPRK’s \$25 million in the BDA be frozen. Then, on October 21, the US blacklisted eight the DPRK enterprises and froze their US assets. On the surface, the BDA case was not directly related to the Korean nuclear issue, yet it exerted a major impact on the progress of the talks.

The DPRK delegation came as promised to the first stage of the fifth round of the Six-Party Talks in Beijing from 9 to 11 November 2005. 注 In December, the US implemented another round of financial sanctions against Pyongyang. In the face of increased US sanctions, North Korea publicly stated that it would not return to the Six-Party Talks until the US removed its economic sanctions. But instead of ceasing to impose sanctions, the US Treasury Department stepped up sanctions in April 2006.

This not only put an end to any possible implementation of the agreement achieved by the Six-Party Talks; it practically set off a vicious cycle of sanctions, nuclear test, more sanctions, and another nuclear test, which has since become a familiar pattern. The escalating sanctions by the US did not stop or slow down the pace of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Pyongyang test-fired seven missiles into the Sea of Japan on July 5, 2006, and declared a successful underground nuclear test on October 9.

On 14 October 2006, the UN Security Council unanimously approved Resolution 1718, proposed by the US^①. The resolution required all the UN members to embargo goods related to nuclear weapons and technology, large weapons, and luxury commodities headed for North Korea, while urging Pyongyang to stop its nuclear tests and suspend all actions relating to ballistic missile development.

In October 2006, China, along with other members of the UN, did not want to give up the peace process and continued to pursue mediation. The DPRK eventually agreed to return to the Six-Party Talks on November 1. During this time, the US Democratic Party had won the midterm congressional elections, forming a majority in both the House and the Senate. So-called neoconservatism ebbed in the US, and the Bush administration toned down its tough stance on the DPRK.

At the second and third stage meetings of the fifth round of the Six-Party Talks held in Beijing from 18 to 22 December 2006, and from 8 to 13 February 2007,^② a major success was achieved: a joint document entitled Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement (hereafter, the February 13 Joint Document). It outlined a number of parallel actions, including the DPRK shutting down its nuclear facilities in Yongbyon and declaring and abandoning all nuclear programs. The US and the DPRK agreed to hold bilateral talks and the US agreed to remove the DPRK from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. The DPRK's agreement to declare and end all of its nuclear programs marked an important step forward.

After the signing of the February 13 Joint Document, the situation on the Peninsula improved and the DPRK and the ROK resumed ministerial dialogues. The IAEA director general, Mohamed ElBaradei, headed for the DPRK to discuss the details of closing and sealing up the nuclear facilities

in Yongbyon. On the same day, the DPRK Vice Foreign Minister, Kim Kye-gwan, paid an “ice-breaking” trip to the US and attended negotiations on normalizing relations between the two countries, the first time for such an event to take place.

However, sanctions on the DPRK continued to hinder the implementation of the September 19 Joint Statement and the February 13 Joint Document. North Korea insisted that the prerequisite for shutting down the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon was to lift sanctions, but the US refused.

When the first-stage conference of the sixth round of the SixParty Talks was held in Beijing from 19 to 22 March 2007, 注 the US confirmed that the DPRK funds frozen in the BDA would be transferred to the Bank of China. The DPRK promised to use the money for humanitarian purposes and education. Unfortunately, due to some “technical problems,” the money was not deposited into the designated Bank of China account on the expected time. The DPRK took this as a breach of the agreement on the part of the US, as Pyongyang had fulfilled its responsibilities while Washington failed to complete its part of the commitment. Therefore, the DPRK declared that it would take no further step until the BDA problem was solved. When it was eventually resolved on June 25, the DPRK resumed its actions to fulfill the February 13 Joint Document. On July 14, with the nuclear facilities shut down, 6,200 tons of heavy oil provided by the ROK arrived in the DPRK and IAEA inspectors headed for Yongbyon to supervise and verify the shutdown. Meaningful progress in addressing the Korean nuclear issue had finally been made.

The US-DPRK working group met in Geneva on 1 September 2007, where the DPRK explicitly promised that it would declare all of its nuclear

programs and disable nuclear reactors. The US also promised to remove the DPRK from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. Nevertheless, when speaking at the UN General Assembly later that month, President Bush referred to the DPRK and other countries as “brutal regimes,” indicating that the US still had a very negative attitude toward the DPRK.

The second-stage meeting of the sixth round of the Six-Party Talks was held from 27 September to 3 October 2007. It saw the signing of the Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement (hereafter, the October 3 Joint Document). The new document focused on “disabling the nuclear reactors” and “declaring all nuclear programs,” required the DPRK to disable the 5-megawatt experimental reactor at the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center as well as the nuclear fuel reprocessing plant (radio-chemical laboratory) and the nuclear fuel element plant, and obligated Pyongyang to declare the suspension of all of its nuclear programs before the end of 2007. The October 3 Joint Document also required further improvement of bilateral relations between the US and the DPRK and between Japan and the DPRK. On November 5, work to disable the nuclear facilities began.

Moving into 2008, the DPRK started hesitating again. Even as it was honoring its commitments and had completed 75 percent of its nuclear reactor disablement, the DPRK did not see corresponding measures being taken by other parties, and the promised heavy oil, equipment, and material assistance had not been supplied. In January, the DPRK slowed down the dismantling of its nuclear reactor.

The DPRK’s behavior became a new focus of controversy. The points of difference between the US and the DPRK were mainly the following: how much plutonium the DPRK had, whether the DPRK had a uranium

enrichment program, and if the DPRK was conducting nuclear cooperation with Syria. The debate over these differences became an obstacle and the DPRK did not issue a declaration of its nuclear programs before 1 January 2008, as had been required.

The parties again engaged in new rounds of consultations and the US and the DPRK managed to meet in Geneva and Singapore in March and April of 2008. The two countries agreed that the DPRK would declare an end to its nuclear program and the US would remove the DPRK from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. The DPRK duly provided a record of reactor operation in Yongbyon so that the US could calculate the amount of plutonium produced. The US took that act as “a vital step forward.” Accordingly, the US was obliged to remove the DPRK from the list of state sponsors of terrorism within 45 days.

But on the very day when the DPRK submitted its declaration, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice raised the issue of verification in the *Wall Street Journal* and called for an inspection of North Korea's declaration. 注 The DPRK was strongly opposed to this, arguing that the October 3 Joint Document did not include any clause on verification. As the 45-day limit expired, the US failed to honor its commitment to remove the DPRK from the list. On 11 August the DPRK declared that it would suspend the operation of disabling nuclear reactors and would at the same time consider restoring Yongbyon nuclear facilities to the original state. It also expelled IAEA inspectors. The situation remained tense until early October, when the US Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill visited the DPRK. An agreement was reached, with the US declaring that it would remove the DPRK from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. The DPRK then expressed willingness to restart the disabling of its reactors and accept verification measures.

It can be concluded that the Six-Party Talks managed to move forward in spite of many difficulties and obstacles and helped to maintain stability on the Peninsula. More importantly, the talks kept all parties moving in the direction of denuclearization and a peaceful settlement of their differences. Unfortunately, this process failed to continue in subsequent years.

Escalation and intensification of the Korean nuclear issue from 2009 to the present

As of September 2017, the DPRK had conducted six nuclear tests. The first occurred following the suspension of Six-Party Talks in 2006 after the BDA issue and US sanctions. The other five tests all occurred after 2009, during which time the Six-Party Talks were completely stalled and a vicious cycle of escalation and intensification took over.

On 20 January 2009, newly-elected US President Barack Obama assumed office. The year before, Lee Myung-bak replaced Roh Moo-hyun as South Korean President and instituted a tougher policy toward the DPRK. As in the past, leadership changes brought new uncertainties to the Peninsula.

The new US administration strongly believed that during the later years of the Bush presidency, the DPRK had not been honoring its commitments in the various agreements and had been allowed to go too far in “cheating and blackmailing the United States.” Opposing any US-DPRK deals became the “politically correct” stance in Washington, especially in military circles and on Capitol Hill. President Obama, who held a liberal worldview, repeatedly emphasized the importance of improving the country’s international image during his campaign, and advocated for a

“nuclearfree world.” After taking office, he prioritized the promotion of international nuclear disarmament and global nuclear security cooperation. This put his administration in an awkward position, as it could neither continue the path of compromise adopted by the Bush administration in its later years, nor go straight toward a “muscleflexing” policy path.

In his first inaugural address, President Obama declared to the “enemies of the US” that “we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist.”^① That was an impressive statement. At a Senate hearing before taking up the position of the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton also indicated that the Obama administration would be more flexible and open in handling the US-DPRK relationship compared to the Bush administration.^②

However, the DPRK did not respond positively to this new gesture and tensions started to escalate following some incidents. In March, the DPRK detained two female US journalists who entered DPRK territory without permit when visiting in the China-DPRK border area. They were later released into the care of former President Bill Clinton. On 5 April, the DPRK announced the launching of the experimental communication satellite Kwangmyŏngsŏng-2 and declared its exit from the Six-Party Talks on 23 April. On 25 April the DPRK Foreign Ministry announced that it had begun to reprocess spent fuel rods taken from the experimental nuclear reactors. On 25 May, it conducted its second nuclear test. Apparently Pyongyang analyzed the situation and decided to take a tougher stance and became more inclined to acquire nuclear capabilities. It is hard to guess what prompted its shift of stance, whether it was the political changes in the ROK or if it had simply lost confidence in the talks.

On 12 June 2009, the UN Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1874, which condemned in the strongest terms the nuclear test conducted by the DPRK and demanded that DPRK immediately and fully comply with its obligations under Resolution 1718. It also contained clear provisions banning the import and export of the DPRK's arms, as well as authorizing the inspection of vessels related to the DPRK and traveling to or from the country, which was intended to prevent the inflow of foreign funds into the DPRK to develop missiles and nuclear weapons.

The then Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited Pyongyang on from 4 to 6 October 2009, as part of regular bilateral exchanges. He met Kim Jong-il and discussed the issue with him. Subsequently, tensions started to ease in January 2010 when the DPRK expressed a willingness to sign a peace agreement with the US within the Six Party framework, on the condition that sanctions be removed prior to the talks. But the US wanted the Six-Party Talks to be resumed first and a peace agreement to be discussed during the talks.

On 26 March 2010, the South Korean warship Cheonan, carrying 104 officers and crew onboard, sank in the waters between Baengnyeong Island and Daecheong Island in the Yellow Sea, when an unidentified explosion hit the rear of the ship, causing 46 deaths. The US and South Korea immediately accused the DPRK of attacking the warship with a submarine torpedo. Russia participated in the international investigation that followed, while China did not.

Although the DPRK never acknowledged responsibility, South Korea announced the suspension of trade and exchanges. This undoubtedly increased tension and deepened distrust and antagonism between South Korea and the DPRK and between the US and the DPRK.

On 12 May 2010, the DPRK's official newspaper, *Rodong Sinmun*, reported the country's development of nuclear fusion technology. Soon after, following joint talks between the foreign and defense ministers of both South Korea and the US, new sanctions were imposed by the US on five entities and three individuals from the DPRK on the grounds that they supported the DPRK's attainment of weapons of mass destruction.

China continued to mediate for resuming the Six-Party Talks and, on 15 March 2011, the DPRK Foreign Ministry agreed to unconditionally rejoin the talks and also agreed to include in the discussions the issue of uranium enrichment. In October, the DPRK held separate meetings with ROK, the US, and Russia also expressed willingness to unconditionally return to the Six-Party Talks. Then on 17 December 2011, Kim Jong-il suddenly passed away.

Another important international event occurred in 2011 that is worth mentioning. In February, the "Arab Spring" movement spread to Libya, with people taking to the streets against Moammar Gadhafi. The demonstrations soon evolved into civil strife. On 17 March the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1973, which authorized the creation of a no-fly zone over Libya. On 19 March France, Britain, the US, and other countries started to conduct air strikes in Libya, which had already given up weapons of mass destruction in 2003. On 20 October Gadhafi fell into the hands of the opposition in Sirte and died in a tragic manner. When speaking to the public for the last time, Gadhafi mentioned that Kim Jong-il must have been looking at him and laughing. Indeed, the DPRK kept a close eye on the situation in Libya. An article published in *Rodong Sinmun* on April 18 said, "In recent years, the tragedies of some countries which renounced the nuclear program half way under the US pressure have clearly confirmed the

sensible and correct choice the DPRK has made. Only by doing so can the national and ethnic autonomy be safeguarded.”

Although concerned and wary following the events and aftermath of the Libyan uprising and the “Arab Spring”, which might have had an impact on its considerations about pursuing the nuclear path, the DPRK did not totally give up dialogues. Kim Jong-il remained committed to the “unconditional resumption of the Six-Party Talks” until his death on 17 December 2011. He was succeeded by his youngest son, Kim Jong-un, who appeared to be willing to continue the policy adopted by his father.

The DPRK and the US held a third round of high-level talks in Beijing on from 23 to 24 February 2012, as the Six-Party Talks were yet to be restarted. The two sides reaffirmed their commitment to fulfilling the 19 September Joint Statement, stating that the Korean Armistice Agreement was the cornerstone of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula prior to the signing of a peace accord. They also agreed to simultaneously take confidence-building measures to improve DPRK-US relations.

Subsequently, they separately released the 29 February Agreement (or “Leap Day Agreement”). Although the documents were not completely identical, there were elements reflecting some basic consensus. Among the key points were: the DPRK should suspend nuclear tests and long-range missile tests as well as uranium enrichment activities, and allow the IAEA to verify and supervise its activities; and the US should not be hostile to the DPRK and should be willing to improve their relations and expand exchanges. The US also promised to provide the DPRK with 240,000 tons of nutritious food.

Over the following weeks and months, the two sides made many claims and counterclaims. The essential dispute was whether the agreement

included the launching of satellites. The DPRK argued that the moratorium on long-range missile tests did not include the launching of satellites. But the US insisted that launching satellites was included. Unfortunately, what was exactly agreed and disagreed on this matter remain unclear.

On the morning of 13 April 2012, the DPRK launched its first application satellite, Kwangmyongsong-3, and the US government decided to not deliver food aid as previously agreed. On 2 May, the UN Security Council's the DPRK Sanctions Committee updated the sanctions list, adding three DPRK's entities. On 13 May, the fifth session of the 12th Supreme People's Meeting of the DPRK amended the country's constitution, declaring in its preface, "Comrade Kim Jong-il has established our motherland as an invincible political and ideological power, a nuclear nation and an unrivaled military power."

On June 18, President Obama accused the DPRK of being a continuous threat to the US and declared an extension of sanctions against Pyongyang for another year. On 12 December, the DPRK announced the successful launch of a second Kwangmyongsong-3 satellite, which was widely believed to be a Taepodong-2 missile. On 12 February 2013, the DPRK conducted its third nuclear test. On 7 March, the UN Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 2094, condemning the DPRK's third nuclear test and issuing a new round of sanctions. On 2 April, the spokesperson for the DPRK's Atomic Energy Agency said that the Yongbyon 5-megawatt graphite-moderated reactor, which had been closed and sealed in 2007, would be restarted.

In 2014, after the US and South Korea started the "Key Resolve" joint military exercises on 24 February, the DPRK repeatedly launched various types of missiles.

On 20 May 2015, the DPRK issued a statement, claiming that it has achieved a miniaturized and diversified “nuclear strike capability.”

The situation further escalated in 2016. The DPRK conducted its fourth nuclear test on 6 January. On 13 January, South Korean President Park Geun-hye announced at a press conference that the South Korean government would consider the introduction of the missile defense system known as Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD).

On 7 February 2016, the DPRK announced the launching of a satellite with a long-range rocket. On 2 March, the UN Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 2270, which in turn initiated a series of new sanctions.

From March to April 2016, the US and the ROK conducted large-scale “Key Resolve” and “Foal Eagle” joint military exercises, involving more than 300,000 South Korean soldiers and 17,000 American soldiers with carrier battle groups, strategic bombers, and other strategic weaponry. The scale of these military exercises was larger than ever before in terms of the destructiveness of weapons and the number of participants, and “decapitation strikes” were also included. Almost every year since the 1970s, the US and the ROK have conducted joint military exercises, including “Key Resolve,” “Ulchi Freedom Guardian,” and “Team Spirit.” In recent years, such military exercises have become large in scale and more specifically targeted. North Korea in response and in preparation, would mobilize its people into a war footing, redeploy military forces, and sometimes even recruit reserves to strengthen the standing army. Understandably, such a practice not only creates tension but also forces the DPRK to expend a lot of manpower, materials, and financial

resources, which has been a stress on the national economy and people's livelihoods.

The DPRK conducted five more test launches of its Musudan missiles. On June 1, the US Treasury Department designated the DPRK "a jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern" and, on July 6, the US placed its leader Kim Jong-un on the sanctions list for the first time. The DPRK followed this by firing missiles up to 50 kilometers (311 miles) into the sea throughout July and August.

On 22 August 2016, the US and South Korea started its annual "Ulchi-Freedom Guardian" joint military exercises. To protest, the DPRK fired a submarine-launched ballistic missile into the eastern waters of the Peninsula on 24 August and three ballistic missiles into the sea on 5 September. On 9 September 2016 the DPRK conducted its fifth nuclear test.

Eighty-two days later, on 30 November 2016, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2321 in response to the DPRK's fifth nuclear test. Most noticeably, the resolution imposed a ceiling on coal exports, which had been the DPRK's largest export material. China again called for the parties to resume dialogue as soon as possible to deal with their differences in a peaceful, diplomatic, and political manner.

Looking back on the eight years of the Obama administration, the US linked the Korean nuclear issue with its disapproval of the DPRK government. Indeed, the widely reported "brutality of the regime" has been a troubling concern within the international community. The US adopted a policy of "strategic patience," the essence of which was that no matter how the DPRK conducted itself, the US did not want to give any serious consideration to Pyongyang's security concerns. If the DPRK was willing to negotiate, the US would talk but with no intention to make any progress. If

the DPRK chose confrontation, the US would intensify sanctions. The ultimate purpose was to see the North Korean government collapse under constant pressure.

The US maintained secret and semi-public bilateral contacts with the DPRK in New York, Pyongyang, and Kuala Lumpur, but as long as the DPRK refused to abandon its nuclear program, the role of such contacts was limited. So, the reality is that the Obama administration's de facto tough policy concealed by the word "patience" bumped against the DPRK's strong will to possess nuclear power. The two countries reinforced each other in a negative direction, allowing the tense situation to slip into a downward spiral.

As the DPRK's nuclear and missile programs continue to make progress, Washington's "patience" is rapidly running out. Washington is said to be reassessing the DPRK's potential to acquire deterrence against the US, and the timeline is believed to be not very long. Moreover, anti-the DPRK sentiment is growing in the United States, and all kinds of stories about the DPRK, though unverifiable, are spread widely. Capitol Hill had increasingly accused the Obama administration of being weak and incompetent in dealing with Pyongyang.

Donald Trump's administration, after taking office early 2017, treated the Korean nuclear issue as a primary security challenge in Asia. It announced the end of the Obama administration's policy of "strategic patience" toward the DPRK and implemented the "maximum pressure" policy. The US and ROK carried out the military drill "Ulchi Freedom Guardian (UFG)" in August 2017. Tension continued to rise on the Peninsula.

On 3 September 2017, the DPRK conducted its sixth nuclear test from the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Facility and claimed it to be a successful test of hydrogen bomb, with the yield being 10 times stronger than the fifth test. This triggered wide condemnation in the international community. As a response, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted the Resolution 2375 which contained a series of economic and commercial sanctions against individuals and entities of DPRK. These include that selling condensates and natural gas liquids to DPRK and purchasing its textiles shall be completely prohibited; nations shall be prevented from providing work permits to its citizens; the export of refined petroleum products to the DPRK shall not exceed 2 million barrels per year.

There has also been some news coming out of military and strategic circles about the US working with its allies to fine-tune a targeted strike plan against North Korea. This adds uncertainty, clouding the future of the Peninsula.

One newly added grave concern for China is that on 8 July 2016, the US and South Korea announced the deployment of the THAAD anti-missile system in South Korea. The AN/TPY-2 X-band radar used in the THAAD system is reportedly the largest and most advanced land-based transportable radar, with a range of about 1,200-2,000 kilometers (746-1,243 miles). Its detection distance for medium-and long-range missiles on the ascent stage is over 2,000 kilometers (1,243 miles), and it can precisely calculate the expected impact points of warheads or false warheads from a distance of about 580 kilometers (361 miles).

If deployed in South Korea, even by the most conservative estimates, this radar would radiate through parts of northeastern and northern China as well as the Bohai Sea and Yellow Sea areas, thereby

weakening China's strategic deterrent and in turn exacerbating the already asymmetric strategic balance in the region. The US already has strong missile defense systems in the western Pacific. Once the THAAD system is deployed in South Korea and is connected to and shares information with the two X-band radars in Japan and the THAAD system in Guam, it will be perceived as posing an increased threat to China's strategic security.

China is also concerned that the deployment of THAAD in South Korea is only a new start to the US pursuit of zero-sum security in the Asia Pacific. It has been reported that the US is considering deploying THAAD in Japan and other parts of East Asia. If this becomes reality, China and the US may have to confront more serious challenges regarding the question of strategic balance, which may push the Asia Pacific region into a strategic arms race.

Where to go

It remains to be seen where the Korean nuclear issue is heading. There are three possibilities:

First possibility: The vicious cycle of US and UN sanctions followed by DPRK's nuclear and missile tests goes on until reaching a tipping point. For an isolated and relatively independent country such as the DPRK, sanctions may exert huge pressure, but the country can hold up and will not give up nuclear development. As a matter of fact, the DPRK started nuclear testing after sanctions started, and it has conducted six tests against the background of intensified sanctions. So it is not hard to see that this situation could make the issue drag on into a spiral of intensified sanctions and continued nuclear testing until Korean nuclear and missile technologies

reach a point that can no longer be tolerated. At that point, those who oppose the DPRK possessing nuclear weapons would be faced with the hard choice of taking extreme actions with unknown consequences, or tolerating it.

This pattern is difficult to change because of two factors: First, the DPRK is determined to possess nuclear capabilities in order to ensure its own security. This has been its policy choice, and has been increasingly reinforced over recent years. The DPRK has perceived external security pressure and has not been successful at acquiring a security guarantee, despite having attended different forms of peace talks. The events in other countries like Libya have also affected Pyongyang's thinking. Secondly, the United States is unwilling to make any compromise or a deal with the DPRK, and this has become a politically correct view, especially in the military and strategic circles. In the meantime, the US is also making use of the tension to invest heavily in strategic deployment and military activities in Northeast Asia and, therefore, cannot focus itself on resolving the nuclear issue. Given its political habits, any adjustment in policy toward the DPRK would meet strong resistance. Whether President Donald Trump can free himself from the old inertia and find a way out remains to be seen.

In the US, there is often talk about the military option. Every time this is seriously considered, the analysis invariably shows that, given the heavily deployed conventional and strategic weaponry across the Peninsula, military action, big or small, would cause huge civilian casualties and results that are hard to control. Keeping the military option on the table also threatens stability and is a source of mistrust among the countries involved. As the situation gets closer to a tipping point, it is all the more important for the US to carefully calculate its moves and for China and the US, as well as other countries concerned, to better coordinate on future steps.

Second possibility: The DPRK government collapses—which is what the US and the ROK want the most. The US has long taken a stance of non-recognition and hostility toward the DPRK, with the collapse of DPPK as its main goal. This was also one of the fundamental principles of President Obama's policy of strategic patience. To a large extent, the persistence of the US in intensifying sanctions while giving no chance for talks had the intention of pushing the DPRK to undergo internal changes. In the US, contact and dialogue with the DPRK are often regarded as helping the DPRK and hindering changes. That is why the DPRK firmly believes that the US will not change its hostile policy and, therefore, the DPRK should take a strong position to resist. The reality is that its economy has already passed through its most difficult time. Kim Jong-un, after taking up the mantle as the DPRK's top leader, has stabilized the domestic situation. Though the DPRK's domestic policy and behavior have caused wide resentment, the expectation of its collapse as a solution to the Korean nuclear issue may not be realistic in the short term.

Third possibility: Talks and serious negotiations restart, which may ease or even resolve the nuclear issue. Admittedly, this is harder now as mistrust between the US and the DPRK has grown deeper over the years, and the ups, downs, and many setbacks throughout multilateral negotiations have undermined the parties' confidence in dialogue. But past experience shows the obvious benefits of talking: First, talks helped stabilize the situation and created conditions for addressing mutual concerns. Second, talking opened the way to reaching various agreements. The 19 September Joint Statement,¹³ February Joint Document, and 3 October Joint Document, which were achieved through the Six-Party Talks, represent the maximum consensus among all parties and together provide a roadmap for a political solution to the Korean nuclear issue. The disruption of the talks

was due to a failure to implement the agreements, and the nuclear issue has escalated in the absence of talks.

It should be noted that, after years of escalation, the ground has shifted and the basis for negotiation has changed significantly since 2003. If talks are resumed, whether all parties can accept such a reality and whether they can restart negotiations without preconditions remains an open question. In other words, if some parties assume nothing has happened or try to return to the past without considering the changes that have taken place, it will be hard for the new talks to succeed. Currently, one realistic starting point may be a “double suspension.”

As Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi explained at a press conference on 8 March 2017:

To defuse the looming crisis on the Peninsula, China proposes that, as a first step, the DPRK suspend its missile and nuclear activities in exchange for a halting of large-scale US-ROK exercises. This double suspension approach can help us break out of the security dilemma and bring the parties back to the table. Then we can follow the dual-track approach of denuclearizing the Peninsula on the one hand and establishing a peace mechanism on the other. Only by addressing the parties’ concerns in a synchronized and reciprocal manner can we find a fundamental solution to lasting peace and stability on the Peninsula. 注

In other words, China calls for parallel steps to address nuclear and security concerns.

At the most recent China-US summit in Florida and the first round of China-US Diplomatic and Security Dialogue in April 2017, the two sides had an in-depth exchange of views on the Korean nuclear issue. China

reiterated that it is committed to denuclearization, peace, and stability on the Korean Peninsula, as well as a settlement through dialogue and consultation. China also said that it would continue to fully implement the UN Security Council resolutions on the DPRK. China further explained to the US side its proposals of “double suspension” and a “dual-track approach of denuclearizing the Peninsula,” stressing its hope to achieve a breakthrough for resuming talks. China also reiterated its opposition to the deployment of the THAAD anti-missile system. During the summit, the two sides confirmed the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula as a common goal, and agreed to keep close communication and coordination on the issue. This gives hope for a better understanding between China, the US, and the other parties concerned, and a better future for inclusive security in the Northeast Asia region.

To conclude, China’s interest lies in ensuring a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, and preventing the disruption of peace and security in Northeast Asia and the whole of the Asia Pacific. China’s responsibility is to play a proactive role in achieving the above objectives through peaceful means, and to help bring about a peace accord, thus creating lasting peace and enabling greater cooperation in the region. China should also be firm in preventing any major turbulence or even conflict on the Peninsula. Only through dialogue can mutual security be achieved. In this way, we may help the Korean Peninsula move out of its current vicious cycle and prevent the security situation of Northeast Asia from turning into a “Dark Forest.” 注

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issue of 2017 of the China Newsweek magazine.

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2. For more discussion of Pareto Optimality, see John Eatwell et al., eds., *The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics*, Volume 3 (London: Macmillan Press, 1987), 811-813.
3. Dai Bingguo, *Zhanlue Duihua: Dai Bingguo Huiyilu* (Strategic Dialogues: Memoir of Dai Bingguo) (Beijing: People's Publishing House, 2016), 208.
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8. "DPRK Stance Towards Terrorist Attacks on US," Korean Central News Agency, September 12, 2001, <http://kcna.co.jp/item/2001/200109/news09/12.htm#3>.
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11. George W. Bush, *Decision Points* (New York: Crown Publishers, 2010), 422-426.
12. "The Proliferation Security Initiative is a global effort that aims to stop trafficking of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states

and non-state actors of proliferation concern. Launched on May 31, 2003, US involvement in the PSI stems from the US National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction issued in December 2002. That strategy recognizes the need for more robust tools to stop proliferation of WMD around the world, and specifically identifies interdiction as an area where greater focus will be placed.” For more information, see US Department of State, “Proliferation Security Initiative,”<https://www.state.gov/t/isn/c10390.htm>.

13. “Waijiaobu: Zhong-Chao-Mei jianghui tan, mianduimian hen zhongyao (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China: China, North Korea, and the US will talk; face-to-face dialogue is important),”Xinhua News Agency, 22 April 2003, http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2003-04/22/content_844845.htm.
14. Dai Bingguo, 208.
15. Ibid., 216-217.
16. Ibid., 217.
17. The heads of the delegations for the second round of the Six-Party Talks were respectively:Wang Yi, Vice Foreign Minister of China; Kim Gye-gwan, North Korean Vice Foreign Minister; James A. Kelly, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs in the Bush administration; Lee Soo-hyuck, undersecretary of the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade; Mitoji Yabunaka, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau director-general; and Alexander Losyukov, Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister.
18. After the disintegration of the former USSR, Ukraine inherited a large number of Soviet nuclear weapons. In January 1994, Russia, the US, and Ukraine reached a trilateral agreement to destroy nuclear weapons within the territory of Ukraine. Ukraine gradually destroyed the launching silos and transported 1,300 nuclear warheads and over 600 cruise missile warheads to Russia. In October 2001, Ukraine officially became a nuclear-free country.
19. “Full text of Chairman’s Statement of 6-party talks,” China Daily, February 29, 2004, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-02/29/content_310346.htm.
20. The heads of the delegations for the third round of the Six-Party Talks were respectively: Wang Yi, Vice Foreign Minister of China; Kim Gye-gwan, North Korean Vice Foreign Minister;James A. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific affairs in the Bush administration; Lee Soo-hyuck, undersecretary of the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade; Mitoji Yabunaka, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau director-general; and Alexander Losyukov, Russia’s deputy foreign minister.
21. The heads of the delegations for the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks were respectively: Wu Dawei, Vice Foreign Minister of China; Kim Gye-gwan, Vice Foreign

- Minister of the DPRK; Christopher Hill, US Assistant Secretary of State; Song Min-soon, undersecretary of the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade; Kenichiro Sasae, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau director-general; and Alexander Alekseev, Russia's deputy foreign minister.
22. The heads of the delegations for the fifth round of the Six-Party Talks were respectively: Wu Dawei, Vice Foreign Minister of China; Kim Gye-gwan, North Korean Vice Foreign Minister; Christopher Hill, US Assistant Secretary of State; Song Min-soon, undersecretary of South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade; Kenichiro Sasae, director-general of the Asian and Oceanian Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Ministry; and Alexander Alekseev, Russia's deputy foreign minister.
 23. UN Security Council, Resolution 1718, "Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea," 14 October 2006, <http://www.un.org/press/en/2006/sc8853.doc.htm>.
 24. At the second-stage conference of the fifth round of the Six-Party Talks, the undersecretary of the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Chun Yung-woo, replaced Song Minsoon as the head of the South Korean delegation and the Russian ambassador to China, Sergey Razov, replaced Alexander Alekseev as the head of the Russian delegation.
 25. The heads of the delegations for the sixth round of the Six-Party Talks were respectively: Wu Dawei, Vice Foreign Minister of China; Kim Gye-gwan, North Korean Vice Foreign Minister; Christopher Hill, US Assistant Secretary of State; Chun Yung-woo, undersecretary of the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade; Kenichiro Sasae, director-general of the Asian and Oceanian Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Ministry; and Alexander Losyukov, Russia's deputy foreign minister.
 26. Condoleezza Rice, "Diplomacy Is Working on North Korea," The Wall Street Journal, Jun. 26, 2008, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB121443815539505367>.
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 30. See Liu Cixin, *The Dark Fores (Remembrance of Earth's Past)*, trans. Joel Martinsen (New York: Tor Books, 2016). [It is a state of relationship described by Liu Cixin in his novel

in which even the minimum trust is absent and every galaxy is under the threat of others.]

Is There Hope for Peaceful Settlement of Korean Nuclear Issue? 注

The DPRK's sixth nuclear test and multiple Inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) launches in 2017 have raised concerns in the US that the DPRK is approaching the threshold of being capable of launching nuclear attacks on the US mainland. The US wants to exert greater military intimidation and economic sanctions on the DPRK, although there have been no peace talks, which have been called for in all the UN Security Council resolutions. The Korean nuclear crisis has turned into a major security challenge. Is there still hope for a peaceful settlement?

Since 2006 when the DPRK conducted its first nuclear test, the UN Security Council has adopted nine resolutions on sanctions, with the latest Resolution 2375, banning 90% of its trade, which is estimated to fall to around \$2 billion in 2018, about the level of the late 1990s. The new resolution tightened restriction on the DPRK's imports of crude oil to no more than four million barrels per year, which is only half of China's daily imports. In addition, the US and its allies have imposed unilateral sanctions to deter any financial investment or services from the outside world.

These measures have put the DPRK in an extremely difficult situation, yet they have failed to stop its nuclear missile programs, and instead, have heightened its sense of determination. The DPRK has become more determined to showcase its continuing progress in nuclear warhead miniaturization and ballistic missile technologies by repeatedly and

deliberately demonstrating its tough position, while completely ignoring all pressures and voices from the outside world.

The DPRK's economy does not seem to be much worse than before, growing by around 1% in the past two years. In 2016, its grain production grew by 7% to 4.81 million tons, which marked its best harvest since the mid-1990s. Together with the help of external humanitarian aid, it can meet the population's minimum needs.

Why did the 10 years of sanctions fail to force the DPRK to comply? There are many reasons. For the DPRK, this is a national security matter, and it does not see any other convincing alternative. For the US and its allies, they are often distracted from the nuclear issue, sometimes paying more attention to the DPRK's domestic affairs and even believing that the DPRK would collapse under the pressure of sanctions. Consequently, any compromise in peace talks would be regarded as support for the country.

The Korean nuclear issue is now at a dangerous stage, like a train entering a dark tunnel. Regional security and the credibility of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime both face serious challenges. But the end of the tunnel is probably not the end of the problem, only the beginning of new troubles.

Where is the way out? Given that the hostility on the Peninsula is the root cause of the Korean nuclear issue, the US, as a key player should try to ease the tension and hostility instead of heating them up. While imposing pressure and sanctions, it should also show the DPRK the possibility of other choices for its survival, including the launching of peace talks, making necessary diplomatic compromises and seriously considering the DPRK's security appeals.

The US likes to talk about the use of military strikes as an option. But the fact that it has allowed the issue to drag on for so long indicates that, given the high costs and unpredictable consequences, it is hard for the US to go to war. But its military threats and rhetoric of war have successfully scared the DPRK, forcing it to believe that accelerating its nuclear program is the only way to protect itself. This has led to today's dilemma. Does the US want to continue to deceive itself and allow the issue to drag on?

For China, sanctions are necessary, but they will work only when the door to peace talks is open. As Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi pointed out, imposing sanctions and facilitating talks should proceed simultaneously.

It is worth noting that the current situation of the nuclear issue and the basis of negotiations are far from the position we saw when the Six-Party Talks were launched in 2003. Whatever happens, we need to hurry up, because the cost will become greater the longer the problem drags on.

The US should adjust its policy objective and methods to bring about peace talks. China has proposed the "suspension for suspension" initiative, meaning, the DPRK suspends nuclear and missile tests, while the US and South Korea suspend large-scale military exercises, to give peace talks a chance.

China-US coordination is crucial. Since President Trump took office, the relationship between China and the US has normalized. The two countries have demonstrated a willingness to properly handle their bilateral issues and avoid a collision. A bigger test is whether they can truly coordinate when dealing with international challenges that require a deeper and more stable strategic trust.

During US President Trump's visit to China in November 2017, Chinese President Xi Jinping gave him a full account of China's position on this issue. The two sides agreed to work together to support the international non-proliferation regime and denuclearization on the Peninsula, and neither side would recognize the DPRK as a nuclear weapon state.

They agreed to maintain pressure on the DPRK's nuclear and missile activities by implementing the UN Security Council resolutions. They also stated that they are committed to the use of dialogue and negotiations to resolve the issues peacefully and addressing the legitimate concerns of all parties. The two sides agreed to stay in close contact and keep each other informed of the measures that they would take.

Admittedly, there are differences between the two countries. First, China disapproves of military solutions. Second, China views sanctions as a means to promote peace talks and prefers to focus on the nuclear issue. Third, China opposes any moves by the US or its allies to undermine China's security interests, i.e., THAAD deployment.

China has faithfully implemented the UN sanctions. For example, since last February, Chinese organizations have banned or restricted imports of coal, iron, ore, lead, lead ore and seafood, as well as textiles from the DPRK. Additionally, exports to it of condensed oil and refined oil products have been stopped, and no joint ventures are allowed with the DPRK entities or individuals. Chinese financial authorities will also be conducting retroactive investigations into relevant the DPRK individuals and entities.

These steps are not without cost and many Chinese companies have suffered huge losses. The sanctions have also caused damage to China's relations with the DPRK.

Nevertheless, China is firmly committed to denuclearization, peace and stability on the Peninsula and will fulfill its international obligations and engage in close coordination with the US as well as Russia, South Korea and other countries.

The Korean nuclear issue reveals the necessity for a new order in Northeast Asia. China's diplomatic objectives include building a community of shared future for mankind. This provides new philosophical thinking to achieve common security on the Peninsula.

China does not wish to see war, chaos, nuclear pollution, or a wave of refugees on the Peninsula. If war breaks out, no one would be winner. We need to take a fresh look and adopt a new approach to the security and order of Northeast Asia and recognize that we have a shared future.

If the US and its allies refuse to "live and let live," they will never understand the necessity for compromise.

The window for a peaceful settlement is not completely closed, and the current crisis should be turned into an opportunity. Comprehensive and sensible pressure should be applied to the DPRK, while also offering sincere talks, that treat it as an equal sovereign state with legitimate security and development concerns.

The DPRK should also view the current situation seriously and seize the opportunity to return to talks. The latest indications are that both the DPRK and the US are sending out signals suggesting a willingness for talks. Should peace talks start, it would be possible to avoid a war or conflict where all parties would lose. Every party concerned need to make a sincere effort to resolve the issues and produce a favorable outcome in the

current dilemma. And in doing so, we could build an all-inclusive security architecture in the region, where every country's security is ensured.

1. This article was published by German weekly news magazine Der Spiegel, No. 51, 2017. The Chinese and English versions were later published on 18 December 2017, by guancha.cn.

The South China Sea

Why China Says No to the Arbitration on the South China Sea Issue^注

The arbitral tribunal will issue a final verdict on 12 July 2016 regarding the much-discussed South China Sea arbitration case, between China and the Philippines. Many Western countries have already started urging China to accept the ruling, seemingly they already know the result: China will lose. But Beijing's position is clear: no acceptance of the proceedings, no participation, no recognition and no implementation. There is a solid international legal basis for China to oppose this case. As in doing so, China is not only safeguarding its national interests but is also protecting the integrity and legitimacy of the international maritime order.

Why does China refuse to accept or participate in the proceedings of this tribunal, being held at the Hague? Because as a sovereign state, China is entitled to choose its means of dispute resolution: a legitimate right under international law. Moreover, the Philippines' case is inherently illegal and flawed, as it is not only an abuse of the dispute settlement procedures, but also a distortion of concepts, with deliberate concealment of the real nature of the disputes.

The Philippines' arbitration relates to the dispute over sovereignty of islands and reefs in the South China Sea, and to maritime delimitation. But these territorial issues can not be addressed at the Hague, as they are beyond the scope of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). In 2006, China declared it would exclude "disputes concerning maritime delimitation" from compulsory arbitration, under

Article 298 of UNCLOS. Furthermore, the Philippines failed to meet UNCLOS preconditions before it unilaterally initiated the compulsory arbitration process.

According to UNCLOS, “no arbitration without the existence of a dispute,” which is a principle that requires the existence of a real dispute between the parties. Additionally, discussions or at least exchanges must have taken place between the two countries, before arbitration is requested. In fact, neither precondition was met. China has never presented specific claims relating to individual islands, as it has always treated them as part of its Zhongsha Islands and Nansha Island groups. The Philippines and China did not have discussions or exchanges on this matter. So the assertions of an “impasse” with China in “the bilateral exchanges” and “the great many subsequent exchanges,” were untrue. In fact, China had tried in vain to engage the Philippines in meaningful discussions.

The Philippines’ unilateral initiation of arbitration fell short of meeting UNCLOS’s conditions, and in doing so, it violated an earlier agreement with China. Both countries had previously stated their commitment to bilateral negotiations and consultations as the means of settling disputes.

Why does China find it impossible to recognize and implement the tribunal’s upcoming decision? Although Article 288(4) of UNCLOS stipulates that the tribunal should decide whether it has jurisdiction and the application of this provision, but it does not mean it can decide as it pleases. Indeed, there is no such thing as absolute power in international law. This tribunal, whose authority and powers are conferred by its member states, is an international dispute settlement mechanism under UNCLOS. If the tribunal abuses its power, China or any other member of the international community has the right to reject its decisions. And in this case, the tribunal

has acted recklessly. By its violation of the basic principles of the international law, the faith China and other nations had in UNCLOS has been undermined.

Although we do not yet know the outcome, we do know that the tribunal failed to fully understand or investigate the real dispute between China and the Philippines. It disregarded the essence and purpose of the Filipino claims and deliberately treated them merely as an issue of the interpretation and application of UNCLOS. But in fact, the handling of the submissions went far beyond this scope. There is a deep concern in China that the tribunal is failing to consider the specific geographical framework and situation in the South China Sea, where the maritime claims of the two countries potentially overlap.

Given the above, it is not hard to understand why China has decided not to recognize and implement the tribunal's decision. More than 60 countries have voiced their support for China's position of resolving the issue through negotiations and consultations. China, as a signatory to UNCLOS, supports and respects the treaty's principles and spirit. What China opposes is not UNCLOS and compulsory arbitration as such, but the tribunal's abuse of power in handling this case.

Today, most disputes are resolved through negotiations directly between the countries concerned. The prerequisite for such negotiations, whether bilateral or multilateral, is the consensus of or an agreement reached by all concerned. China's claim and position in this case are consistent not only with the spirit of international law but also with recognized practices in international relations.

This arbitration cannot resolve the disputes between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea, but will increase tensions and

undermine peace and stability in the region. If the coastal countries around the South China Sea do not intend to heighten tensions, they need to return to the path of seeking resolution through negotiation. China and the countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have agreed to handle issues through a dualtrack approach and resolve disputes through peaceful negotiations. Consultations on the code of conduct in the South China Sea region are making progress, and this momentum should not be interrupted.

As President Xi Jinping said, China is committed to upholding international justice and is opposed to forcing one's will upon others. The handling of the South China Sea issue has a bearing on justice, as well as peace and stability. Countries in the region need to work together to build rules-based cooperation. The international community should support the efforts made by China and other coastal states to manage and resolve disputes in a peaceful manner, respect China's choice of resorting to negotiations as the means to settle disputes, and protect the legitimacy and fairness of international mechanisms, especially UNCLOS.

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1. This article was published on the website of the American magazine Foreign Policy under the title on 11 July 2016. Its Chinese version was published on 12 July in the Chinese newspaper Global Times (Iss. 3947).

South China Sea: How We Got to This Stage^注

The second decade of the 21st century has seen the South China Sea issue turning into the most important and difficult topic in the China-US dialogues. The rhetoric is heating up on both sides and tense atmosphere is also rising between the militaries of the two countries. This issue is turning into a platform of rivalry and confrontation between China and the US, which leads to the two sides to reassess each other's intentions from a strategic perspective.

In the year 2016, the debate is about who is militarizing the South China Sea and freedom of navigation operations. Voices in favor of military confrontation are emerging in both countries. The friction over the South China Sea issue further reveals the lack of strategic trust between China and the US. David M. Lampton, an American scholar, has warned the two countries by stating that “a tipping point in US-China relations is upon us”. The South China Sea issue, if not a major contributor to the current turbulent China-US relations, is at least an important catalyst.

The two countries have different opinions about what has led to the current situation. In China, it is widely believed that it is the US' Asia-Pacific Rebalance strategy, its taking sides on disputes in the South China Sea, and its direct intervention in the disputes that have escalated tensions and made the South China Sea issue more complicated. In the US, the concern is that China is trying to drive the US out of the South China Sea with a salami-slicing strategy and will try to eventually turn the South China Sea into a Chinese lake.

History shows that the core issue in the South China Sea is disputes between China and some Southeast Asian countries, including Vietnam and the Philippines. All the incidents and events that have unfolded over the years have been about sovereignty and rights over the Nansha Islands and their surrounding waters. Such disputes are not uncommon, as throughout the world history, especially in the Cold War after World War Two when seeds of disputes were sown for many African and Asian countries.

However, the disputes in the South China Sea have long been kept under control thanks to the joint efforts of China and the other coastal countries. A good proof was the “golden era” of the China-ASEAN relations from 1991 to the end of 2010, during which bilateral cooperation flourished and trade ballooned nearly 37 times, from no more than \$8 billion to \$300 billion. During this period, China’s GDP rose rapidly, and most Southeast Asian economies expanded more than five-fold.

Tensions started to build up in 2009 and have further escalated since 2012. It is worth the effort to examine the incidents and the behavior of countries concerned, the reactions they triggered, and the consequences incurred, in the leading up to the current state of affairs. This paper provides an overview of the chain of events contributing to the escalation of tensions in the South China Sea, as well as their context and possible connections.

It is hoped that this paper will help those interested in the issue see the bigger picture and get to the heart of why things have happened the way they have. It is also hoped to be a reminder of the danger of deepening misunderstanding and spiraling of tensions.

The Japanese and other foreign invasion of Nansha islands and reefs and the post-war arrangements regarding the South China Sea

The South China Sea is the largest marginal sea in the West Pacific region, covering an area of 3.5 million kilometers. It is located south of China and the island of Chinese Taiwan, west of the Philippines, north of Kalimantan and Sumatra, and east of the Malay and IndoChina peninsulas. It connects the Pacific through the Bashi and Balintang channels in the northeast, and the joining the Sulu sea through Mindoro and Balabac straits in the southeast; joins the Java Sea through the Karimata and Gaspar straits in the south, and is linked with the Indian Ocean through the Strait of Malacca in the southwest. Rich in fishery resources and oil and gas reserves, the sea plays an important role in the economic development of the coastal countries.

China has sovereignty over all the four archipelagos in the South China Sea, namely, the Xisha, Nansha, Zhongsha and Dongsha Islands, which are indicated by the 9-dotted lines (originally 11-dotted lines) on the map drawn in 1947 by the Republic of China (ROC, 1912—1949) which was an ally to the US. The Nansha Islands (coordinates: 3°40'-11°55' N; 109°33'-117°50'E) comprise over 230 islands, islets, sandbanks, rocks and shoals that are scattered along a 1,000-kilometer span from the southeast to the northwest of the Sea. China was the first to discover, name the Nansha Islands (meaning south-sand islands) and the first to exercise sovereignty over them. That exercise has been ongoing. ④ Before the 1930s, there was no dispute over China's ownership of the Nansha Islands and China's ownership was reflected in many maps and encyclopedias published around the world.

At the beginning of the 20th century, western colonial powers, including the UK, Germany, France and Japan, kept coveting the Nansha Islands as they were colonizing Southeast Asia and invading China. But most of their territorial ambitions ended in failure due to strong

resistance from China's late Qing dynasty and later the ROC(1912—1949) as well as the general public. In the 1930s, France provoked the “Nine Isles Incident” in the South China Sea and tried to take over some of the isles and was again strongly opposed by the ROC (1912—1949). During World War Two , Japan seized the Nansha Islands in 1939, as part of its effort to control Southeast Asia and in preparations for invasion of Australia. 注

The Cairo Declaration of November 1943, signed by the heads of the Republic of China(1912—1949), the United States and the United Kingdom, proclaimed that “...Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of WWI in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa (Presentday Taiwan, China) , and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China.” 注 The Potsdam Declaration of 26 July 1945 also stipulated in its eighth article that “the Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and such minor islands as we determine, as had been announced in the Cairo Declaration in 1943.” 注

In December 1946, a year after the defeat of Japan, the government of the Republic of China organized patrols by warships and to reclaim to the Nansha Islands including Taiping and Zhongye. During that trip monuments were erected on Taiping Island (a pronunciation based on the Chinese dialect in the island) and Zhongye Island. Also in 1947, on Taiping Island, administration was established by the ROC (1912—1949).

In 1947, it organized the compilation of *Nan Hai Zhu Dao Di Li Zhi Lue*(A Brief Account of the Geography of the South China Sea Islands), and on the basis of geographic survey, renamed some of the islands in South China Sea historically under China's jurisdiction, including their

components such as islands, reefs, sandbanks and shoals, which accounted a total of 172 collective and individual geographic names. Among them, 102 belonged to the Nansha Islands.

Its officials, together with experts made a trip to South China Sea in 1946 and accomplished the ceremonies of recovery of sovereignty over the South China Sea Islands including Xisha Islands and Nansha Islands. It is worth mentioning that, they were able to complete the work on board of warships provided by the US. ④ They also made survey of the two groups of islands, and drew the *Nan Hai Zhu Dao Wei Zhi Tu* (A Location Map of the Islands in the South China Sea) on which the 11-dotted line was marked. This map was officially published and made known to the world in February 1948.

Given the American presence in the region during World War Two and in the postwar Asia and its alignment relationship with the ROC (1912—1949), and then the Taiwan region (after 1949), there is every reason to believe that the US government was aware of and supported China's recovery of sovereignty over the South China Sea Islands. It should also be in the know of the postwar publication of map and geographic names, and the status quo in the South China Sea. The US had made no objection after the publication of the map.

Chiang Kai-shek fled to the island of Taiwan and continued to enjoy American support. This development started to subtly change the US attitude. In the face of China's division on the two sides of the Taiwan Straits and the outbreak of the Cold War, the US opted for a more pragmatic approach. This was reflected in the Peace Treaty of San Francisco between Japan and some of the Allied Powers. Signed on 8 September 1951 and entering into force on 28 April 1952, the document served to end the allied

post-war occupation of Japan and establish Japan's territory and role in the international arena after its defeat in World War Two. Japan officially renounced its rights to Korea, Taiwan and Penghu, Kurile Islands, Sakhalin Island, Chukye Island, the Nansha Islands and the Xisha Islands. Article 2(6) provided that "Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Spratly Islands (China's Nansha Islands) and to the Paracel Islands (China's Xisha Islands)." But the document failed to specify the ownership of these islands.

⑨

Though China was one of the biggest victims of and one of the four largest victors over the Japanese militarism, the People's Republic of China was not invited to the treaty talks held in San Francisco. As the talks were going on, the central government of the PRC issued a Declaration in the name of the then Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai on 15 August 1951, over the Draft Peace Treaty with Japan by the US and the UK and on the San Francisco Conference. The Declaration affirmed China's consistent sovereignty over the archipelagos in the South China Sea, including the Nansha Islands, and protested about the absence of any provision in the draft on China's taking over of the South China Sea islands following Japan's renouncement of all rights, title and claim to them. It reiterated that "the Chinese Government of the day had taken over those islands" as referred above after the surrender of Japan and that "the People's Republic of China's rightful sovereignty shall remain intact, whatever the outcome of the conference may be." ⑩

Following the San Francisco Talks, the US, in its effort to reconcile the relations between Japan and the Taiwan authorities for the sake of serving its strategic interest in the Asia Pacific, presided over the signing of the Treaty of Peace between Japan and the Taiwan authorities in April 1952. Article 2 of the document provided that "It is recognized that under Article 2

of the Peace Treaty with Japan by the US and the UK signed at the city of San Francisco on 8 September 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the San Francisco Treaty), Japan has renounced all right, title, and claim to Taiwan and Penghu (the Pescadores) as well as the Spratly Islands(China's Nansha Islands) and the Paracel Islands(China's Xisha Islands).”Indeed, the United States at that time still deemed the Taiwan authorities as China's legitimate government and there is no doubt that the Treaty means for the Taiwan authorities to have reclaimed,on behalf of China, the territories in the South China Sea forcibly seized by Japan.

Contending parties during the Cold War

Starting from the mid 1950s, the Philippines and the South Vietnam(then the Republic of Vietnam) started to move onto some of the islands and shoals in the South China Sea. Growing occupation activities by other claimants in the later years give rise to territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea.

In 1956, Tomas Cloma, a Filipino adventurer, announced his discovery of a group of islands in the Nansha waters, and regarded them “free land”.
④The Philippine government then claimed that they were entitled to those islands. But being aware of the Taiwan authority's position on the sovereignty over these Islands, Manila once intended to send a delegation to Taiwan to discuss the matter.④

After Vietnam was divided into the North part and South part by the Geneva Treaty of 1954④, a fierce civil war erupted in the country. The two sides took different positions regarding this issue. North Vietnam,held a clear position supporting China's sovereign rights in the South China Sea.

South Vietnam started in 1962 to occupy some islands and shoals in South China Sea, including Nanzi Islands, Dunqian Cay, Hongxiu Island, Jinghong Island, Nanwei Island, and Anbo Cay. Such actions provoked strong voice of protest on both sides of the Taiwan Straits.

During the period between 1970 to 1980, a bigger wave of occupation took place. It was mainly prompted by the discovery of oil and gas resources in the islands and waters off the Nansha Islands. Multiple survey published by the US and UN disclosed that the continental shelf of the South China Sea was rich in oil and gas resources. The negotiations and completion of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) also influenced the development. According to UNCLOS, a state has jurisdiction over 200 nautical miles exclusive economic zone (about 370 kilometers) from its territorial sea baseline, one of utmost system innovations in UNCLOS.

The new rules concerning the maritime rights have further complicated the South China Sea issue given to the reality that the ownership of the islands shoals is in disputes and the delimitation of maritime right are without proper base. However, lured by precious resources, Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia sped up infringing upon China's legitimate rights in the Nansha Islands and their surrounding waters.

Vietnam's position went through a change as affected by the domestic development. Up to 1974, the government of North Vietnam had consistently acknowledged that the Xisha Islands and the Nansha Islands were integral part of Chinese territory. However, as the North was winning the war and was about to unite with the South, it began to reverse their stance. In 1975, North Vietnam, on the pretext of "liberation," occupied six

islands and reefs of the Nansha Islands which were formerly seized by South Vietnam.

In 1979, China fought a self-defense war with Vietnam in land border areas and the relationship became colder. In 1988 China started setting up marine observation station in Nansha Islands area in the project coordinated by the Inter-Governmental Oceanographic Commission of UNESCO. Vietnam tried to prevent it, and on 14 March 1988, it sent combat ships and fired at Chinese personnel working on the Chigua Reef. Later Chinese military fired back. So the two sides exchanged fires, claiming heavy casualties. After this incident, to make sure that the project safely implemented and also to prevent further occupation of islands and reefs of the Nansha Islands, China decided to deploy forces on Yongshu Reef, Huayang Reef, Dongmen Reef, Nanxun Reef, Zhubi Reef, Chigua Reef.

Other claimants have also become more aggressive in their stance on the Nansha Islands. By formulating their national laws of the sea or issuing political statements, they officially asserted sovereignty claims over the Nansha Islands and rights claims over waters off the Nansha Island. Towards the end of 1980s, the Philippines had already occupied eight islands and reefs, including Feixin Island and Zhongye Island included. Malaysia had seized Danwan Reef, Nanhai Reef and Guangxingzai Reef.

During this period, the US remained committed to acknowledging China's sovereignty over the Nansha Islands. This is clearly indicated in the form of diplomatic inquiries, measurement requests, and flight plan notifications. The Taiwan authorities received visit by American military officials on Taiping Island of Nansha which it occupied. Regarding issues on islands occupation by countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam, the US government did not reveal its stance in public, but it did make enquiries

to the Taiwan authorities multiple times relating to the Nansha sovereignty issue. ④ Take for example, from 1957 to February 1961, the US Government made application requests to “the Taiwan authorities” for allowing the US Air Force based in the Philippines to conduct nautical chart measurement and meteorological surveys in the vicinity of Huangyan Island and the Nansha Islands.

For a long period after World War Two, the acknowledgement of China’s sovereignty over the islands and shoals in the South China Sea was also indicated in a variety of maps and books published in the US, such as Columbia Lippincott Gazetteer of the World (1961), Worldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations (1963), and Constitutions of the Countries of the World (1971), to name a few.

A policy dilemma for the US was that on the ground of international laws and moral principles, it should have supported China’s sovereignty over these territories. However, for its anti-communism stance and its strategic interest in the Asia-Pacific region, the US was unwilling to let the PRC to have control over them. Furthermore, it was also unwilling to hurt relations with its allies like the Philippines.

Road to the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea

In the early 1990s, as the Cold War came to an end and economic integration accelerated in the Asia Pacific region, China and Southeast Asian countries and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). switched to a fast track toward establishing rapport. In 1990 it resumed

diplomatic ties with Indonesia and established diplomatic relations with Singapore. In 1992, it became ASEAN's dialogue partner.

Since then, China has embarked on a path of confidence-building and all-round cooperation with ASEAN, guided by its foreign policy of building and maintaining stability in the neighborhood. In China's dialogues with its Southeast Asian neighbors, the Nansha issue was the most frequently debated problem. China, based on its ancestrally inherited ownership of the islands in the South China Sea with historical and legal evidence, had consistently defended its indisputable sovereignty as it did in the past. However, in order to stabilize the newly established ties, China resorted to the approach it used for addressing the disputes over the Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea: Setting aside the disputes while pursuing joint development of resources without abandoning territorial sovereignty.

In 1994, China normalized its diplomatic relations with Vietnam. In 1995, ASEAN expanded to 10 countries with the admission of Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia. In 1996, China became ASEAN's full dialogue partner. When a serious financial crisis hit Asia in 1997, China stood firm and offered strong support to the region, living up to being a responsible partner, winning wide praise and greater trust from ASEAN countries. In 1997, the first ASEAN-China (10+1) Informal Summit was held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, at which the 11 countries announced the establishment of "a 21st century-oriented partnership of good neighborliness and mutual trust."

During this period, the rapid development of the China-ASEAN relations largely masked undulating contention in the South China Sea; nevertheless, disputes surfaced from time to time.

A major development was a new wave of unilateral occupation of the Nansha Islands and the drilling for oil and gas in the surrounding waters. In the 1990s, Vietnam took 5 more reefs and shoals, bringing a total of 29 islands and reefs under its occupation. By March 1994, Vietnam had licensed out 120 oil blocks for bidding in the Nansha and Xisha waters. Malaysia also seized Yuya Shoal and Boji Reef in 1999, and it accounted for over half of the oil rigs erected by all claimant countries. Its maritime law enforcement forced also registered the largest number of expulsions and arrests of Chinese fishermen in the 1990s.

Another source of tension was caused by a series of provocations from the Philippines concerning Meiji Reef, Huangyan Island and Renai Shoal .

In 1994, to better provide for Chinese fishermen, China built shelter facilities on Meiji Reef. The Philippines reacted strongly by taking a series of actions. In late March 1995, its navy force blew up survey markers that China had installed on Wufang Atoll, Xian'e Reef , Xinyi Shoal, Banyue Shoal and Ren'ai Shoal. Its patrol ships, with the support by its air force, attacked 4 Chinese fishing vessels berthed near Banyue Shoal and 62 Chinese fishermen on these vessels were brought into custody. On May 13, the Philippine military escalated the tension and send out fleets in an attempt to land on Meiji Reef by force to hamper the construction, only to end up in an 8 hour standoff against China's fishery administration ship "Yuzheng 34". Chinese side managed to finish its construction work on Meiji Reef.

Huangyan Island is part of China's Zhongsha Islands, east of the Manila Trench and facing the Philippine Islands. No later than in Yuan dynasty (1271-1368), China had already discovered and exercised jurisdiction over Huangyan Island. Both China's mainland and the Taiwan

region have declared China's sovereignty over Huangyan Island on multiples occasions. The Philippine official document and maps made no indication of differences regarding this fact and the Huangyan Island has always been marked as outside of Philippine territorial water on its national maps. It was only from 1990s that the Philippine government started making disputes regarding this island. In fact, before 1997, the Philippines had never staked a claim over Huangyan Island.

It is recognized that, the Philippines' territory was defined mainly in the 1898 Treaty of Paris, between the US and Spain, the 1900 Treaty of Washington between the US and Spain as well as the 1930 Convention between the US and Great Britain. All three treaties contain explicit clauses defining the territory of the Philippines as being east of the 118th degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich. Huangyan Island is located clearly to the west of that line and has never belonged to the Philippines. The Philippine government had not included Huangyan Island into its scope of territory or sovereignty, and its own officially published maps of 1967, 1981 and 1984 clearly marked Huangyan Island is outside of the dotted Philippine boundary.

In a letter responding to a German radio amateur's enquiry in February 1992, the then Philippine Ambassador to Germany clearly stated that the Huangyan Island did not fall within the territorial sovereignty of the Philippines. ② Even as recently as on 18 October 1994, the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority of the Philippines (NAMRIA) confirmed that the territorial boundaries and sovereignty of the Republic of the Philippines were established in Article III of the Treaty of Paris signed on 10 December 1898. Huangyan Island clearly lies outside those limits. ②

In late April of 1997, a Philippine Naval ship came to the Huangyan Island, blew up the territory monument that China had erected, and planted the national flag of the Philippines. Chinese marine surveillance ships arrived on the scene and the two sides went into a stand-off for some time and ended without serious incident. In the following years, the Philippine navy continued to expel, arrest and even shoot at Chinese fisherman who passed the Huangyan Island.

In May of 1999, when I was serving as Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines, a fishery dispute occurred near Huangyan Island. I was invited to speak to the International Press Club in Manila the next day. On my way to the club, I stopped over at a newspaper stand on the street and bought a map of the Philippines published by the NAMRIA. As I was speaking to both the local and international journalists, I showed the map to them see that the Huangyan Island was clearly marked outside of the Philippine territory.

On 9 May 1999, the Philippine military sailed the Landing Ship Tank the Sierra Madre (No 57) into the Ren'ai Reef and refused to move away on the excuse of a leakage at the bottom of cabin. It has stayed there ever since and the servicemen on the retired military vessel have been rotated from time to time. Chinese side made repeated diplomatic representations requesting them to leave but with no success. On 3 November 1999, the Philippines played the same trick again and this time at the Huangyan Island. It claimed another retired military vessel was "stranded" on the northern side of the Southeastern mouth of the Huangyan Island lagoon. Then Chinese side brought compelling diplomatic pressure on the Philippines. Under the then Philippine President Estrada's order, the Philippine military towed the ship back to pier on 29 November, 1999.

Chinese government, with a view to containing the disputes and stabilizing the situation for the sake of preserving the sound China-ASEAN partnership, stepped up diplomatic efforts to communicate with the Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia. In particular, China held multiple rounds of negotiation and consultation with the Philippines, to ease the situation. In March 1999, the first round of China-Philippines Experts Group Meeting on Confidence-Building Measures took place in Manila. More consultations were subsequently held, and the two sides agreed to exercise restraint and “not to take actions that might escalate the situation”.


The other ASEAN countries were watching the South China Sea issue closely, and held multiple rounds of consultations with China too. Earlier in the 1990s, there were also Track 1.5 meetings, a series of semi-official and semi-academic closed-door dialogues. They were all aimed at in-depth discussion on territorial disputes and territorial water delimitations. Both China and Chinese Taiwan region participated in these dialogues. One important consensus was that the Nansha disputes were complicated and difficult to solve, nevertheless, they should be settled through peaceful negotiations, and the proposition of “shelving the disputes” which China put forward was the most viable option in the process. It was also generally acknowledged by the parties that before any resolution of the disputes was achieved, persisting in one’s territorial claim would only escalate the conflict. Therefore, it was wise to shelve the disputes and start joint developments. Those discussions laid foundations for further consensus between China and the ASEAN countries later. In 1998, with an aim to enhance regional integration, the ASEAN Summit adopted the Hanoi Plan of Action, proposing that efforts should be made to “establish a regional code of conduct in the South China Sea among the parties directly concerned.”^② Working for building mutual confidence and friendly

relations with the neighbors, China in principle agreed to join consultation about “the code of conduct.” 注

On 15 March 2000 an informal consultation was held between China and ASEAN countries in Thailand, and “the code of conduct” documents drafted by China and the ASEAN countries respectively were exchanged and discussed. However, due to disagreements on how binding the code of conduct should be and also different opinions between China and Vietnam on the range of disputes the code should cover, there was little progress in the code of conduct” and subsequent meetings did not bring significant headways neither.

At the 35th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting held in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei in July 2002, Malaysia, with a view diffusing the standoff, proposed to replace the code of conduct with a compromising and non-binding “declaration”. The motion was approved by the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, and a joint statement was published after the meeting, stating that ASEAN and China would work closely together to make the Declaration a reality. 注 Several months later, a consultation on the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) was held. Since then, China and the ASEAN members were engaged in many rounds of difficult negotiations. At the 8th ASEAN Summit convened in Phnom Penh, Cambodia on 4 November 2002, Mr. Wang Yi, then China’s Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Foreign Ministers of the ten ASEAN Member States jointly signed the DOC.

In the DOC, which contains ten provisions, the parties recognize the need to promote a peaceful, friendly and harmonious environment in the South China Sea; undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force,

through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned, in accordance with universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea; reaffirm their respect for and commitment to the freedom of navigation in and overflight above the South China Sea; undertake to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability including, among others, refraining from action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features and to handle their differences in a constructive manner; and agree to work, on the basis of consensus, towards the eventual attainment of the document's objective.  The focus throughout the negotiations was on the disputes over the sovereignty of the Nansha islands and reefs. Much attention was directed to preventing escalation of disputes and the main purpose of the DOC was to prevent further act of occupying and controlling islands.

It is worth noting that, right before the final signing of the DOC, opinions were divided about what name to use referring to the disputed areas. Most ASEAN member states agreed to use the expression of “Spratly Islands,” while having no objection to China using the Chinese name “Nansha Islands.” However, Vietnam insisted using “the Hoang Sa Islands” and “the Truong Sa Islands” (respectively referring to the Xisha Islands and the Nansha Islands) as a way to assert its stance. And this went beyond China’s bottom line, as China had never admitted there is any dispute in the Xisha Islands, nor had the consultations touched upon those islands. Chinese side can’t accept such unreasonable request. Eventually, in the hope of breaking the long deadlock and maximizing common interests, China agreed to use a more ambiguous expression—“Parties in the South China Sea,” “the freedom of navigation in and overflight above the South China Sea” and “code of conduct in the South China Sea.” Description

about islands disputes were also vaguely rendered as “refraining from action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features,” without specific mention to the Nansha Islands. The DOC played a vital role in diffusing disputes in the Nansha Islands and maintaining regional stability. But the ambiguity on the specific area in dispute made the local territorial disputes look like a more general maritime issue. The mixing up of the concepts of “disputes over islands” and “maritime disputes” is confusing. Gradually, disputes over portions of the Nansha Islands and delimitation of their surrounding waters are more often referred to as South China Sea issue.

In the period immediately after the Cold War, the US remained committed to its policy of not taking sides on the legitimacy of territorial claims in South China Sea, emphasizing that the disputes should be peacefully resolved, and that the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea be maintained. Relatively speaking, Asia was not on the radar of American global security concerns as its relationship with China was improving and the tense relations across the Taiwan straits were eased. Occasional frictions in the South China Sea region did not change the US’ policy of not taking sides. It only emphasized that the territorial dispute should be peacefully resolved. ④

Under the peace mask, a decade of undercurrent of tension

In nearly ten years after the introduction of the DOC, China faithfully observed the principles and spirit of the document, refraining from taking any action that might escalate the disputes in the South China Sea. China also consistently promoted peaceful cooperation and joint development of resources in disputed waters. However, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines

appeared to be half-hearted about full implementation of the DOC. They kept on transforming and expanding occupied islands and reefs, reinforcing its control, and accelerated the development of oil and gas in surrounding waters. They also occasionally arrested Chinese fishermen operating in these waters. One common purpose of these claimant countries is to solidify their illegal occupation and deny the existence of any disputes, let alone shelving them. Such development continuously enraged Chinese public and media, eliciting sustained attention on the Nansha disputes.

Vietnam was particularly active. In April 2003, it held a commemoration to celebrate the 28th anniversary of the “Liberation of the Nansha Islands.” In June, it signed a secret pact with Indonesia on the delimitation of continental shelf under the South China Sea. In April 2004, it organized the first commercial tour to the Nansha Islands. In early 2005, it published a revised map of Vietnam, which included China’s Xisha and Nansha Islands into its Danang city and Khanh Hoa Province respectively. In early 2006, Vietnam and Malaysia set up a navy hot-line to coordinate the resource development and settlement of sovereignty disputes over the islands and reefs. In April, it started another round of bidding for oil blocks in the surrounding waters, and announced cooperation with foreign corporation on building natural gas transmission pipelines in the Nansha Islands. In May 2007, it conducted an extensive geological survey in surrounding waters using a chartered Russian surveying ship; a month later, it held elections of “National Assembly representatives” on some of the occupied Nansha shoals.

In April 2003, Malaysia sent four flotillas one after another totaling 11 surveying vessels to the waters around Nantong Reef (“Louisa Reef”) to conduct prospecting operations; in May, it organized an international maritime challenge in waters around Danwan Reef and approved for the

first time commercial tourism to Yuya Shoal by travel companies. In November 2004, it published stamps showing a Malaysian map which included Nansha islands. In August 2008, Malaysia's then Minister of Defense landed on Danwan Reef with some 80 journalists in a high-profile visit.

The Philippines made a lot of moves too. In April 2003, it celebrated the 25th anniversary of the establishment of Kalayaan Municipality in Zhongye Island and in June 2006, it started to renovate and upgrade the air strip and other facilities on that island. In March 2008, it set up satellite communication facilities on some of the occupied islands and reefs.

It should be noticed that before 2009, despite constant frictions, the situations in the South China Sea area was generally manageable. Greater complexity was brought by a series of events that happened in 2009. The UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) set 13 May 2009 as the deadline for the submission of claims defining extended continental shelf limits. This served as a stimulus, but the bigger factor was the readjustment of the US' AsiaPacific policy.

In January 2009, Barack Obama was sworn in as the US president. Shortly after taking office, the new president signaled that he would correct the Bush administration's misplaced foreign policy by shifting the US strategic priority to the Asia-Pacific region. This seemed had boosted some of the claimants' confidence in wrestling with China on the South China Sea disputes.

Between January and February 2009, the Philippine House of Representatives and Senate adopted the Territorial Sea Baselines Bill, which claims China's Huangyan Island and some islands and reefs in the

Nansha Islands as Philippine territory. On May 6, Vietnam and Malaysia jointly submitted to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) information on the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles in the South China Sea. They did so with no regard for the outstanding territorial and maritime delimitation disputes in these waters. On May 7, Vietnam separately submitted to the CLCS information on the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, claiming sovereignty over China's Xisha and Nansha Islands. In face of such a situation China decided to present a note verbale to the UN, providing its own position and the preliminary information on the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, to prevent further infringements on Chinese interests.

China and the US meanwhile started to experience frictions in South China Sea as reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance activities intensified. In 2009 alone, there were at least 5 incidents, of which the one about USNS Impeccable was the best known.

The year of 2010 witnessed a new turn in the US policy and it began to show an inclination to play a role on the issue. On July 23, at the Ministerial Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) held in Hanoi, Vietnam, the then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton openly spoke on the South China Sea issue. She said the United States "has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia's maritime commons and respect for international law in the South China Sea." She also emphasized that claimants should pursue their territorial claims and accompanying rights to maritime space in accordance with the Convention, and that the US opposed the use or threat of force by any claimant. Hillary revealed in her memoir: "That was a carefully chosen phrase, answering the earlier Chinese assertion that its expansive territorial claims in the area constituted a 'core

interest’.”^② Later, on multiple occasions, Hillary spoke on the Asia-Pacific policy of the Obama administration and on the South China Sea issue. In the meantime, the US military had increased its presence in areas in and around the South China Sea, including an increase of military drills.

China, with the aim of maintaining the general stability in the South China Sea and easing the tense atmosphere among the ASEAN countries, made consistent diplomatic efforts and achieved some progress. At the ASEAN-China Ministerial Meeting (10+1) held in Bali, Indonesia in July 2011, the Guidelines to Implement the DOC was adopted by China and ASEAN countries. China also obtained some bilateral understandings with the Philippines and Vietnam. However, China's diplomatic efforts failed to offset the impact brought by the American Asia-Pacific strategic adjustment, nor did Vietnam and the Philippines show restraint.

The change in the posture of the US side has made some ASEAN countries more restive. The Philippines and Vietnam step up reclamation activities on the features they occupied and frequently conducted military exercise with the US in the South China Sea. At the same time some ASEAN countries showed the tendency to group up against China, taking continued provocative activities in disregard of China's concern. In March 2011, the Philippine government disclosed plans to invest 230 million dollars in the renovation of the barracks and the airstrips on the features in the South China Sea. From June to July, a number of sensitive military exercises were held by the Philippines, Vietnam and some forces from outside of the region in the South China Sea which it has occupied. Aquino III, the President of the Philippines, ordered the official use of the “West Philippine Sea” to replace the standard name of South China Sea, with the hope of strengthening the Philippine territorial and maritime claims. What is more alarming is that such an irresponsible behavior of altering

geographical names on the world map gained some kind of support by senior US officials, such as the Secretary of the State who used the term when visiting the Philippines. In March 2012, the Philippines and Vietnam made known that they agreed to make joint military exercises and maritime border patrols in the South China Sea. In April, Vietnam even dispatched some monks to settle in temples on some of the South China Sea islands.

The provocative actions of the US and some ASEAN countries gave rise to strong repercussions in China, inflaming public discontent. Chinese government has been exercising restraint on the issue, but it now is confronted with growing pressure from the public and has to reconsider how to explain and carry on the policy.


Behind the spiraling tension in South China Sea

To observe the rising temperature in the South China Sea, the Huangyan Island incident in April 2012 was like the last straw on the camel's back which touched upon the bottom line of Chinese policy and patience.

On 10 April 2012, Philippine warships launched a surprise raid on twelve Chinese fishing boats operating in the Huangyan Island lagoon, disturbing and harassing their fishing activities, and even forcibly boarded some of the boats and detained the fishermen. Photos of the Chinese fishermen being stripped to the waist and exposed to the scorching sun on the deck of the Philippine ship made media headlines in China and triggered off an outcry among Chinese public. Such a provocative action by the Philippine navy stimulated heated public debate in China which compelled, and consequently Chinese government take immediate counter measures.

The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs made successive representations with the Charged'Affaires of the Philippine Embassy in Beijing without getting any clear response.

On 14 April 2012 China decided to requested all the Chinese fishing boats to leave temporarily from those waters, to prevent escalation of tensions. They returned about 9th of May and continued their licensed fishing operations. In the meantime, China send Marine Surveillance and Fishery Law Enforcement Command patrol ships to the waters around Huangyan Island.

Between April 15 and the middle of May 2012, Chinese government had more than once presented its position and the historic background of Huangyan Island to the international community through the media and Chinese Embassies overseas. I was the Vice Foreign Minister of China in charge of Asian affairs at that time, and tried many times to communicate with the Charged'Affaires ad interim at the Philippine Embassy in Beijing, questioning the Philippine behavior and its violation of the memorandum of understanding with China. But the Embassy gave no response. The Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs issued a statement on April 25th stating that “China thinks that the Philippines does not abide by agreements, and yet the Philippines thinks that there has never been any agreement between the two sides”

Sadly, the provocations did not stop. Philippine coastguard ships once again forced their way into the lagoon and they went in and out in turns to maintain a constant presence. Some Chinese fishermen observed that there were armed personnel on board. This was a source of grave concern as there was the danger of clashes. Chinese side urged through diplomatic channels that the Philippines withdraw their armed vessels from the lagoon, but these

requests were ignored. The Philippine DFA also refused any request for dialogue from the Chinese Ambassador in Manila.

This difficult situation continued for over two weeks, and by the end of May, China decided to send its own law enforcement patrol boats into the lagoon to protect the fishing boats. There was also a reinforcement of the guarding ships outside the lagoon.

Throughout the time when these events were going on, the US, on many diplomatic occasions, reaffirmed the effectiveness of the US-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty, and also strengthened diplomatic and military interaction with the Philippines. And yet, its approach regarding the incident was measured, refusing to respond to any hypothetical questions about possible conflict, and the US emphasized that its military maneuvers like the Balikatan war games were not targeted at China. The senior US officials such as the then Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta also indicated that the US did not take any position on issues of the disputes, and had no intention of getting involved in the Huangyan Island issue. ④ Such attitudes obviously fell short of what the Philippines had expected. ④ On April 30 2012, the Philippine Foreign Secretary Albert Del Rosario admitted at the press conference after the US-Philippine “2+2” meeting that “the US has been clear that it does not get involved in territorial disputes like the one over Huangyan Island”.

④

The US’ relative neutrality and its’ distant position led the Philippines to waver about continuing to engage in provocations and prolonged confrontation with China. It realized that confrontation was not a sustainable strategy, as China was determined to strengthen control over Huangyan Island by sending surveillance ships to conduct routine patrols in

waters off the coast of the Huangyan Island. In addition, the Filipino Patrol forces, limited by the size of their ships, was overstretched during the month's standoff. Therefore, in late May, they were about to shift their position.

Meanwhile, China had been proactively seeking diplomatic solutions to ease the tension, talking to all the parties concerned.

In early June 2012, after the Philippine armed vessels left the lagoon, China started also to bring its law enforcement boats out of the lagoon. On 5 June the Philippine DFA publicly confirmed that the government vessels and boats from both sides had come out of the lagoon. Then, as the fishing season in the South China Sea was coming to an end, a routine fishing moratorium period (May 16 -August 1) was imposed in the area by China. The Chinese fishing boats, which extended their operation because of the disruption, gradually left Huangyan Island lagoon. From then on, China kept only 1-2 law enforcement ships in the nearby waters of Huangyan Island to make sure peace prevails and the situation had finally calmed down.

The facts are clear: the Philippines never owned Huangyan Island, let alone losing it. In dealing with these sudden provocations, China exercised great restraint and acted in goodwill. The focus of negotiation was how to cease the intense situation in the lagoon. China's main emphasis throughout the incident was to make sure that the fishing activities in the lagoon be left in peace. To clarify some of the stories about China not honoring an agreement about withdrawing its ships, China had never promised to leave completely from the area since the Philippines could not be trusted to refrain from making further moves. China's intention is to safeguard its territorial right of Huangyan Island by keeping a vigilant guard around its

waters. However, during the incident, to manage risks and prevent conflicts, especially to make sure the Filipino armed vessels be brought out of the lagoon, China underwent negotiations through other parties including the US. That was a key step which finally allowed tranquility return to the area. But to say China deceived the US was untrue. The South China Sea disputes does not concern the US which is not a disputant.

Heating up tensions in the South China Sea, Vietnam made new moves too by adopting the law of the Sea of Vietnam on 21 June 2012. Such a “legislative move” made by Vietnam was meant to further thwart China’s legitimate rights there, and draw more international attention to the disputes. 注 On the day of its adoption, China’s then Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhang Zhijun summoned the Vietnamese Ambassador to China Nguyen Van Tho to protest against this move. On the same day, China’s Ministry of Civil Affairs announced that the State Council had approved Chinese long-planned establishment of Sansha city at prefecture level on Yongxing Island in the Xisha Islands, the place of the Administration Office for the Xisha, Nansha and Zhongsha Islands. In the following months, a series of administrative, judicial and military measures were implemented to put Sansha city into function.

On 22 January 2013, the Philippines submitted to the UN the Law of the Sea tribunal a Notification and Statement of Claim in order to initiate compulsory arbitration proceedings. To this, China’s Foreign Ministry stated: “The Philippines and the Arbitral Tribunal have abused relevant procedures and forced ahead with the arbitration, disregarding the fact that the subject matter of the arbitration involves territorial sovereignty and maritime delimitation and related matters, evading the declaration on optional exceptions made by China in 2006 under Article 298 of the UN

Convention on the Law of the Sea.” China therefore, decided not to acknowledge nor participate in the arbitration.

The Philippines initiated arbitration on account that its consultations and negotiations with China reached an impasse. But the truth is that ever since the Huangyan Island Incident, the Philippines refused to have any serious dialogue with China, let alone negotiations, nor did it consult the other DOC parties. As far as arbitration is concerned, China already made a declaration on optional exceptions in 2006 under Article 298 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Since the Philippines’ claims jurisdiction concerns sovereignty, historic rights and entitlement, China is exempted from the arbitration. Whatever the arbitration result is, it is not legally binding upon China.

Later, the standoff at Ren’ai Reef and Zhongjiannan Incident (Platform 981 Standoff) aggravated the situation. The Philippines aground a landing craft at Ren’ai Reef in 1999 on the excuse of needing repair and had never left. Now it had long become broken beyond repair, and the Philippine tried to start piling work on Ren’ai Reef in an attempt to actually occupy the reef. China certainly cannot accept that and therefore remained alert on the situation. In March 2014, China’s Maritime Safety Administration intercepted the Philippine warships that were sailing towards Ren’ai Reef carrying construction supplies. A standoff followed. The Philippine encouraged media to cover the story, drawing international attention with the hope that the US would get involved. It later gave up the attempt.

In May 2014, China started Zhongjiannan drilling operation in Xisha area. This HYSY 981 rig project was completed inside the contiguous zone of China’s Xisha Islands. Two drilling were performed 17 nautical miles from the south of Zhongjian Island of China’s Xisha Islands from May 2 to

August 15. The operation was harassed by hundreds of Vietnamese vessels. So the China Coast Guard flotilla chased and even collided with the Vietnamese vessels and the situation was intense at moments until the drilling was ended.

Under such situation in the area, Chinese side felt the need to update the infrastructure to safeguard sovereignty, enforce defense, and improve the living conditions there. From the end of 2013, China launched reclamation projects on the stationed Nansha islands and shoals. Since those features are away from international sealane, the reclamation project would not in any way affect freedom of navigation. Yet, the US and the Philippines reacted strongly by initiating a media hype and pointing fingers at China. In view of the concerns about China's reclamation efforts, China's Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying made a detailed explanation at a press conference on 9 April 2015: Chinese government has been carrying out maintenance and construction work on some of the garrisoned Nansha islands and reefs with the main purpose of optimizing their functions, improving the living and working conditions of personnel stationed there, better safeguarding territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, as well as better performing China's international responsibility and obligation in maritime search and rescue, disaster prevention and mitigation, marine science and research, meteorological observation, environmental protection, navigation safety, fishery production service and other areas. The relevant construction, which is reasonable, justified and lawful, is well within China's sovereignty. It does not impact or target any country. 注 Later on a number of construction projects that can provide service to the international community are being constructed, including lighthouses, automatic weather station, ocean surveillance center, marine scientific research facilities. 5 lighthouses that can facilitate navigating safety are constructed.

China's actions did not gain full understandings from its neighboring countries, and voices of concerns were emerging. Meanwhile, the US increased its involvement and used rhetoric like "too big and too fast" and "islands militarization" to pile pressure on China. It even sent out military fleet to sail close to Xisha and Nansha Islands, seen by China as serious provocations.

To many Chinese people, the US is behind the intense situation in the South China Sea. For a start, since the US launched its Pivot to Asia which was later changed into rebalance to the Asia Pacific, it has increasingly viewed China as its main rival and therefore the target. In 2013, the US military proposed a "two 60%" deployment target, which is: by 2020, the US would have deployed 60% of its warships and 60% of its overseas air force to the Asia-Pacific. Apart from this, the US also took every possible opportunity to highlight the potential challenges posed by China, dubbing it as "Anti Access/Area Denial", and it was actively working on the Air-Sea Battle model targeting China. This heavy-handed military posture of rebalancing forces by the US has undoubtedly made the disputes and situation in the Nansha Islands and surrounding waters more complicated. Some Chinese scholars wrote about their concern that the imaginary threats and crises in the Asia-Pacific region, based on which the US is trying to adjust its strategies, might turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Since 2014, the American statements regarding issues concerning China's neighborhood revealed that it was taking a posture of more open and direct intervention in the region and clearer favoritism for its allies.

On 5 February 2014, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Russel said at a congressional hearing that China's establishment of the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the

East China Sea was “a step in the wrong direction,” and that “China’s lack of clarity with regard to its South China Sea claims has created uncertainty, insecurity and instability in the region. It limits the prospect for achieving a mutually agreeable resolution or equitable joint development arrangements among the claimants.” He said that “the international community would welcome China to clarify or adjust its 9-dotted line claim.”^④ In the same month, the US Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Jonathan Greenert announced US’ support for the Philippines in the event of a China-Philippines conflict,^⑤ in so far the toughest and most partial talk on the issue by any high-ranking US officials. At the Post Ministerial Conference of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Naypyidaw in August the same year, the US Secretary of State John Kerry called for a moratorium on land reclamation, building on disputed islands, and actions that might further escalate disputes.

It was evident that the US started to make a “cost-imposing” tactic against China, namely trying to employ all means at its disposal, political, diplomatic, media and military, to raise the cost of China’s actions in the South China Sea, forcing China to back off and reining in “China’s expansion”.^⑥ In 2015, the US released four strategic security documents, entitled Forward Engaged and Ready: A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy and Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, respectively, all of which elaborated on the South China Sea issue, claiming that it would let China pay the cost.

The US policy changes from non-involvement to interference not only undermined itself as a supposedly unbiased party, but also deepened

China's concern over the possible threat to Chinese important interest, and this in turn stimulated China to further strengthen its defense capabilities.

While the US was changing its policies, its military became more active, targeting at China by taking various provocations and measures of deterrence. It intensified surveillance and close-in reconnaissance at the Nansha Islands and its surrounding waters. The number of sorties flown by the US planes increased from about 260 in 2009 to over 1,200 in 2014. 注 Its muscle-showing moves also include sending navy ships to make “freedom of navigation operations” near Nansha Islands, and even within 12 nautical miles of Xisha Islands, an area not under dispute. For example, on 27 October 2015, the USS Lassen sailed within 12 nautical miles of Zhubi Reef in the Nansha Islands; On 30 January 2016, the USS Curtis Wilbur passed near Zhongjian Island in China's undisputed Xisha territorial waters. Different from before, the US was very open about these actions. Admiral Harry B. Harris, commander of US Pacific Fleet, announced that the US would conduct more extensive and complicated patrols in the South China Sea at least “twice a quarter.” 注

The US defense forces started to take more activities aimed at deterring China. In July 2015, Admiral Scott Swift, the commander of the US Pacific Fleet, joined the surveillance mission on board the ASW P-8A Poseidon to conduct close-in reconnaissance at the South China Sea. On November 5, the then United States Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter boarded the USS Roosevelt and spoke on the South China Sea issue, when USS Roosevelt passed through the area about 150-200 nautical miles south of the Nansha Islands and about 70 nautical miles north of Malaysia. On November 8 and 9, two US B-52 strategic bombers flew near China's reconstructed islands in the South China Sea. On 15 April 2016, Carter, while on a diplomatic visit to the Philippines, boarded on the USS John C.

Stennis during its navigation in the South China Sea. There were also some incidents where the US military vessels and aircraft entered the Chinese territorial waters and airspace, and claimed that they were careless mistakes.

The US has strengthened its alliance with countries near the South China Sea and its military networking. Since its Pivot-to-Asia policies, the US has endeavored to increase military presence in Darwin, Australia, Changi Naval Base, Singapore, as well as in the Philippines and Malaysia. It also enhanced cooperation with Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam to conduct intelligence gathering and reconnaissance cooperation in the region, and expanding military support to the Philippines and Vietnam, helping them to improve reconnaissance, patrol control and anti-access capabilities. In March 2016, the US and the Philippines announced at their sixth annual Bilateral Security Dialogue that the US forces were allowed to use six Philippine military bases. In April 2016, the US military and the Philippine military conducted “shoulder-to-shoulder” exercises which had well-targeted missions, including “recapturing lost islands and protecting oil rigs”, all based on scenarios of the South China Sea disputes.

Those activities by the US in the South China Sea, be it deployment of its own forces or military cooperation with other parties, have certainly further flared up tensions, and exaggerated the South China Sea’s position on the international strategic chessboard. It started to look like that the competition between China and the US was becoming the main focus in the South China Sea issue.

Upon reflection, the US was involved and even took the lead in almost all the world’s confrontations and tensions after the Cold War, some of which has dragged on till today. This compels Chinese to wonder, what is the US’ real intention on the South China Sea issue?

China increasing its capability in managing the situation while pushing for cooperation

It can be seen from the above that the situation in the South China Sea came to the state of where we are today is the result of the entangling effect of the actions and reactions along multiple lines of development. There is also the influence of the changes in the international and regional security environment. The elements that pushed the spiraling twists and turns include not only such considerations as sovereignty, resources and strategic security, but also tangible interests. There is also the problem of information incoherence and institutional memory loss. Moreover, the guessing game about each other's strategic intentions and policy objectives is playing a role as well. It has to be pointed out that the US, as a power from outside the region, has played a major role by coming into the issue and adjusting its policies towards the disputes since 2009. The question arises: what is the future of the South China Sea? The US is watching China's next step, while China has some deep doubts towards the US's intentions. There is a danger of intensifying confrontations and strategic misjudgments regarding the South China Sea issue and disputes on Nansha Islands.

China's position in the South China Sea has not been changed and is consistently maintained. That is to safeguard national territorial integrity and maintain regional peace and tranquility. For Chinese, the painful memory of history is not long gone and they have not forgotten that the country suffered the humiliation of foreign invasion and aggression. That is why the Chinese people and government are very sensitive about anything that is related to territorial integrity and would never allow the recurrence of territorial loss even if it's just an inch of land. This is something the outside world needs to be aware when looking at China and trying to understand China's behavior. Admittedly, there is no major external threat that can

endanger China's survival or development in today's world. China adheres to the path of peaceful development and is dedicated to promoting world peace, development and cooperation. Its belief and commitment are firm and unchanged.

In his speech at the Opening Ceremony of the Fifth Meeting of the CICA Ministers of Foreign Affairs on 28 April 2016, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated: "China is committed to maintaining peace and stability in the South China Sea. We firmly stand by our sovereignty and rights and interests in the South China Sea, and remain committed to resolving disputes peacefully through friendly consultation and negotiation with countries directly concerned".^④ Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi held many rounds of consultations with his counterparts from ASEAN countries. From the discussion results, one could see that China's proposition of "dual-track" approach, meaning disputes be resolved peacefully through negotiation between the parties directly concerned and China and ASEAN countries work together to maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea, has been well received and supported. Many ASEAN countries started to realize the importance of keeping the situation under control and return to the track of dialogue.

So, to be specific, China's policy objectives in the South China Sea could be read through the following angles.

First, China's fundamental policy objective for the South China Sea is to protect the security of its sovereignty and maritime rights. China's principle is not to make the first move, and act with restraint. However, when provoked, China would not hesitate to take countermeasures. The Chinese people would not tolerate any further infringement of sovereignty and rights concerning islands and shoals and the legitimate waters off them

in the South China Sea, and therefore hold high expectations towards Chinese government to protect national interests. China will not give up its sovereignty stance and will increase its capabilities to control the situation and prevent any further loss. As long as no new major threat looms large, China will continue to uphold the policy of “shelving the disputes and seeking joint development”. China’s policy of solving the dispute through negotiations and peaceful means remains firm.

Second, China’s policy also pay important attention to the freedom and safety of navigation. The South China Sea is an international pathway of strategic importance and has the busiest commercial shipping routes, allowing 40 percent of the world’s ocean freight to pass through. The freedom and safety of navigation in the area are indispensable to all major economies. China relies on those routes for more than 70 to 80 percent of its trade and energy supplies. The pathway also serves as an important passage for Chinese navy to sail to the wider sea.

Third, the common denominator of China and its neighbors is regional peace and stability. China does not have an agenda or motive to seek hegemony in the region. The very reason that China exercises restraint and try to keep the disputes and differences under control is exactly for the sake of maintaining general peace in the neighboring environment. In this regard, China would continue making efforts in the following aspects: to provide and share more information with others for better understanding; to offer more public goods for the well-being and safety of all; to complete the “code of conduct” with ASEAN members for a rule based regional order. From a long-term perspective, as the biggest coastal country in the South China Sea, China should have the ability not only to defend itself but also to maintain peace in the South China Sea, and to gain a good position for seeking a negotiated settlement.

Fourth, China and the US should both care for maintaining the freedom and safety of navigation, and promoting stability and prosperity in the South China Sea area. The US has no territorial disputes with China in the south China Sea. Therefore, the two countries should avoid the trap of security dilemma and misunderstandings by engaging in dialogues, clarifying each other's intentions. China and the US need and should be able to work towards cooperation. As China is building its maritime capabilities, the wider seas and oceans in the world are increasingly important to its development as well as its global cooperation. China's vision will surely go beyond the South China Sea.

The future direction of trend would very much depend on the perceptions and choices of the parties involved. If they choose to cooperate, they may all win. If they choose to confront each other, they may only head for impasse or even conflict and no one can benefit totally.

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The Belt and Road Initiative

China's BRI: A Contribution to Fulfilling the Age-old Dream of Eurasian Connectivity 注

Chinese President Xi Jinping declared the initiative to jointly build the Silk Road Economic Belt when he visited Kazakhstan in September 2013. He also proposed the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road when visiting Indonesia in October 2013. This initiative has since attracted much attention, discussion and interest.

In March 2015, China's National Development Reform Commission, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, with State Council authorization, jointly issued a document entitled "Vision and Actions" to outline China's thinking on the implementation of the Belt and Road initiative (BRI).

For centuries, the historic Silk Road connected Asia and Europe both by land and sea. The new proposal from China, while reviving the ancient concept of the Silk Road, also aims to carry forward the Silk Road spirit of peace, cooperation, openness, inclusiveness and mutually shared benefits.

Naturally, it takes time for people to take in such a big idea. The first challenge is choosing a good translation that can capture the world's imagination. But that was not easy. This initiative has been translated into English as the Belt and Road Initiative. I am often asked what this means: "Why does China want a belt built on land and a road built in the sea?"

What Chinese President Xi Jinping means to convey is a renewed connectivity initiative both within Asia and between Asia and Europe. It

should benefit not only the heartland but also the coastal regions. While it strengthens traditional infrastructure, it also strives to build highways for trade, as well as financial and cultural exchanges.

There has already been a warm response from over 60 countries and a number of international organizations. How to take the initiative forward through concrete projects are a subject of ongoing discussions at bilateral, multilateral and regional levels; for example, how to promote an upgraded China-ASEAN Free Trade Area, and the construction of the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar economic corridor while integrating with the Eurasian Economic Union and the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank(AIIB).

The aspiration for Asia-Europe connectivity

Connecting Asia and Europe from the Pacific to the Atlantic has long been a dream, with the two continents making many attempts over the past hundred years.

In the 19th century, Russia built the Trans-Siberian Railway, which successfully connected from the Baltic Sea to the Pacific, and is known as the northern line. However, its main purpose was security, and its economic benefit is not very significant.

The second railway, known as the New Eurasian Continental Bridge runs through the center of the region. In 1990, China extended a railway through its Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region to the Alashan pass, enabling a journey from Lianyungang port on China's East Sea coast, all the way to Rotterdam, using various European railway networks.

In the mid 1990s, during a trip to the Alashan Pass, I saw for myself one of the many problems with this line. The line gauges on the two sides of the Chinese–Kazakhstan border were different, resulting in the need to unload goods from the train and then reload them onto the train fitting the gauge on the other side of the border. Due to the sheer volume of traffic on these lines, long delays were inevitable, making the concept of connectivity more academic than real.

The third line is in the south, which remains an idea. Though there are some railway lines between northern and southern China, the plan to connect China to the Southeast Asian networks, through Malaysia, onto Singapore and India has never been realized.

These difficulties notwithstanding, the dream to connect Asia and Europe has remained alive. In the 1990s, some European scholars proposed the Eurasian Land-Bridge plan, with an exciting map. By sheer chance, when I attended a Silk Road Forum in Yiwu last May, I rediscovered that map which had made young diplomats like me very excited in the early 1990s, in Madam Helga Zepp-LaRouche's brochure. I think European countries' support for the AIIB at this time is probably rooted in this very dream of Eurasian connectivity.

In the 1990s the Asian Development Bank (ADB) proposed a series of Asian infrastructure network programs. These included the Kunming-Bangkok Highway, which was built through the joint efforts of the ADB, China, Laos and Thailand. However, the general idea of a grander Eurasia connectivity project had no hope of being realized at that time, due to the lack of capital and technology. China itself was not ready either, as the necessary infrastructure networks at home were not in place yet.

As a result, while such ideas did occasionally come up in discussions between ASEAN and China at official and academic levels over the years, they had to wait for the right conditions and the right vision.

Twenty years on, those constraints have started to disappear. China has made tremendous progress in building infrastructure across the country, with a vast network of highways and railways being completed, including the world's longest high-speed railway system.

More importantly, China has come a long way in terms of economic strength, with enhanced capital and upgraded technology. Now, China is in a position to propose such a massive initiative, which will not only further develop China but more importantly create higher levels of growth across Asia and beyond.

All-round connectivity promotes peace, stability and economic prosperity of the region and beyond

Singapore sits on the world's most vital arteries for trade between Asia and Europe. It plays a very important role by virtue of being a gateway.

Most inland regions in Asian countries are less prosperous, compared to their coastal ones due in part to the lack of transportation and infrastructure. This has resulted in many Southeast Asian countries and vast areas of China's western interior, as well as the region between China and Europe being left behind. Poverty in these places is a major problem which can lead to instability, engendering such problems as human and drug trafficking and terrorism.

China is both a land and maritime country. Its inland area is four times larger than the eastern coastal region and lags far behind in infrastructure and development. But the potential is huge, as the West China lies at the center of the Eurasian continent, with the advantages of connecting commerce from and to both the south and west.

Other maritime countries along Maritime Silk Road like Indonesia and Malaysia also need to improve inland connectivity, to enable them to catch up and benefit from the new wave of growth in Asia. By developing these transport arteries further, we will be able to introduce and spread advanced productivity into the disadvantaged economies in Asia's hinterlands, creating opportunities, prosperity and improving competitiveness across the region.

Connectivity programs—the new driving force for cooperation

China is now the number one trading partner of most Asian countries. Those countries supporting Belt and Road Initiative have seen their trade with China growing in double digits, and this is expected to grow further when the initiative translates into more projects.

As an example, China and Singapore are not only important trading partners but also have strong and growing two-way investment, with Singapore ranking as China's top foreign investor in the last two years in a row and Chinese investment in Singapore is also picking up. This momentum is hoped to be reinforced by the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative.

In the wider context, Asia is yet to tap its full potential. According to the Asian Development Bank, 600 million people in Asia have no access to

electricity. The demands for infrastructure between 2010 to 2020 are estimated to be as high as \$ 8 trillion.

To help jumpstart the region's infrastructure and development drive, China initiated the Silk Road Fund with \$ 40 billion and the AIIB with an initial capital of \$ 100 billion.

In China, we say that connectivity is the shortcut to prosperity. This has been our experience in recent decades, and we now want to share this success with other countries. Chinese companies are capable of providing high quality, low cost and affordable infrastructure projects and they are already active in the region. According to the information found on the Chinese Ministry of Commerce's website, between January and May this year, Chinese companies signed up to more than 1,000 projects in countries along the Belt and Road. This accounts for 50% of the overseas projects undertaken by China during this period.

In many ways, Singapore has a crucial role to play. As an important maritime, freight and logistics center with advanced facilities, it can provide an essential transit hub for both the maritime and land Silk Road programs. Singapore is also an important financial center, housing the second biggest offshore RMB clearing center. This puts it in a strong position to provide trade, financing and investment services across the region. Singapore will be the country coordinator for China-ASEAN relations over the next three years. We count on Singapore to play a leadership role in upgrading the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area, and in taking forward the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, the Asia-Pacific Free Trade Agreement and the connectivity projects in the region.

At the moment, China and Singapore are discussing a new flagship project relating to connectivity and the modern service industries in Western

China, which would strengthen Singapore's role in the Belt and Road Initiative development.

Challenges and response

Like any good initiative, the Asia-Europe connectivity or pathway will be tested in practice, and it has already been confronted with difficulties and challenges.

It has always been a challenge for China to communicate its thinking and ideas to the world. This, of course, is not helped by language difficulties and the challenges of putting conceptualized initiatives into practice.

Furthermore, to promote better understanding, China must also listen to its neighbors. The Silk Road initiative is an open and inclusive program, aimed at serving common development. It is therefore important for the participants to nurture trust and understanding, and to learn to communicate among themselves as well as with the outside world.

Security and other risks on infrastructure projects, which are longterm and slow to show returns, are always a concern. The success of projects depends entirely on the ability of host countries concerned to ensure the necessary environment and conditions, while the companies themselves must base their decisions on full and accurate risk assessments. Of course, in turn, good connectivity programs will reinforce regional stability.

Market factors play a key role. Companies and markets must be allowed to determine which is or is not a viable project for the connectivity program. Economic viability holds the key to success. Governments can

facilitate this by providing policies, legal guidance and the necessary facilities.

The list of challenges is long. But the warm and supportive response to the initiative indicates that there is a keen interest in it, which is necessary for its success. I hope I am not overstating the case by saying that the region has never been so united and so full of hope for extensive connectivity. Should the Silk Road initiative be successful, it will not only generate new development opportunities but also create prosperity for hundreds of millions of people.

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1. Speech to the Singapore Regional Business Forum on the theme of “the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road” on 29 July 2015. Lianhe Zaobao of Singapore published its Chinese Version on 3 August 2015.

Chinese Way

Different Pictures of China 注

When talking to foreigners, I often feel their impressions of China are quite different from ours. This feeling was particularly strong when I recently attended the annual St. Gallen Symposium.

This Symposium was held in the Swiss city of St. Gallen in early May and is attended by political and business leaders along with outstanding students from across the world, to discuss world affairs. For this reason, it is regarded as a mini Davos Forum. My impressions from the forum are that while people are greatly interested in China, they have many misunderstandings. With the most frequently raised question being: as an emerging power, how will China view and lead the world?

To reflect the Chinese view, I shared with the forum my personal experience of discussing the issue with Chinese audiences: “When I give speeches in China, I often ask the audience whether they agree with the statement ‘China is already the second biggest power in the world.’ People rarely raised hands to agree with this statement. However when asked which country they believed rank the second, they expressed diversified views. Intrigued by talk story, the host asked the audience to raise their hands if they thought, “China is the second biggest power in the world.” Most of the people raised their hands high. But the Chinese students who attended cried out loudly: “No!” It was clear that the views held by the outside world about China are not the same as those held by Chinese. Many in the international community think that China has indeed grown into the second biggest world power. While we ourselves still believe that, we remain a

developing country, as in spite of our great success, the country in many aspects is far from being second in the world.

I also talked about China's history and national conditions, telling them that while the outside world judges China's development and strengths based on the size of its economy, most Chinese people have just started to lead a life above the subsistence level. As China's per capita GDP is still below the world average, what ordinary Chinese see are the immediate and real gaps and challenges facing us and therefore have more sober assessments of China's international status. I also told the audience that the Chinese Dream reflects the hopes of every individual and family in China, and the nation's pursuit of modernization: "urbanization" will be the engine of China's next stage of development, and the "rule of law" will provide the preconditions for further reform and development. China needs international cooperation in order to further its development and this, in turn, will bring about more opportunities for the world. China's international responsibilities lie in the maintenance of peace and by facilitating cooperation.

Both during the meetings and on the sidelines, the attendees took China's views seriously. But there were also some harsh and biased comments expressed by those who may have received one-sided information. For example, some were saying that China is bullying its neighbor in the Diaoyu Islands dispute; some talked about "genocide" in Tibet and yet knew little about the past and present of Tibet. Incorrect information, when repeated often enough is believed to be true. This results in ambivalence toward China: many in the international community strongly urge China to shoulder more responsibilities for the world, while also harboring worries and concerns about China's rise; they admire what China has achieved but think many things China does are "incorrect."

Although they are curious about the changes in China's current leadership and what the new leaders think, their analysis and the questions they asked are often based on prejudice and are opposite to what is happening in China.

In China people's views of their own country are also quite diverse, which reflects a changing and developing China. Despite what it has achieved, the country still faces many daunting difficulties and challenges. A full picture of China will not emerge if the rest of the world keeps looking at China from limited angles. To get the real and full picture of China, not only does the rest of the world need to have a better understanding of China's history and current situation, but the Chinese must also be able to successfully articulate their views. To this end, we must raise our international awareness and broaden our horizons. Some Chinese students successfully did this by standing up and sharing their views. They won respect from the other attendees and brightened up the event with such confidence that is typically seen in the younger generation. They also got support from representatives from the developing world and others who know China as well as those who wanted to hear more voice from China. We must recognize and respond to the growing desire from the outside world to know and communicate more with China.

1. This article originally appeared in 8 May 2013 issue of the People's Daily.

Let's Agree to Disagree in Harmony^注

It is a privilege to speak at the Brookings Institution in its 101st year. For over a century, brilliant ideas have come out of this building, not only forming a cornerstone of American foreign policy but also leaving strong influence on international political thinking.

It is now an important moment for China and the US that President Xi Jinping and US President Obama have just had a historic meeting at the Annenberg Retreat at Sunnylands in a harmonious atmosphere. It was so good to see them spending a considerable time sharing thoughts about their respective countries and the world.

One of the most important messages coming out of the meeting was their commitment to working together to build a new model of relationship. This is encouraging. It may not automatically lead to all-round partnership between the two countries, but will certainly help reduce possibility of conflict as many had concerned. Though they have not solved all of the problems, there is high hope that the collaboration of our two nations will lead to many productive results in the years to come.

There is no denying that China and the US have different views on many issues. It is therefore important that we work to understand each other's thoughts and actions, as in doing so we will find ways of working together better. Today, I want to touch on some of the myths about China and share with you our latest developments.

One very divisive issue is whether China is competing for world power, now that it is regarded as a big power on the global stage or number two of the world. The expectation of China swings from asking China to take on greater international responsibilities, to preventing it from grabbing world power.

In China, most people don't see things that way. For them, the per capita income is more real than the size of the total GDP and they insist that China is still a developing country. It is widely believed in China that although ours is a large country in size and population, it is far behind the developed nations. It is confronting challenges that people in other countries could hardly imagine.

After the splendid opening ceremony at the Beijing Olympics in 2008, a British journalist asked me what had been China's most important achievement. I said, having enough to eat for the 1.3 billion people .

Indeed, food has been at the center of Chinese politics since the ancient time. The dynasties rose and fell because of this essential issue. But over the span of one generation, we have achieved the goal of having sufficient food. It's a task easier said than done. Now the days of food shortage in China are gone forever. The lives of the Chinese people have been completely transformed thanks to sustained economic growth, combined with successful reform and opening-up to the outside world.

Are people happier? Not necessarily. Take for example those born in the 1980s. They are the first generation not knowing hunger. Yet they claim they are old and tired. They find themselves struggling to meet the demands from high mortgages and competition in jobs, to the rising costs of living.

The challenges for today are no less daunting, though at a higher level. The top news story for us at the moment is about, for example, the over 9 million students attending the college entrance examination. At the same time, approximately 7 million students graduating from universities are hunting for jobs. The smog that shrouded Beijing last winter vividly drove the message home to us that a growing GDP should not come with a price on the environment. Migrant workers are not integrated into the cities where they work and are unable to enjoy the welfare benefits. This has resulted in their children and grandchildren feeling excluded in the cities where they were born. The gap is widening. Even outside the big cities, just 300 km away from Beijing or Guangzhou, for example, you find people living in very rudimentary conditions.

As China is moving beyond just basic needs, people are embracing new dreams. They long for a better life, with stable jobs and reliable social security built on an improved social environment that includes better education and facilities. They want the effective application of the rule of law and greater guarantee on their rights. They also want to take pride in the country, as part of the community of nations. They want to have a sense of dignity, as they become global citizens, and assurances that their country and people are well protected.

The concept of the Chinese Dream, proposed by President Xi Jinping reflected the aspirations of the people. He said in his speech to the 12th National People's Congress last March: "The Chinese Dream is as much a dream of the whole nation as a dream for every individual. People should all share in the opportunities to fulfill his or her potential, to realize the expectation and to make progress along with the progress of the nation."

The 18th National Congress of the CPC set out two centenary goals. The first is to double not only the GDP size but also the amount of the per capita income of 2010 by 2021, which will be the 100th anniversary of the founding of the CPC. This is only 8 years away. The second goal is for 2049, the year marking the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. The objective is to turn the country by then into a strong, prosperous, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious socialist society.

To achieve these goals, the new leadership has given priority to stable economic growth. Further reform measures were announced, including readjusting government functions to allow market and society to play a larger role. The government will also focus on ensuring a level playing field for fair and open competition and on looking after those weaker groups who require help. The country will strive towards industrialization, urbanization, informatization and agricultural modernization. China's future urbanization will be the largest the world has ever seen, involving 600 million farmers. The emphasis will be on the urbanization of people, or the integration of farmers into the cities. If promoted successfully, it will unleash great stimulus for growth and increase consumer demand.

Environment, energy, excess capacity and the slowing down of the economy, the list of problems is long. And to tackle them, we must change the model of development and promote greater international cooperation.

The underlying condition for all these is the rule of law, especially improved legislation. The Standing Committee of the 12th National People's Congress has now laid down its program to step up and improve legislation, in the areas causing the greatest public concern. The country now has 244 laws which form the general legal framework, but more are

needed. There is also the need to improve the quality of the laws and ensure that they are more effectively and fairly enforced. This, in turn, will create a culture of greater compliance with the law. No one should be allowed to rise above the law.

As China moves forward, the US will surely benefit from the opportunities China's progress will bring about should the latter continue as a partner.

China can only achieve its objectives with a peaceful international environment and by working closely with the rest of the world, especially the US. In return, China's continued success will also add to world peace and prosperity.

Let me move on to say a few words on the bigger picture. Today's world is changing. Many developing countries like China, India and South Africa are now growing fast, and their share of the world economy is expanding, while some developed countries are trapped in financial and economic difficulties. Statistics show that the gap is narrowing. This gives rise to the view that the center of gravity of the global power is shifting and the new powers will pose a threat to the incumbent world leaders.

This view is also heard and discussed in China. But in the real world, you do not see the center of gravity of global power shifting from one country or region to another. It is true that changes are occurring. World issues are more globalized and need to be handled by more countries working together. It should also be noted that the growing internet population is becoming more and more vocal, which is inevitably having an effect on decision making both at home and abroad. So part of the global power may be moving out of its traditional center but not necessarily to another center, more likely be disseminating to a wider sphere.

This change reflects the developments in today's world. A strong wave of globalization after the Cold War allowed capital, technology, markets and human resources to move more freely and quickly. This has resulted in the center of economic activities spreading out of the traditional center, to countries and societies that were for a long time in the periphery. China, India and South Africa, along with many others are now on track for fast industrialization. They have little incentive to override the existing world structure as they are benefiting from it. But as the system needs to accommodate changes, countries are working together to promote reform, which has been reflected in the G20 and Doha exchanges.

In the meantime, the developed countries, in particular the US, remain at the center and leaders in many fields. Here in the US, you have the best universities, the most advanced science and technology, very dynamic creativity and high-end manufacturing, not to mention the most profitable companies and brands. Surely it doesn't mean that the US does not have its share of problems that need to be resolved.

China has a long way to go. The new leadership in China has shown a lot of confidence and wisdom, but it is very important that China stays focused and avoid losing sight of its right direction.

If you ask, what is Chinese comment about the US? I would say, at least the habit of seeing China as "politically incorrect" is of concern. For example, although China has transformed so much, and yet the human rights accusation of China continues and the mindset remains the same.

In May 2013, I was attending St. Gallen Symposium. There were also some Chinese students who were invited via the internet. There were the usual old questions about China's human rights, and one of the students, a girl, stood up and asked the audience, can you be more creative?

The actual relations between China and the US, in spite of doubts and hesitance, are progressing fast. In the over 30 years of my diplomatic career, I have watched how the relationship grows. Now the two countries are working closer than many have ever imagined and are successfully managing some of the most difficult issues. The Six Party Talks on the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue are one of them.

Developments in the past couple of years have given rise to concerns that China's neighborhood is growing disquiet. But I prefer to look at it from a historical and global perspective. In the years after the Cold War, many parts of the world saw turbulence and even war. Asia remained relatively peaceful. This enabled many countries in the region to focus on economic progress and become successful. We owe this to the close partnership of the countries concerned. China's policy for regional peace and its ability to maintain domestic stability and prosperity have contributed significantly to the general vitality of the region. We also hope the principles agreed by China and the ASEAN countries on maintaining the tranquility in disputed areas should stand and the regional peace be upheld.

China has on many occasions welcomed the constructive role of the US, which has long association and influence in Asia. But questions have also been raised in recent years. The US invested heavily in Europe during the Cold War for reasons we all know. After 9/11 attacks the US attention moved to the Middle East because of terrorism. Now the US has shifted its attention to Asia, people start to wonder why and ask: Can China and the US work in partnership and help to promote peace and prosperity in the region? So, Asia may become the first testing ground for the new model of relationship between China and the US.

Many of the new challenges we face today concern the common interests of countries on this planet, such as ecological sustainability, the possible spread of nuclear weaponry, food safety, terrorist threats, or cyber security. Countries, big or small, are all in the same boat. If we can move beyond the old ways and trust each other, we may be able to find the strength to work together.

Now that the two leaders have charted the path, let's work together to make our world a better place in the 21st century.

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1. Speech at the Brookings Institution on 12 June 2013. Part of the speech appeared on the website of the National People's Congress (NPC) of the People's Republic of China in Chinese on 13 June 2013.

How Will China Influence the World? 注

There is growing attention to and increasing interest in China by the outside world. In some of the international forums I attended recently, I often met people who wanted to know more about the program of comprehensive reforms in China, which were introduced at the 3rd Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee. They are interested to learn about what is happening in China and the most often raised question is: how will China influence the world.

The underlying reason for them to ask this question is the rapid growth of China into the second largest economy in the world and into a leading trading nation, and its fast reaching parity with the US. This was perceived by some Westerners with a bit disbelief and puzzlement. They have little knowledge of the difficulties and hardship the Chinese people had gone through. And their habit of ostracizing Chinese ideology made it hard for them to understand Chinese politics and the political strength that guided China's success.

Yet countries in the world on the whole are looking at China as an emerging global power, and their main concern is how China is going to maximize its security and economic interests, and how this will influence the world. As is assumed, the interests of a major country normally evolve and expand in line with the growth of its power and its greater global share of productive capacity. History also shows that the biggest challenge for a growing power is whether it can align the expansion of its interests with the trend of the times, or in other words, with the interests of the majority of

countries. This challenge has cut short many ambitions and quests for major power status.

President Xi Jinping has emphasized the importance for Chinese to nurture a proper understanding of the greater good and shared interests. This gives some hint for answering the question above. Greater good means that a country should accommodate the interests of others when pursuing its own, and should sometimes even withhold its own interests for the benefit of others, thus living up to a higher moral stand. This approach is different from that of traditional powers, which would be more ready to override the interests of others with their own. They sometimes went so far as to resort to military means to support the pursuit of their own interest. China has chosen the path of peaceful rise. This is both consistent with its beliefs and values, and a reflection of the trend of peace and development that prevails in today's world. This is also different from the past.

As a socialist country with a long history and a distinct civilization, China needs to accommodate rules, norms and customs that, reflecting a common understanding of the international community, have become successful or established practices in today's world. At the same time, we need to enrich and refine our own belief in the greater good. We also need to improve our modern concepts and principles that would govern our relations with other countries. China is willing to offer more public goods that are within its strength and ability. This may include bringing more economic opportunities to the rest of world and sharing its experiences in poverty reduction and environmental protection with other developing countries. Naturally, a growing power would also be confronted with provocations and infringements upon its interest, which cannot be avoided just by dodging. China needs to counter swiftly and proportionally and speak its mind clearly in order to prevent more provocations from

following-suit. When necessary, it should also re-affirm or formulate common rules among the concerned.

China will hear more questions and doubts, as the world is paying more attention to it and questioning how it conduct its relations with the other countries. We need to listen to the views of the others and improve our ability to understand the world around us. We must also make more efforts to explain to the world our intentions and present our side of the story when events occur. By promoting better understanding, we can reduce the obstacles in China's integration into the world as it grows.

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1. This article was published in the Expert Opinion Column of thePeople's Daily, on 2 January 2014.

China's Reform and Development Make Asia and the World Safer^注

This year marks the centenary of the outbreak of World War One, which prompts timely reflections on the root causes of the war. History is a good indication of the future. Only by drawing lessons from the past can mankind avoid making the same mistakes and move forward.

The world has changed a great deal over the past century. While not forgetting the past, the European nations have managed to achieve reconciliation and become pioneers in regional integration. A single market was created, and the Euro came into being. Europe has not only enjoyed its longest time of peace but also brought about enormous prosperity. Even though the debt crisis forced a re-adjustment of certain policies, the future of Europe still looks bright.

As a conference participant from China, I, like everyone present, feel grateful to be living in an age of peace and development. Thanks to the lessons learned from the two disastrous world wars, peace now prevails over war, and progress overcomes stagnation.

China's focuses are now on the two centenary goals (which are: by 2021 which is the centenary of CPC, China will have built a moderately prosperous society in all aspects, with both its GDP and average per capita income doubling that of 2010; Then by 2049, the centenary of the founding of the People's Republic, China will have become a modern, prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious socialist country. Chinese President Xi Jinping summarizes the endeavors aimed at the

rejuvenating the nation as the Chinese Dream, which essentially means that the 1.3 billion Chinese people aspire to achieve a comfortable life, with adequate income, education, pension and medical care and everyone lives in dignity. This is what makes the Chinese Dream so attractive.

The Chinese people are confident about realizing such a dream, but we are fully aware of the challenges coming in our way. China's leadership transferred in 2013. In that year, against the downward pressure on the economy, China still posted GDP growth rate of 7.7%, a steady growth brought about by continued reforms.

A secret ingredient of China's continued success is its relentless efforts in reform and opening-up, which have kept, and will continue driving the country forward. The Third Session of the 18th Central Committee of the CPC, held toward the end of 2013 made the decision to deepen reforms across all fronts. This involved more than 300 reform measures, on almost all issues of public concern.

In China's calendar of deepening reform, 2014 is an important year. The responsibility of providing legal guidance for the reforms falls on China's National People's Congress (NPC). The work we do is to check and make sure that all reforms have a sound legal base, and that they proceed in an orderly way. The NPC also keeps up with the reforms and improves its abilities to exercise oversight over the State Council, the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate, working to modernize the governance institutions and capabilities.

China needs a peaceful and stable international environment for its development. In the past decades, we have not been involved in major international conflicts; on the contrary, China has become an increasingly

important force for safeguarding world peace and promoting international cooperation. Particularly in Asia, China is playing an important role in bringing the Asian nations together.

Having the largest number of neighboring countries (14 land neighbors and 8 neighbors across the sea), China has long been emphasizing the importance of maintaining good relationships with its neighbors. The new set of ideas President Xi Jinping proposes underscores amity, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness, and are aimed at advancing good-neighborliness, promoting mutual understanding and trust, and encouraging economic and financial cooperation. All of this is to ensure that Asia continues to be one of the most attractive regions in the 21st century.

Peace, development and cooperation are the best descriptions of the current relationships among Asian countries. Trade and economic ties are growing. People are frequently traveling between countries. Last year, the number of Chinese traveling to ASEAN countries exceeded 10 million. Each week, there are more than 800 flights between China and South Korea. China has also been actively promoting cooperation in its dialogues with the ASEAN countries and with Japan and South Korea. It also plays a significant role in the East Asia Summit, working for an improved architecture of regional coordination. It is fair to say that China has become an anchor of peace and prosperity in Asia.

Yet, some disputes still exist, with disagreements between China and some of its neighbors. For instance, at the moment, people are concerned about China-Japan relations. What landed this relationship into difficulty is the problematic views of history held by certain Japanese leaders. Only by facing up to its history of aggression can Japan break free from its shackles and be released from its burdens. An evolving Japan in the 21st century

needs a healthy and open mind, and needs to adjust to the new circumstances, otherwise it might be difficult for it to become a constructive player in Asian affairs.

On issues regarding territorial and jurisdictional disputes, China will defend its sovereign rights, but will also deal with these issues with good intentions and in an honest approach. It will continue to work on consultations and negotiations to achieve proper resolution. China and the ASEAN countries have agreed to comprehensively implement the Declaration of Conduct on the South China Sea (DOC). Consultations on the code of conduct in the South China Sea are also underway. On the Korean nuclear issue and Afghanistan, China is also playing a constructive role in seeking to solve the problems and will continue to put efforts into safeguarding regional peace and stability.

Asia is an important intersection where the interests of China and the US meet. Chinese leaders have proposed the building of a new model of major country relations based on the principles of no confrontation or conflict, mutual respect and win-win cooperation. If the two countries can start with the Asia-Pacific region and work for progress step by step, they will send out a positive message. It will offer reassurance to peace-loving nations and will discourage certain countries from plotting to reap unfair gains from any friction between China and the US.

Different from a century ago, a major change in the world today is the diffusion effect of globalization, which has seen capital, technology, market and resources spreading wider in the world, opening up opportunities for the emerging countries to develop faster and has enabled billions of people around the world to live a modern life. It has also prompted changes in global governance and engendered a power shift. International affairs are no

longer mere maneuverings by a few countries in the power center. Besides, it is now almost impossible for a single country to solve global issues. These changes not only contribute to promoting and maintaining world peace but have also expanded the range of economic activities more than ever before. The world, therefore, is increasingly diversified and has been made a better place.

Looking at these changes, we have good reasons to believe that history will not blindly repeat itself. The world will not go back to what it was like 100 years ago, nor is the current situation similar to that of Europe a century ago. Anyone trying to challenge human conscience and international justice will be strongly resisted by people across the world.

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1. Speech at the panel discussions on “Global Power and Regional Stability” at the 50th Munich Security Conference on 1 February 2014, published for the first time

A View on China's International Standing 注

China is now an active player in diplomacy, as it has many exchanges and high-level visits with other countries. President Xi Jinping has just attended the 14th meeting of the Council of Heads of Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and also visited Tajikistan and the Maldives. He is continuing on with state visits to Sri Lanka and India, and all are receiving considerable attention.

China's National People's Congress also has close contacts with its foreign counterparts and receives visiting parliamentary delegations nearly every week. We sense that other countries are paying greater attention to and have higher expectations of China, but they also seem to have stronger feelings of concern than they had previously. It is widely believed in the international community that China is the greatest variable in today's world. Some people argue that the most predictable thing in the world is China's unpredictability. They see three perplexing questions about China:

First, has China become a world power?

Second, will China contend for world dominance?

Third, what will China bring to the world?

Has China become a world power?

People in China and in the international community seem to have different opinions on this issue. Many foreigners are observing and treating it as a newly rising power. However, most Chinese people think the outside world has overestimated China.

When I deliver a lecture in China, I often start with a poll, asking the audience whether China has become the world's second largest power. On most occasions, no more than 5% of the audience will agree to it.

To the Americans, China is really catching up. No rising power has come close to the US in this way since it became the world's largest economy in the 19th century.

We all know the United States is the only unquestioned superpower after the Cold War. Then it fought two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq during the first decade of the 21st century and suffered a serious financial crisis in 2007, which led to severe erosion of both its hard and soft power. China has come a long way during these years and has avoided both internal and external conflicts. Its accession to the WTO has opened up more opportunities to boost its international trade and economic relations with other countries across the world.

China's gross domestic product (GDP) stood at \$1.2 trillion in 2000, rising to \$8.2 trillion in 2012. In other words, China's GDP increased from a ninth to half of the US's in 12 years.

Taking the trend of globalization after the Cold War has been one of the most important factors in China's growth. With the more globalized allocation of factors of production, China and some other developing countries have achieved fast development. The Chinese people's

commitment to hard work and efficient governance of the political system has enabled China to make better use of the opportunity.

This shift is significant for the world, a turning point in the evolution of human society. Through globalization, western developed countries have reaped huge benefits, while living standards in developing countries have also improved remarkably. According to the Atlantic Council in the US, data from 1988 to 2008 indicates that the middle classes in emerging market economies have benefited from globalization more than others. Correspondingly, the social status of the middle classes in the western developed countries has not climbed as fast. It is predicted that by 2050, middle class consumption will be the highest in developing countries such as China and India.

However, does this mean China has become a world power? The Chinese people are level-headed and objective about their country's international standing. On the one hand, there are still many poor people in China, as you can see from TV news coverage of President Xi Jinping's visits to poverty-stricken areas. You can see homes with rusty old-style rotating fans on the ceilings and newspaper-plastered walls. Premier Li Keqiang once recalled, when visiting a run-down area he found the indoor temperature was so low that some residents had to wear cotton-padded caps and clothes while sleeping and he remarked that it was deeply distressing for the government.

On the other hand, China now has more opportunities and greater capabilities to get involved in international affairs, and its citizens have a growing interest and willingness to participate. So, how should China be defined? In discussing this issue, most scholars consider China to be a world power with major regional influence. At the same time, China is

burdened with many issues left over from history. For example, it has not yet achieved national reunification, and some of its territories are still controlled by other countries. China remains a large developing country. As a country on an uphill journey, it needs to work hard to develop itself and engage in extensive international cooperation.

Will China contend with the United States for greater world power?

In *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, Professor John Mearsheimer argued that the international goal of a state is to seek global hegemony, and therefore, a rising China is a dangerous potential threat to the US.

In terms of China's rise, some Western academics prefer to make observations from the perspectives of inevitable competition and conflict among powers. In 2013, when delivering an after dinner speech to an international audience in Beijing, I said that Chinese did not consider China a world power, and nor would they want to contend for international power. The US former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, who was present at the dinner, said she was impressed by my remarks. Six months later, we met again in South Korea. She asked me whether I had said that Chinese did not consider China a world power and that they did not want to contend for international power. She explained that she wanted some clarification, as on some occasions when she quoted my remarks, people said that she must have misheard.

At the recent Aspen Ministers Forum, China-US relations and China's intentions were again the focus of discussion. I said that many people in China were not so interested in replacing the US. The audience burst into laughter, saying who would believe this? I had to respond: "Does the

international community really want to see China replacing the United States? Does the world need another US?” Many people laughed again. An American representative intervened by saying, “Well, the United States is committed to world peace.” The whole room exploded into greater laughter, and she had to add, “Except for George W. Bush.”

Indeed, the world is paying closer attention to what China, a new power, will do, particularly in Asia. Does China want to drive the US out of Asia? Many people don't know that in most cases, causing tensions in territorial disputes along Chinese border are provoked by China's neighbors. China cannot allow other countries to infringe on its maritime interest and has to defend its rights, but it does not have an expansionist policy.

The misinterpretations of China in the United States and other western countries can negatively affect China's relations with them at a time when China needs and relies on the world even more during this crucial period of its development. The United States is in a period of contraction. However, if it recovers, expands again and then feels threatened by China, it will introduce tougher policies to constrain China, a situation that would not be conducive to international cooperation.

What will China bring to the world?

It is still too early for many Chinese to think about this question. In 2011, the Chinese government donated 23 school buses to Macedonia, causing an unexpected wave of criticism from the general public. This was because some Chinese children had been killed in a school bus crash not long before in a remote Chinese province. According to

Internet sources, there were about 230 million students in high schools and elementary schools in China, of which 90 million need school buses. So, China needs more than one million safe school buses but only has just over 10,000. This means that Chinese school children in many places ride on inferior buses, not to mention those in remote areas without any buses, who have to walk miles on rugged mountain roads, some even on their bare feet. The argument was, how could China assist a country thousands of miles away, while it was not managing its own affairs well at home?

The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC) meets every other month to deliberate all kinds of proposals, including those from NPC deputies and reports submitted by government departments. The discussions which are often heated, reveal that China indeed faces a myriad of serious challenges, and that the country focused on domestic affairs for years to come.

However, this doesn't mean Chinese don't care about the world and don't want to assume their appropriate international responsibilities. But we have difficulties in agreeing with the approach of the United States and other western countries, who have long been dominating the world affairs, and who often expect other countries just to "follow me and do things for me."

Also at the Aspen Ministers Forum, David Miliband, former British Foreign Secretary and current President of the International Rescue Committee, stressed there were 9.5 million refugees in Syria, which created huge pressures on its neighbors. He called for various parties to provide support and expressed his strong desire for China to play a role. I responded by saying that in my opinion, a ceasefire should be achieved first. No matter

why this war broke out, the damage being caused far outweighs the problems the war was intended to resolve.

The Chinese tend to take a broader perspective on world affairs. After its victory in the Cold War, the West has believed that “the winner takes all” and imposed its own system, ideology and values on other countries. Much of the current developments and events in many places around the world are reminiscent of the Cold War. The Cold War itself lasted for more than 40 years, and it ended over 20 years ago. However, it seems that it is still not yet over. It’s really a very much drawn-out ending.

Therefore, politically, many Chinese based on their own philosophy don’t agree with some of “international behaviors.” China has fulfilled its international responsibilities mainly within the framework of the United Nations. For example, China has contributed more UN peacekeeping troops than any other permanent members of the UN Security Council. Additionally, over the past five years, Chinese navy has escorted more than 5,600 commercial ships in the Gulf of Aden, half of them foreign.

China has played a key role in global poverty reduction, as so many Chinese people have come out of poverty through China’s rapid development. At the same time, it has provided preferential loans to African countries, forgiven debts of the least developed countries in Africa, helped build schools and train teachers, and increased scholarships to African students. Most importantly, China has become a major engine of world economic growth, contributing approximately one-third of global economic growth in the past few years. Based on its resources and philosophy, China will be able to provide growing international public goods in areas where it has expertise. Examples of this are the Silk Road Economic Belt and the

Maritime Silk Road Initiative which fit well with China's strengths and the needs of its neighbors.

1. Speech at the annual dinner of the HSBC Board of Directors on 17 September 2014.

China's Growth and the Debates on Orders 注

As the renowned architect Frank Lloyd Wright said, “Eventually I think Chicago will be the most beautiful great city left in the world.”

In China, Chicago is more famous for its university. This university is especially attractive to the Chinese parents who want to get their tuition's worth, as this is known as a place “where fun has come to die!”

A great many musicians, scientists and politicians were nurtured here, and I am sure some of you will one day join them. You have my best wishes.

I guess most of the students here were born after 1990. In China, we call people like you “90 hou,” meaning the post-90 generation. You all share one thing in common: you keep up with the latest in the world.

For my generation, by the time I first heard of an computer operating system called Windows, Bill Gates was already the richest man on earth. Now trendy Chinese wait on tenterhooks for every iPhone launch just like here. And “Fast & Furious 7” will be released in Beijing cinemas at about the same time as here in Chicago.

I hope I am not too idealistic in thinking that since so much information is shared among young people across the world, that this new generation will be more open and ready to understand each other. Then, isn't it possible to find a new way to build a global order capable of ensuring lasting peace?

When your President Obama spoke here on a Father's Day a few years ago, he said the most important thing for parents is to pass along the value of empathy: the ability to stand in somebody else's shoes and to look at the world through their eyes.

The first point of my speech today is about China's experience with the evolving world order. Dr. Kissinger's latest book *World Order* generated lots of discussion in China. It is absorbing to read about the 400 years since the Westphalia peace conference, and the wars and conflicts that have led to the shifting of power and the rise and fall of powers.

However, the book also pointed out that, the Westphalian system was not universal, but one of the many systems that existed in parallel. Obviously, they did not have the internet!

In China, a different system of governance, values, and traditions has been nurtured over our long history, which continues to influence us to this day. So, our view of the world may not be exactly the same. Let me pick up on a number of events from Chinese history during the evolution of the world order as Dr. Kissinger laid out.

You will probably remember that it was in 1648, Europe finalized the Westphalia Treaty to end the Thirty Years' War and established the early framework of a modern world order based on nation states, recognizing their sovereignty and self-determination in internal affairs. Then the European powers started colonizing the rest of the world, including America, and it was not until 1776 that the United States was able to free itself and declared independence.

During this period in Asia, a long and generally peaceful relationship had prevailed. China's Qing Dynasty was in its prime and up to the 18th

century, its population was greater than that of all the European countries combined. But this serenity which had lasted almost 2,000 years was broken when the European imperialists arrived in the middle of the 19th century.

By the time the Treaty of Versailles was signed in 1919, at the end of the World War One, most parts of Asia were colonized, and China's territorial integrity had been violated. By then, China's last emperor had abdicated. The attempt by the political elite to install a republic and Western style parliamentary system had failed, resulting in the country descending into chaos and conflicts, and the younger generation was looking for alternative solutions.

It was in this context that the CPC was formally founded in 1921 when the delegates of 1st National Congress of the CPC, no more than a few dozen were mostly in their late 20s, not much older than you! It is amazing how young people change the world!

Fast forward to 1941, when Henry Luce of *Time* Magazine stated the arrival of the "American Century," two thirds of China's territory had fallen under Japanese occupation. This occupation and war killed or wounded up to 35 million Chinese. In this September, China will host a major commemoration to mark the 70th anniversary of the victory in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression. We will remember the heroes, reflect on history and the value of peace. China and the United States fought against fascism on the same side, and we will never forget the heroic American pilots who helped China during the war.

When peace did come in 1949, and the People's Republic of China was founded, the economy was already on the brink of collapse, the average

life expectancy was under 35 years, and more than 90 % of the population were illiterate.

In other words, for many years following the end of the World War Two, when the two super powers of the US and USSR contested for world power and achieved what could be described as a balance of terror, China's main concern was its very survival, not least feeding its huge population. There were many setbacks along the way, and I still have vivid memories of hunger in my younger days.

In the late 1970s, China's relationship with the world turned a new page. The PRC restored its legal seat at the UN. The policy of reform and opening-up to the outside world led by Deng Xiaoping enabled China to reconnect with the world economy.

When Chinese talk about the international system, which we are committed to, we are referring to the international institutions and mechanisms centered on the UN. Learning from its painful history, China believes in the principles of equality among all nations and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries as enshrined in the UN Charter. Chinese President Xi Jinping, when attending the event marking the 60th anniversary of the Bandung Conference, reiterated the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.

The reason I took you on this brief journey was to illustrate that when discussing the world order, we should be mindful of our different experiences and how they have led to our different perspectives.

So, how should one look at China today? Now China has grown significantly. But, I have to say, knowledge and understanding of China in the outside world, especially in Western countries, has not quite kept up. A

European journalist and keen observer of China, summed up Western media reporting on China into three categories: First, China is incredibly big: with the biggest population, biggest cities and a big demand.

Second, China is very “bad”: Seemingly doing all the wrong things and not fitting into the norms.

Third, China is very “weird”: Eating weird stuff and having weird ways of doing things, such as grandma’s square-dancing (open-air fitness dancin) . So, one man’s meat is another man’s poison.

I often receive members of the US Congress, many making their first visits to China. What impresses them the most is their encounters with ordinary Chinese, such as the migrant workers they bumped into while visiting the Palace Museum or the young entrepreneurs whose ambition was to be the next Jack Ma of Alibaba.

The ordinary people represent the true face of China, and they are the real driving force that is enabling China to grow strong and successful.

So, what kind of future world order do Chinese want to be part of? Is the future destined to be a confrontation between China and the US for world power as some suggest?

I like reading memoirs by American politicians and I am fascinated by the depth of the US’s involvement in world affairs and its effectiveness. But, I am also puzzled about why the Americans would be so keen on involving itself in the affairs of other countries, sometimes without their consent or in an aggressive manner.

I can not help but wonder: is the prevalent understanding of world order among Americans, a world dominated by US rules and power? Is it only centered on American values and interests, and supported by US alliances? Does this mean that from a US perspective, rising powers only have two choices: to submit or to challenge? What would you do if you were in this situation?

China is one such rising power. It has grown largely by combining its natural advantages with the opportunities offered by globalization rather than “flag before trade.” The capital, markets, resources and talents that used to be concentrated in the Western world since industrialization, have now become available to the wider world, thanks to economic globalization.

Riding on the tide, China has made continuing policy reforms and achieved a 9% year-on-year growth rate for the last 30 years, allowing great improvements in people’s living standards, and enabling the country to grow into the world’s second-largest economy. It is now the largest trading partner for over 130 countries. It is even predicted that China will soon be the world’s biggest economy.

And yet, international academics found, to their disbelief, that most Chinese are disinterested in the debate about a new shift in world power.

Many Chinese are also often feeling annoyed by double standards at play. For example, if someone or some groups kill innocent people in Western countries, they are terrorists. Yet, similar crimes in China tend to be viewed by foreign observers as an ethnic or political issue. When China’s neighbors act provocatively on territory disputes with China, the US turns away. But when China defends its interests, it is described as either assertive or a bully.

If we can not even agree on some basic facts, how can we have a meaningful debate on the evolution of world order? In Guangdong, when people are talking at cross purposes, they are described as having a “dialogue between a chicken and a duck.”

China’s focus remains on addressing the many domestic challenges: Environmental pollution, fighting corruption, countering the economic slowdown and improving the livelihoods of its people.

On the question of what the future world order should look like, the discussions in China are more pragmatic. Although views still differ, one thing people do agree on is that the world has changed, and many old concepts have lost their relevance.

In today’s world, it is no longer possible to have different world orders existing independently of each other, as happened in earlier centuries. The orders of today need to open up and make adjustments to fit the new realities and allow differing perspectives.

Due to the interconnected nature of today’s world, it is no longer viable to achieve the transfer of power and find a new balance through wars among the major powers.

We are now facing new kinds of global issues, which do not respect the traditional order or sovereign borders. Look at Ebola. Look at ISIS. Look at the people trying to reach Europe from Africa by boat, there needs to be new thinking and a new global framework or global order, to cope with these new types of challenges.

The good news is that as we enter the 21st century, mankind is already working in an innovative and collaborative manner, through international

institutions like the G20, and the Conference on Climate Change, to tackle the challenges. For its part, China has initiated the land and maritime Silk Road programs to strengthen Asian and Eurasian ties and is setting up the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to support them. All these practices are complementary to the existing international systems and will help with its gradual evolution into a fairer and more inclusive structure.

Dr. Kissinger tellingly ended his book with a question: “Where do we go from here?” Obviously, history has come to a turning point. The question is, in which direction it will turn.

This question is also relevant to China and the US. Do we have the resolve and wisdom to avoid the old traps of power conflicts? And can we build a new type of relationship and global order through cooperation instead of confrontation? That is why Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed to US President Obama the building of the China-US “new model of major country relationship.”

Actually, in spite of the misunderstandings and stereotypes, China and the US already have a close partnership in many fields. We are even called reluctant twins. And the trust level is impressive too. Otherwise, how could we give each other 10-year visas? So what the younger generation is inheriting from our relationship is more positives than negatives.

To build a new model of relationship is an unprecedented endeavor for the two countries. We both understand the importance of strengthening cooperation, managing differences and creating a stable strategic framework for peace and development in Asia and the world. This path is the right direction for our relationship, and it is also our shared responsibility to make sure that we keep to it.

So, to end my speech, I want to say that evolving a global order for the 21st century will take time, and finding the right answers is not going to be easy. The world will count on the younger generation, and I am sure you will come up with good answers.

1. Address to the second session of US-China Forum of the University of Chicago on US-China Relations, on 20 May 2015. The full speech was published in Chinese on the websites of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC and of the China-United States Exchange Foundation, and has been widely quoted in the media.

China Needs to Better Communicate with the Outside World^注

Twenty Fifteen marks the 70th anniversary of the end of World War Two and is also the 101st year since the start of World War One. The world is again at a crossroads, and China is regarded as one of the most important factors driving the changes. There is now a new angle for China studies: To predict the future of China and the world based on analysing China's today.

With this in mind, the theme of this forum, China's Reform, Opportunities for the World, offers a very good opportunity. It sets out two important questions: How do we interpret the changes in China and their impact on the world and how will the world respond.

In today's discussions, many people referred to the proposed draft of the 13th five-year plan published by the 5th Plenum of the 18th CPC Central Committee. For the first time, China has laid out its national planning in relation to global economic development. The Belt and Road Initiative has been incorporated in the plan, which stresses the need for us to actively participate in global economic governance, advance infrastructure connectivity through the construction of major international trade routes and build a community with common interests. Key words of the 13th five-year plan include innovation, coordination, green development, openness and sharing, and highlighting the interdependence between China and the rest of the world. The world attaches great importance to the plan and regards it as an important indicator of China's development and world economic trends in the coming five years. This further reflects the mutual

influences between China and the world, which offers a new dimension when exploring China studies at home and abroad.

I recently read an article in the *Washington Post*, by former US Treasury Secretary Larry Summers. He criticized the world for lacking consensus about of China and for alternating between wanting to support or contain China. He does not think the US and the West are prepared for China's rise, and he questions whether China itself is prepared. When we met in Beijing in early November, he said while China asks for more say and more respect in international affairs, it still tends to stress that it is a developing country when it comes to many international affairs. He argued that China could not be a world power and evade international responsibilities at the same time. His opinions are highly representative of many Americans. The lack the knowledge and understanding of China's political positions and people's sentiments make them view China from their own angle and interests. When there are differences on specific issues, negative feelings are easily created, which then affect America's policy and views toward China. However, Chinese do also have difficulty fully understanding the policy thinking of the US and other Western countries. This sometimes results in the two sides having both agreements and differences on a number of major international issues.

For the Western world, China is like a new book. I have met many ordinary Americans, who on their first visit to China, often wonder at how different it is from what they have read and learnt. Obviously, in the Western world, sources of information and knowledge about China are still at best limited and often one-sided.

I think there are reasons on both sides for this phenomenon. Many people in the West refuse to let go of their pride and prejudices regarding

China, while some still hold ideological stereotype of us. They readily pre-judge China as “politically incorrect,” which makes it harder for them to understand the real China. Chinese on the other hand, also need to improve their communication skills when explaining Chinese narrative. This is not easy. Due to the huge linguistic and cultural differences, our international communication language is often distorted either by loaded western terms or by our traditional Chinese jargons, neither of which can successfully carry the right meaning.

Chinese system and culture are rather different from those of the West. But as we can see, they are not opposite to each other. To help communication, we need to be aware of the following:

First, our narrative should be established on the basis of Chinese system and its unique features. Take the National People’s Congress as an example. What China practices is democratic centralism, which is by nature the delegation of power. The people delegate state powers, which belong to them, to the deputies they elect. The people’s congresses at various levels play a critical and effective role in communicating and reflecting public opinions, and in guiding national decision-making and legislation. However, it is very difficult to automatically compare the National People’s Congress system with the parliamentary system of any other country. Such a comparison is neither accurate nor understandable.

As such, Chinese narrative must be based on its political reality and profound historical and cultural context. We have no need to conceal the fact that we face many difficulties and problems, and our system needs to be constantly improved. A full picture of China must contain both achievements and challenges.

Second, China should make good use of the available opportunities and gain its place and let its stronger voice be heard in the international system, while enhancing its capacities to fulfill its new role. We must study how to best contribute to peace and development in Asia and as well as in the world, which may include the provision of more public goods. Higher international status means greater responsibilities, so our commitment is to undertake these responsibilities in line with our country's rising international status.

Third, Chinese should move beyond the memories of the past sufferings. By adding optimism, confidence and broadening their expressions, and communicating China's strategic objectives and policy intentions more openly, they may find the world will be more receptive.

In the opinion of President Xi Jinping, China today is "unprecedentedly close to the center of the world stage and to the realization of great rejuvenation of Chinese nation" and it "has the unprecedented ability and confidence to achieve that objective." This self-image should be the basis of Chinese narrative.

The development and progress of China are there for all to see. In their speech today, many scholars argued with a large amount of data that indicated China is every inch a major global country. Many believe that we are a global power. As Dr. Kissinger said, China has been restored to its past glory and again possesses profound influence. But we are still beset by many difficult problems, and these have given rise to many ideas being exchanged today. A more accurate description is like this: you see both Europe and Africa in China at the same time. So the ongoing economic transition and upgrading is definitely an uphill battle.

And the biggest concern expressed by some is: Will such a large emerging world power bring instability or even war? This often asked question reminds us the need to broaden people's knowledge and understanding of China. Chinese narrative must, therefore, be to address the huge gap in Chinese-foreign perceptions. Supported by sound theories We need to use straightforward language and convincing fact to inform the world about China, including about who we are, what we are doing and what we want to achieve. Only by doing so can we gain better understanding and trust, and build a more peaceful and stable international environment for the realization of the "two centenary goals ."

In the past century, mankind has experienced two hot world wars, and one Cold War that lasted over 40 years. Now some people have started talking about new "cool war." The most ardent hope of Chinese and other peoples around the world is unquestionably a new century of peace and development. So, how do we achieve it; what can China do; what do we hope the world will do; and what does the world need China to do? These are all big questions that are worthy of a lot of discussions.

In conclusion, I believe that to build a complete and effective Chinese narrative is both a necessity and an important contemporary subject for China Studies.

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1. A speech given at the 6th World Forum on China Studies, 20 November 2015. Excerpts from the speech were published on the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences' forum website.

A Roadmap for Managing China's Rise 注

The speed of industrialization and modernization of a country the size of China is unprecedented in the world and will inevitably bring big changes, though some of the impacts are hard to predict. What kind of power will China become, and what role will it play globally? How should the existing international order and world structure adjust to the new changes?

We Chinese are not familiar with the discussions like this, but we can no longer shy away from them. The world is re-examining China, and China also needs to find its new identity in the world. As President Xi Jinping has said, “Today, we are closer than ever to the goal of national rejuvenation and more confident and capable than ever of realizing this goal. Our generation, having inherited this cause from our predecessors, must not only fight for today, but also carve out a better path for tomorrow.” These are the goals that define today's China.

For China, the first priority is to focus on its own path and follow through on the planned agenda. Over the years, at the center of China's policy there has been the firm belief that development is of paramount importance for the country. This is still true now and will remain so in the future. But as China achieved more in the rudimentary stage of its development, the people's expectation for further development have also increased. GDP growth is no longer considered the only goal; rather, higher-quality sustainable and balanced growth is being pursued. At the

same time, the society is demanding more equitable distribution of wealth and improved governance.

Currently, China's development is far from balanced, with new challenges and difficulties on the way. Therefore, it is essential that the government remains focused on promoting development and addressing the people's concerns.

Diplomatic policy extends from domestic affairs. China's foreign policy objective is therefore to cultivate a favorable and stable international environment, which will enable the country to realize its national objectives.

There is also a growing consensus in China that the country needs to take on more international responsibilities and make a greater contribution to world peace and development. To do so, the country and people need to prepare themselves by cultivating awareness and building capabilities as a major global player.

One of the key reasons that China has been successful over the past decades is that it has correctly identified and followed this trend. The main trend, as we believe, still favors the peaceful development of nations. Nevertheless, there are new changes in the world, and the factors affecting global trends are also changing. Due to the existence of nuclear deterrents, the major challenge to peace may not be a large-scale war among major countries. But, security challenges have become increasingly complex due to the spread of terrorism, as well as the emerging new type of hybrid warfare or "cool war" of military buildups.

The challenge we face is that, while the existing security mechanisms are also flawed and are incapable of meeting all the needs, it is hard to

create new synergy among them. At the same time, it is hard to gather enough agreement and support to establish a new system to manage global security. Take the UN peacekeeping mechanism for example, it is by far the best embodiment of common security interests, yet it is unable to cope with all security challenges facing the world. The US, which has the strongest defense capabilities in the world, insists that its military alliance system, should remain as the global security pillar. However, this alliance system is an exclusive circle. It is not able to accommodate the security interests of non-allies, nor to address today's many international security concerns.

As a matter of fact, some of the US's strategic miscalculations, notably the war in Iraq and the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, have instead aggravated security situation in the Middle East and North Africa. Given the new security environment, it is imperative for both the US and the newly rising countries like China to explore new paths. The recent China-US diplomatic and security dialogue was a step in the right direction. Such dialogues are evidence of the two countries' efforts in seeking coordination and collaboration on international security.

From a historical perspective, the rise of emerging powers is often accompanied by readjustments in the existing global structure. These readjustments inevitably come with a certain type of tension. The lesson of history is that conflicts may occur as a result of the way rising and established powers cope with the tension. To avoid this trap, China must strive to build a new model of peaceful development while promoting global cooperation.

President Xi Jinping has proposed building a new model of international relations featuring win-win cooperation. He has called on nations to forge a community with a shared future for mankind by

embracing a common development era, not least through the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative, which will revive the old Silk Road routes and bring together countries from across continents.

These propositions and initiatives highlight the idea of doing things together to benefit all and are at the heart of Chinese philosophy on world relations. They embody China's response to a changing world. They are not just slogans or self-interested ploys, but theoretical innovations in global affairs, well-conformed to the needs of our times. Naturally, difficulties will be encountered during the implementation of such major initiatives. Therefore, the ideas would have to be revised and improved along the way as unforeseen challenges arise.

China needs to constantly improve the way it interacts with the rest of the world. Former Prime Minister of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew foresaw that small and medium-sized countries, particularly in Asia, would one day face "bigger player in the history of the world" as China develops into a major power.

In recent years, our neighbors and other countries have been watching China's policies and actions closely. China is well aware that as it takes on greater global responsibilities, its initiatives must take into account the sensitivities of others who may be affected. We must promote mutual understanding and be conscious of their concerns and possible reactions.

When a country grows strong, it would need greater capability to persuade and gain support. Therefore, it should be able to understand others and maintaining good communication with the international community. To this end, we must review and improve our capabilities in diplomacy, international law, public opinion and economic affairs to prepare the country and people for more active participation in international affairs and

global governance. In such fast-changing times, it is imperative that China should stay modest and prudent, always be open to listening and learning from others.

We must draw a clear line to make sure that China's sovereign interests are well protected. On issues of common or shared interests, the approach of win-win cooperation is needed. What should China do when its interests may run up against those of few countries? And how should China defend itself in front of the international community? Stronger countries may find it easier to impose on others when dealing with differences, but how to manage the unavoidable consequences, will be the real test.

Above all, we need to avoid falling into the old trap of power confrontation. We should explain our views and positions patiently and persuasively, making it clear to the international community that we pose no threat beyond our own defense. History judges the success of a country not only by how it exercises power for its own ends but also by how it has promoted the common good.

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1. Speech at the dinner on the 6th World Peace Forum(WPF) on 24 June 2017, hosted by Tsinghua University. The original speech was titled "Peace and Sharing Makes the World a Better Place",and published on the official website of WPF, and the edited English version appeared in Huffington Po on 9 August 2017.

Other

In Memory of Ambassador Wu Jianmin 注

When news came on June 18th that Ambassador Wu Jianmin had passed away in an unfortunate car accident, I had a hard time accepting it. The following day, I went to pay my respects. When I arrived, Yan, the Ambassador's wife, was already at the door waiting for me. There she stood, thin but unfaltering. Her handshake was firm as usual. She was still the strong lady I knew. I stood there in disbelief, watching at Ambassador Wu's portrait on the wall with his signature soothing smile. The long narrow table placed under his portrait was covered by white callas. Then Yan murmured behind me, "I feel the door will open at any moment and he will just walk in." I was over whelmed by grieve.

I came to know Ambassador Wu through Yan. Back then, I was young and had just finished an overseas posting. I was placed in the English team of the Department of Translation and Interpretation, at China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where Yan was a senior translator. She took me under her wing and became one of my most important mentors. Starting the career late in life, I was somewhat laid-back by nature. The conscientious and serious person I became is largely attributable to Yan and her strict requirements. She worked on the careless side of my nature by applying stern and sometimes even harsh rules and pointing out every single mistake I made, no matter how small it was. I was afraid of her, but it was exactly because of that I learned to double or triple checked my work, and it became a valuable habit. Compared to Yan's strictness, the team members were fonder of Wu and his kind smile. He would come to pick Yan up at the

end of the day. We would laugh at him for being “a nanny,” but he did not seem to mind it at all and just smiled.

Working in foreign affairs as we were, language competence was important. Otherwise, overseas placements could be quite challenging. It was a common practice that when delegates went abroad, they would require translation assistance from the embassies. Wu majored in French, while Yan English. They both were already top translators, but Wu continued to learn English and became proficient in it. He once confessed that with English, he could be posted to an English-speaking country, where Yan’s expertise could also be put to use, unlike in French-speaking countries. My heart swelled when I heard this, as often, couples working in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were posted to different countries as their expertises were in different languages. Wu’s efforts ensured that he and Yan could always be placed together.

Now that they were separated by his unexpected death, words failed me as I sat there with Yan. I felt that nothing I said could offer her much comfort. She was still confused about the accident and did not believe the speculation that Wu was not wearing his seat-belt, as she knew for certain that he always did. Yan was right. While we were sitting in her apartment, a phone call came from Wuhan confirming that Ambassador Wu was wearing his seat-belt when the accident happened, but they still needed to carry out further investigations to fully identify the cause.

I came back from Yan’s home with a heavy heart. Ambassador Wu’s passing drew a strong reaction across different sectors of society. I came to realize how much he had done over the years to engage with the general public, which was valuable but unusual among us. There were disapproving

voices, too. In frustration, Li, who went with me to visit Yan, asked for my opinions on the mixed online comments.

Throughout the years, I followed with interest Ambassador Wu's public speeches and learned much from them. His dialectical method of viewing the relationship between China and the world, both historical and contemporary, was enlightening. He held that China needs to not only remember the times in history where it suffered from invasion and bullying as a result of falling behind, but also draw lessons from the time when it refused to open up and reform. Wu's debate with people holding different views also left me wondering what foreign affairs meant to Chinese public. Not many countries are like China where the people are generally interested in and even enthusiastic about the government's foreign policies and affairs. This may be due to a number of factors, a mixture of China's historical baggage, particularly in the modern period, and the positive changes that have come with recent development and progress. Contemporary Chinese foreign affairs began with the fight to abolish unequal treaties. This has made China's foreign policy not just about national interests but also an emotional topic, tinged also with self-pity and occasional helplessness.

Ambassador Wu, an experienced diplomat, had a profound understanding of China's foreign policies. He was a trooper on the frontline. Whatever the pressure or however complicated the situations he was facing, Wu could keep a cool head and move forward. I enjoyed many of our discussions, as he had the habit of listening and the ability to analyze that enabled him to quickly see the entire picture when given just a few pieces, even in areas outside of his expertise. Once I was visiting France when Wu was Ambassador there. Interested in the situation in the Asian region which fell into my area of work, he asked about the then ongoing China-ASEAN Free Trade Area negotiations, including China's intentions, policy

considerations and view of their prospects. Based on his observation of the EU's integration, Wu reminded me of the need to grasp the opportunities which the growth in regional integration brought for China.

It was quite evident that Ambassador Wu respected his opponents during debates, and he was always well prepared and took his opponents seriously. From my observations, Wu clearly had a deep understanding of the foreign policies China has upheld over the past 38 years of reform and opening up, which enabled him to interpret and articulate the policies clearly. His views were solid and sound, based on China's proven track record in its foreign relations over the past few decades. Nonetheless, the heated discussions that have emerged also show that people have new expectations and want to know how to build on the past. Had this tragic accident not happened, there would have been more time for all involved to call upon his great knowledge and expertise to delve deeper into this debate, which is exactly what China needs.

Foreign policies are aimed at serving the country's most important objectives. Now as China becomes the second largest economy, both the Chinese people's understanding of the country's role in the world and the world's expectations of China have changed greatly. China has been playing a more active role in international affairs in recent years, and in doing so is gaining greater recognition on the world stage. I was therefore not entirely surprised to find during my conversations with foreign visitors that they were focusing on questions regarding how China would reshape its relationship with the world and define its future global role. Indeed, China needs to go beyond its past foreign policy successes by further broadening its horizons and updating its vision and thinking. Compared with the modernization process of the developed countries, China's progress in the past 38 years of reform and opening up could be characterized as

“condensed,” with China making the leap from poverty to the second largest economy at an unprecedented pace. Yet, the process of changing the people’s mind and mode of thinking cannot be condensed the same way. How to adapt our thinking to the fast developments of our time is a big challenge that is confronting the academic community. I do hope Ambassador Wu’s thinking and the issues he highlighted in the debates he engaged in will be his legacy, as they will help us to understand China’s diplomacy and foreign policy thinking as well as practices better and, in doing so, enable us to cultivate a greater awareness of the need to work with the world in building a community with a shared future for mankind.

1. Published in The Interpreters’ Journal, 20 June 201

Afterword

In his speech to the opening of the Bo'ao Forum for Asia on 10 April, 2018, Chinese President Xi Jinping highlighted that the world is undergoing a new round of major development with great changes and profound readjustments, and humanity faces many uncertainties. He called on us to maintain a good vision for the direction of the world while keeping the history on mind, and never allow our views to be clouded.

China is moving towards the center of the world stage, to a place that has never been unoccupied. "Old scripts" have been played and replayed on the world stage, yet the stories are not always beautiful. From the self-destructive Peloponnesian War in ancient times to the two world wars that brought huge sufferings to mankind in modern times, not to mention the "Cold War," the drama of power struggles has been at the center of the world's history.

In China, war and peace inevitably played their part in history too. When the Peloponnesian War was staged 2,400 years ago, China was in its "Spring and Autumn" and "Warring States" Periods, which witnessed over 500 years of turbulence, as strong states vied for control. This historical legacy has led the Chinese people to cherish peace and maintain stability, rather than obsess over war. Confucius advocated that "Harmony is most precious," and "Caution should be exercised in warfare." Mencius believed that "While a just cause enjoys abundant support, an unjust one ends up otherwise." Even Sun Tzu, a master of warfare, believed that the best strategy was to "Defeat without fighting."

“A contented people living in a peaceful country” has been the ideal state for the Chinese people. However, China was unable to defend and protect itself for a long period of time in the last two centuries when confronted with foreign invasion and occupation ,and it had to give up some of its sovereign rights to foreign powers under humiliating terms. The lessons have been profound, and the Chinese people yearn for their country to be strong and prosperous. They know only too well that peace can only be protected by strength.

Today, we are in a new era of building socialism with Chinese characteristics. Under the leadership of the CPC and its Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core, the Chinese people are joining effort to make greater achievements. While we are still on an uphill journey and there is a long way to go before we realize the modernization goals, China needs to concentrate on domestic development for years to come. People in China are increasingly aware of the impact their country’s growth has on the world and its need to assume greater responsibilities. China must quickly adapt to its new status and learn to effectively and persuasively explain its views and intentions to the world.

The world stage needs a “new script.” Should the new problems be addressed with old methods, or should we find new solutions? The choice we make will also affect the future. The vision of “building a community with a shared future for mankind,” put forward by President Xi Jinping will prove to be a better choice for the 21st century and our children’s future.

Events and issues are still evolving. The future of the world will ultimately depend on the younger generations. Hopefully, they will be able to transcend the traditional thinking that led to great powers contending for

supremacy, and find a new way for nations to get along peacefully. Let's keep hope for the future.

Abbreviations and Acronyms

ADB	Asian Development Bank
ADIZ	Air Defense Identification Zone
ADMM	ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting
AIIB	Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BFA	Boao Forum for Asia
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative, namely, the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21 st Century Maritime Silk Road Initiative
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CICA	Conference on Interaction and Confidence-

	Building Measures in Asia
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CLCS	the UN commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
CNN	Cable News Network
COC	China-ASEAN Code of Conduct in South China Sea
CPC	Communist Party of China
DOC	China-ASEAN Declaration on Conduct in the South China Sea
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EAS	East Asia Summit
EEZ	200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone
EU	European Union
G20	Group of 20
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISIS	Islamic State
KEDO	Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization
MSC	Munich Security Conference
NAMRIA	National Mapping and Resource Information Authority of the Philippine
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPC	National People's Congress of China, China's Top Legislature
NDT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

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Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

PRC	People's Republic of China
RCEP	Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
ReCAAP ISC	Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia Information Sharing Center
RMB	Renminbi
ROK	Republic of Korea
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SHADE	Shared Awareness and De-confliction
THAAD	Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
The US-Philippines 2+2 meeting	The US-Philippines Foreign Minister and Defense Minister "2+2" Consultation
TPP	Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement
TTIP	Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
UN	United Nations
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
US	United States
USCNO	US Chief of Naval Operations
USIA	United States Information Agency
USNS	United States Naval Ship
USS	United States Ship
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
10+1	ASEAN Plus China
10+2	ASEAN Plus China, Japan and ROK

